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AN END OF TERM EXAM: OCTOBER TERM 2003
AT THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES
Peter Bowman Rutledge' and Nicole L. Angarella"
Law reviews enjoy a rich tradition of publishing scholarship that
analyzes the activities at the Supreme Court of the United States.' Some
journals publish scholarship or host symposia on the Court's
jurisprudence in a particular area.' Others adopt the "Dragnet"
approach and provide "just the facts" about a particular year's docket.
Some employ a "macro-economic" approach and identify various trends
in the docket and the justices' voting and opinion-writing patterns.3 Yet
others seek to blend the various approaches.
The Catholic University Law Review is ideally positioned to contribute
to this rich tradition. From its vantage point in the Nation's capital, the
Law School is privy to the developments at the Court. The Law School
has regularly hosted a variety of guests active at the Court, ranging from
* Assistant Professor of Law, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
This Article is an adaptation of speeches that I previously delivered to the Board of
Visitors of the Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law and the D.C.
Chapter of the Law School's alumni association. I would like to thank Dean William F.
Fox of the Columbus School of Law for supporting this research through the Dean's
Research Grant program. Holly Kuebler and Katherine Plemmons provided excellent
research assistance. Steve Young, one of the Law School's reference librarians, provided
invaluable support tracking down sources. In the interest of full disclosure, I worked
closely with counsel for the respondent in Missouri v. Seibert and participated in moot
courts for counsel for respondent in Rumsfeld v. Padilla and United States v. Banks.
- J.D. Candidate, May 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law.
1. Some examples of this scholarship include Harvard Law Review's November
issues, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2002 Term, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2003), Touro Law
Review's fall issues, e.g., Symposium, The Fourteenth Annual Supreme Court Review, 19
ToURo L. REV. 1 (2002), Tulsa Law Review's fall issues, e.g., Symposium, 2000-2001
Supreme Court Review, 37 TuLSA L. REV. 1 (2001), the Cato Institute's Supreme Court
Review, e.g., Symposium, The Constitution at War, 2003-2004 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 23, and
other Supreme Court updates, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Supreme Court Update, 31 N.M.
L. REV. 31 (2001).
2. See Joel Gora, First Amendment Decisions-2002 Term, 20 TOURO L. REV. 251,
251-52 (2003) (focusing on First amendment decisions from the prior Term); Marla E.
Mansfield, By the Dawn's Early Light: The Administrative State Still Stands After the 2000
Term (Commerce Clause, Delegation, and Takings), 37 TuLSA. L. REV. 205, 205-07 (2001)
(focusing on environmental law).
3. E.g., The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 306,
543 tbl. I(C)-(D) (2001) [hereinafter 2000 Leading Cases] (illustrating patterns of voting
between the different justices).
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Supreme Court justices, to employees in the Clerk's office, to seasoned
Supreme Court advocates. Finally, the Law Review has a strong
tradition of publishing scholarship about the Supreme Court.
In light of this special role played by The Catholic University of
America, Columbus School of Law and its Law Review, it is a great
honor to be able to contribute to this tradition of scholarship. The goal
of this Essay is to provide a resource of digestible proportions that any
Court watcher (judge, lawyer, professor, student) can use to inform
himself or herself about current developments at the Court. While the
Essay discusses how the current Term compares to past ones, it does not
do so simply as an exercise in dry social science. Instead, it highlights
those trends of interest to both the scholar and the practitioner.
Likewise, while the Essay discusses particular cases, it does not simply
summarize facts and holdings. Instead, it places those doctrinal
developments in a larger context, analyzes them, and critiques them.
This Essay proceeds in two parts. The first part provides the broad
overview of October Term 2003. It analyzes current statistics in the size
and composition of the Court's caseload and compares those figures to
past terms. It also considers the justices' voting patterns and which
justices proved to be the "swing" votes, both generally and in particular
fields. The second part focuses on the key cases of the Term. It
addresses both what the Court decided and what it failed to decide. It
critiques those decisions and considers their implications for future
doctrinal developments. The Court Consensus offers some closing
lessons to be drawn from the Term.
I. MACRO-ECONOMIC TRENDS
This Section proceeds in two parts. First, it considers the Court's
docket and compares it to prior years. Second, it analyzes the current
and historical voting patterns among the justices.
A. Docket
The first noteworthy trend in this year's docket is the Court's lean diet
of cases. This Term, the Court decided seventy-three cases after
argument.' This figure tracks the steady reduction in the Court's
4. See David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second World
War, 1941-1946, 37 CATH. L. REV 1 (1987), Stephen M. Shapiro, Oral Argument in the
Supreme Court of the United States, 33 CATH. L. REV. 529 (1984), and Mark Villaneuva,
Note, Hill v. Colorado: The Supreme Court's Deviation from Traditional First Amendment
Jurisprudence to Silence the Message of Abortion Protestors, 51 CATH. L. REV. 317 (2001),
for examples of Catholic University Law Review articles evaluating the Supreme Court.
5. See infra app. 1.
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caseload that Court-watchers have witnessed over the past decade. As a
point of comparison, in October Term 1992, the Court decided 107 cases
after argument7 -a nearly thirty percent decline in cases decided after
argument. This Term, however, equals the nadir in the Court's docket in
October Term 2002, when the Court decided a mere seventy-three cases
after argument.8 Data on the number of cases decided after argument
appears in Appendix 1.
A second noteworthy trend in this year's docket is the source of cases
for the Court's docket, summarized at Appendix 2.9 Cases from the
Ninth Circuit made up nearly one-third of the Court's argument docket
this Term.'0 This was the largest by several multiples; the Sixth Circuit
came in a distant second, contributing a mere nine cases to the Court's
docket." The number of cases from the Ninth Circuit exceeded, also by
several multiples, the Court's entire certiorari docket from the fifty state
supreme courts. This figure is consistent with the data for the prior six
terms, which are summarized at Appendix 3.1. In each of those terms,
the Ninth Circuit supplied, by far, the largest percentage of cases on the
Court's docket. 1
4
Noteworthy about this year's figure, however, is the sheer number of
cases. The twenty-five cases decided on certiorari from the Ninth Circuit
this year represents the largest number in the last several terms.' 5 While
the Ninth Circuit contributed a comparably large number of cases last
term (and a higher percentage relative to the size of the docket), one sees
a growing trend in the size of the Court's docket consisting of Ninth
Circuit cases."' By contrast, prior to October Term 2002, the Ninth
Circuit was contributing anywhere from ten cases on the low end to
eighteen cases on the high end. 7
6. See infra app. 1. For the history of the Court's calendar, see Margaret
Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, The Calendar of the Justices: How the Supreme
Court's Timing Affects Its Decisionmaking, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 183, 185-203 (2004), WL 36
AZSLJ 183.
7. See infra app. 1.
8. See infra app. 1.
9. See infra app. 2.
10. See infra app. 2.
11. See infra app. 2.
12. See infra app. 2.
13. See infra app. 3.
14. See infra app. 3.
15. Compare infra app. 2 (illustrating Ninth Circuit statistics for the current Term),
with infra app. 3 (illustrating Ninth Circuit statistics for previous terms).
16. Compare infra app. 2, with infra app. 3.
17. See infra app. 3.
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If the Ninth Circuit was the frequent filer, then several other circuits
were nary to be seen in the Court this year. Remarkably, the Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit contributed no cases to the Court's docket
this year (typically, one or two federal appellate courts contribute no
cases to the Court's docket).8 With the exception of the Fifth and Sixth
Circuits, most other courts contributed on average approximately three
to four cases to the Court's docket, a low average relative to prior years
with the exception of October Term 2002.19
Not only was the Ninth Circuit king of the docket generally, it also led
the way in reversals. 21 Of the twenty-five cases coming from the Ninth
Circuit, the Court reversed a whopping nineteen." This too is more than
double the absolute number of reversals for the next highest court (the
Sixth Circuit with seven reversals).22 While the Ninth Circuit reigned
supreme in absolute numbers, it also had the highest number of
affirmances (six)-again several multiples higher than any other court
(no doubt, however, due to the number of its cases headed to the
Supreme Court). 23 As a consequence, the Ninth Circuit had a relatively
low reversal rate of seventy-six percent 4 This actually represents a slight
improvement for the Ninth Circuit which, in prior terms, has had reversal
rates as high as ninety percent. 21 Several other courts had higher reversal
rates this term, including the Second, Fifth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C.
26Circuits with 100% reversal rates. By contrast, the Fourth and the
Seventh Circuits fared best, with only a single reversal earlier this Term.27
This is consistent with their performance in prior terms, as summarized
in Appendix 3."'
A third noteworthy trend in this year's docket is the type of case that
the Court took. By several multiples, the Court took more criminal cases
than any other category. 21 Of the seventy-five cases decided after
argument, twenty-five qualify as criminal.30 The next largest categories
were international (eight), environmental (six), and First Amendment
18. See infra app. 2.
19. See infra app. 2 (current Term); infra app. 3 (prior terms).
20. See infra app. 2.
21. See infra app. 2.
22. See infra app. 2.
23. See infra app. 2.
24. See infra app. 2.
25. See infra app. 3
26. See infra app. 2.
27. See infra app. 2.
28. See infra app. 3.
29. See infra app. 4 (categorizing the Court's cases for the 2003 Term and illustrating
the number of criminal cases).
30. See infra app. 4.
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(five).31 Admittedly, the categorization is a subjective one. Lumping all
"criminal" cases together arguably overstates their size on the docket.
One might equally argue that the appropriate reference point should be
the number of "civil" cases, in which case they surely would outstrip the
sheer number of criminal cases. Appendix 4 breaks down the docket by
category.32
But even if the criminal cases were broken down further, the Court
clearly demonstrates a penchant for them. For example, the Court took
33six Fourth Amendment cases this year. It also took, again depending on
the methodology, three or four cases that required it to develop
significant law in the Miranda doctrine.34 Thus, however one slices them,
criminal cases clearly constituted a significant share of the Court's
caseload this Term.
B. Voting
When one moves from the docket to voting patterns, several results
are striking. For one thing, despite the high publicity given to the Court's
closely divided rulings on contested matters, the Court continues to
display a remarkable harmony and unanimity. The Court decided
eighteen cases unanimously on topics ranging from Fourth Amendment
law to sovereign immunity law.35 It also decided an additional sixteen
cases by a 9-0 vote (distinct from unanimous cases by one or more
justices writing a separate concurrence). 36 In both absolute and relative
terms, this marks a slight decline over cases decided without a split vote.37
By contrast, last term (when the docket was smaller), the Court decided• - 38
thirty cases unanimously and five more by a 9-0 vote on the disposition.
As unanimity on the Court fell over last year, the number of closely
divided cases grew in absolute terms.39 This Term, the Court decided
31. See infra app. 4.
32. See infra app. 4.
33. See infra app. 4 (showing the number of Fourth Amendment cases in the criminal
category).
34. See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2603 (2004); United States v. Patane, 124
S. Ct. 2620, 2622 (2004); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2144 (2004); Fellers v.
United States, 124 S. Ct. 1019, 1020-21 (2004).
35. See infra app. 4 (referencing the breakdown of votes for each decision in the 2003
Term).
36. See infra app. 4 (listing the cases decided by a 9-0 vote).
37. The Supreme Court, 2002 Term- Leading Cases, 117 HARV. L. REV. 226, 484 tbl.
I(C) (2003) [hereinafter 2002 Leading Cases],
38. Id.
39. Compare infra app. 4 (showing 5-4 decisions for the current Term), with Charles
Lane, Courting O'Connor; Why the Chief Justice Isn't the Chief Justice, WASH. POST, July
4, 2004, at W10 (stating the number of 5-4 decisions in the previous Term).
2004]
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seventeen cases by a 5-4 vote. a0  By contrast, the Court decided a mere
fourteen cases by a 5-4 vote last year.4' In absolute terms, the data reflect
a short-term increase in the number of close cases over last year, but this
year's figure simply brings the Court into line with the pattern during the
October Terms 1999-2001 when the number of 5-4 decisions hovered in
42the high-teens to mid-twenties. In relative terms, this year's figure
actually represents a slight decline in the number of 5-4 cases as a
percentage of the docket, seventy-three percent.43 One need go back to
October Term 1997 and preceding terms to find a time when the number
of 5-4 cases comprised such a low percentage of the Court's docket."
Of particular note in the 5-4 decisions are the voting alliances. The
media regularly reports on the "conservative bloc" consisting of Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas.45 As in prior years, the bloc was by far the dominant one in 5-4
46decisions. It was the controlling majority in eight cases, a slight uptick
from last term but lower than the several preceding terms a7 The next
most powerful coalition in 5-4 cases consisted of the so-called liberal bloc
(Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) joined by Justice O'Connor,
which held sway six times.4 8 In total there were five different alliances
this term in 5-4 cases. This marks a decline over prior terms when the
number of different alliances in 5-4 cases varied from a low of six to a
high of nine. 9
As the foregoing data suggest, certain justices are most and least likely
to be in the majority in close cases. Justice O'Connor continued to be
the swing vote in close cases.50 In fact, in the 5-4 cases before the Court,
she joined the majority in all but four." This is consistent with past
40. See infra app. 4.
41. See 2002 Leading Cases, supra note 37, at 485 tbl. (I)(E).
42. The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 390, 395 tbl.
I(E) (2000) (showing comparable statistics for the 1999 Term) [hereinafter 1999 Leading
Cases]; 2000 Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 544 tbl. I(E) (illustrating the breakdown of 5-
4 decisions for the 2000 Term).
43. See infra app. 4.
44. The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Statistics, 112 HARV. L. REV. 122, 371 tbl. I(E)
[hereinafter 1997 Leading Cases] (1998).
45. E.g., Lane, supra note 39.
46. See 2002 Leading Cases, supra note 37, at 485 tbl. I(E).
47. 2000 Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 544 tbl. I(E); 2002 Leading Cases, supra note
37, at 485 tbl. I(E).
48. See Lane, supra note 39; cf infra app. 5.
49. The Supreme Court, 1994 Term- Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 135, 343 tbl.
I(D) (1995) [hereinafter 1994 Leading Cases]; The Supreme Court, 1998 Term -Leading
Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 200, 405 tbl. I(E) (1999) [hereinafter 1998 Leading Cases].
50. See Lane, supra note 39.
51. Marcia Coyle, Flexing Muscle and Wisdom, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 2, 2004, at 51.
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terms. In fact, for every term since October Term 1998, Justice
O'Connor was most frequently in the majority in 5-4 decisions53
(interestingly, for the five terms preceding October Term 1998, Justice
Kennedy held this honor every term).54  While Justice O'Connor was
most frequently in the majority in 5-4 cases, Justice Breyer was least
frequently in the majority in such cases this Term, an honor he has held
three terms previously since he joined the Court.55
Voting patterns across the range of cases, not limited to 5-4 decisions,
reflect a similar trend. Justice O'Connor led her brethren in being in the
majority most frequently in cases this Term-joining the Court sixty-six
times. 56 Unlike her dominance in 5-4 cases, Justice O'Connor has not
consistently held this honor across the entire docket historically. 57 In
prior terms, both Justice Kennedy and, surprisingly, the Chief Justice
have held (or shared) the honor of most frequently joining the majority
• -- 58
or agreeing in the disposition. On the other end of the spectrum,
Justice Scalia was least frequently in the majority-joining the Court
only fifty-six times.5 9 In the past several terms, Justice Stevens generally
has held this title, though Justices Scalia and Thomas occasionally have
held it as well. 6°
Another interesting cut at the data is to consider voting affinities
between the justices (the rate at which they agree on the disposition in
the case), summarized in Appendix 5. Some affinities track popular
reporting-the most common alliances are Scalia-Thomas and Souter-
61Ginsburg. In each case, the bloc voted together 90.3% of the time-a
slight upswing for the Scalia-Thomas bloc but consistent with prior years
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REV. 139, 371
tbl. I(E); 1994 Leading Cases, supra note 49, at 405 tbis. I(C)-(D); The Supreme Court,
1995 Term-Leading Cases, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 370 tbl. I(D); The Supreme Court,
1996 Term -Leading Cases, 197, 434 tbl. I(D); 1997 Leading Cases, supra note 44.
55. See 1998 Leading Cases, supra note 49, at 434 bl. I(E); 1999 Leading Cases, supra
note 42; 2000 Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 544 tbl. I(E). In the 2000 Term, Justice
Stevens shared this honor with Justice Breyer. Id.
56. See generally infra app. 4.
57. See 2000 Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 394 tbis. I(C)-(D); 2002 Leading Cases,
supra note 37, at 484 tbls. I(C)-(D).
58, See 2000 Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 394 tbls. I(C)-(D) (Justice Kennedy);
2002 Leading Cases, supra note 37, at 484 tbis. I(C)-(D) (Justice Rehnquist).
59. See generally infra app. 4.
60. See 1997 Leading Cases, supra note 44, at 370 tbls. I(C)-(D) (Justice Scalia); 2000
Leading Cases, supra note 3, at 394 tbls. I(C)-(D) (Justice Stevens); 2002 Leading Cases,
supra note 37, at 484 tbls. I(C)-(D) (Justice Thomas).
61. See infra app. 5.
2004]
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for the Souter-Ginsburg bloc. 2  Other data, however, reveal some
surprising and less well-known affinities. For example, this Term,
Justices O'Connor and Breyer represented the next highest affinity
(89.9%)63 followed by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy
(89.0%). 64 The O'Connor-Breyer bloc represents an important break
from past terms (where they tended to vote together 70-75% of the
time). 5 The Rehnquist-Kennedy bloc has been a more consistent one,
though their affinity this Term is one of the highest in the past decades
(only in October Term 2000 and October Term 1997 did they vote
together more frequently).'
On the other side of the scale, certain blocs of justices voted together
least frequently. This Term, the most unlikely alliance was a Stevens-
Scalia bloc. 67 These two justices only agreed in the disposition 55.6% of
the time.(8  Other low-affinity rates include Thomas-Breyer (59.2 %),69
Scalia-Breyer (60.0%),70 and Stevens-Thomas (60.3%). 7' This is
consistent with past terms where Justice Thomas has had low affinities
with Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer and where Justice Breyer has
had a low affinity with Justice Scalia as well.
72
Finally, as an original contribution to the scholarship, we also
considered voting affinities across various topic matters of cases to see
whether the general alliances revealed any more subtle trends.
Appendix 6 summarizes the results. For example, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas agreed in the disposition
of every criminal case this term except one (Blakely).73 The justices
displayed a great deal of harmony in several areas of criminal law
(Fourth Amendment and Sixth Amendment), but deep divides showed
in others (Fifth Amendment and death penalty).74
Similar interesting alliances emerged in the civil area. For example,
two blocs of justices formed around the disposition of First Amendment
62. See infra app. 5.
63. See infra app. 5.
64. See infra app. 5.
65. See, e.g., 2002 Leading Cases, supra note 37, at 481 tNl. I(B1).
66. See 1998 Leading Cases, supra note 49, at 367 tbl. I(B1); 2000 Leading Cases,
supra note 3, at 540 tbl. I(B1).
67. See infra app. 5.
68. See infra app. 5.
69. See infra app. 5.
70. See infra app. 5.
71. See infra app. 5.
72. See 1998 Leading Cases, supra note 49, at 367 tbl. I(B1); 2002 Leading Cases,
supra note 37, at 484 tbl. I(B1).
73. See infra app. 6.
74. See infra app. 6.
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cases, Rehnquist-O'Connor-Breyer and Stevens-Souter-Ginsburg,
allowing Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas to be the swing votes.75
Each of these blocs voted together 100% of the time in the disposition of
First Amendment cases.76  Sovereign immunity cases departed
interestingly from prior terms-with Justice O'Connor voting with the
Seminole Tribe v. Florida" dissenters in all of the sovereign immunity
cases this Term. 7 In the environmental area, two interesting blocs
emerged as well, Rehnquist-Scalia-Kennedy-Thomas and Stevens-
Ginsburg-Breyer, each of which agreed in the disposition in 100% of the
cases-allowing Justices Ginsburg and Souter to be the swing votes.79
The Court appeared to divide into three blocs in civil procedure cases, a
Rehnquist-Kennedy bloc, a Scalia-Thomas bloc and a Stevens-Souter-
Ginsburg-Breyer bloc-setting the stage for Justice O'Connor to be the
swing vote."'
One of the most interesting cuts at the topical alliances came in the
international area. This area covered a wide swath of cases, ranging from
the enemy combatant cases to the Alien Tort Statute cases.81 Here, the
two strongest blocs were Rehnquist-Kennedy-Thomas and Stevens-
. 82
Souter-Ginsburg. This meant that, for a party to prevail, they had to
pick up two votes from among the O'Connor-Scalia-Breyer cluster. The
results in the international cases, as described below, generally bear out
this trend.
This Section has reviewed both the docket and the voting alliances
along various axes. The next Section focuses the microscope on the
particular cases before the Court.
I. MICRO-ECONOMIC TRENDS
This Section summarizes and critiques the major decisions from the
Term. It begins with the criminal cases then works to the civil ones.
75. See infra app. 6.
76. See infra app. 6.
77. 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996).
78. See infra app. 6.
79. See infra app. 6.
80. See infra app. 6.
81. See infra app. 4.
82. See infra app. 6.
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Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure
Fourth Amendment
Thornton v. United States
Thornton v. United States 3 finally provided the Supreme Court a
vehicle by which to address a lingering question about the search incident
to arrest doctrine-namely, does the Belton rule (allowing warrantless
suspicionless searches of the passenger compartment of an automobile in
connection with a valid arrest)m-apply in cases where the first contact
between a defendant and law enforcement officials occurs after the
defendant has left the vehicle."5
In Thornton's case, a Norfolk police officer observed him driving
erratically and, after running the tags on Thornton's car, ascertained that
they had been issued to a car other than the one that Thornton was
driving. 6 Before the officer could pull him over, a perhaps crafty
Thornton pulled into a parking lot and exited the automobile s0 After
obtaining Thornton's consent, the officer patted him down and
discovered what later proved to be illegal narcotics8 The officer then
handcuffed petitioner, informed him that he was under arrest, placed him
in his cruiser, searched Thornton's car, and discovered a handgun under
the driver's seat."' At his trial on drug and firearms charges, the district
court denied Thornton's motion to suppress the firearm, and the Fourth
Circuit affirmed.90
In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court affirmed
but divided badly on the reasoning." In order to appreciate the Supreme
Court's opinion, it is important to understand the parties' arguments.
Thornton's counsel, the able Frank Dunham, Federal Public Defender
for the Eastern District of Virginia (and a CUA alum), argued for the
"contact initiation rule"-which would limit Belton to cases where the
83. 124 S. Ct. 2127 (2004).
84. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,460 (1981).
85. Thornton, 124 S. Ct. at 2129. In two prior cases, the Court had granted certiorari
to resolve this question but disposed of the case before reaching the merits. Arizona v.
Gant, 124 S. Ct. 461 (2003) (mem.) (remanding for reconsideration in light of intervening
decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Dean, 76 P.3d 429 (Ariz. 2003)); Florida
v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774, 776 (2001) (dismissing for lack of jurisdiction).
86. Thornton, 124 S. Ct. at 2129.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 2129-30.
91. Compare id. at 2132 n.4, with id. at 2133 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
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officer had initiated contact with the suspect while he was still in the car.
In contrast, the United States argued that Belton extended to
"occupants" and "recent occupants" of automobiles, the latter category
being defined by the recent occupant's "temporal" and "spatial"
relationship to the automobile.93
The five justices in the majority (Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Breyer) rejected Thornton's argument but did not quite
embrace the Government's position. 4 The majority held that Thornton's
"contact initiation" rule was untenable because it forced police officers
to "gamble" that the suspect might destroy evidence or threaten their
safety and because it severely undermined the bright line value of
Belton., But the majority did not embrace the Government's attempt to
abstract criteria for how close a "recent occupant" must be to an
automobile for the Belton rule to apply.96  Instead, the majority
concluded, somewhat unhelpfully, that "[s]o long as an arrestee is the
sort of 'recent occupant' of a vehicle such as petitioner was here, officers
may search that vehicle incident to the arrest. 9 7 In other words, the
Belton rule extends to "recent occupants" in the same shoes as Thornton
but not necessarily to anyone else. Therefore, the Belton rule extends
beyond occupants at the time of contact, but the majority opinion leaves
unclear how far this extends.
While Thornton's precise holding might be narrowly construed, the
reader should not be deceived about what was (and remains) at stake in
these cases. The three separate opinions make this far clearer. In her
concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed with the Chief Justice but
expressed misgivings about the "state of the law" under Belton.9' While
disinclined to show her hand, Justice O'Connor clearly signaled her
willingness to reconsider Belton in the proper case. She declined to do so
here, only because, according to her, the parties had not briefed the
issue.9
92. Brief for Petitioner at 29-30, 35, Thornton (No. 03-5165). Dunham argued in the
alternative that the Court should limit the Belton rule to those defendants who are within
"reaching distance" of the automobile. Id. at 35. The majority declined to address this
alternative rule, finding it beyond the scope of the question presented in the petition for a
writ of certiorari. Thornton, 124 S. Ct. at 2132 n.2.
93. Brief for the United States at 5-6, 9, 14, Thornton (No. 03-5165).
94. Thornton, 124 S. Ct. at 2132-33.
95. Id. at 2131.
96. Id. at 2132.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 2133 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
99. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part).
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Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment
and took a far bolder approach.' Unphased by technical arguments
about what was within the scope of the certiorari petition, the erstwhile
D.C. Circuit judges and occasional opera singers were prepared to
jettison the Belton rule in its entirety.' °1 In their view, the underlying
safety rationale for Belton was indefensible, and the cases had strayed far
from the history that underpinned searches of this sort.1° In place of
Belton's bright line rule, these Justices proposed limiting the doctrine "to
cases where it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of
arrest might be found in the vehicle." °10 3  Despite articulating a new
standard, Justices Scalia and Ginsburg concurred in the judgment
because in their view, under this new standard, it was reasonable for the
Norfolk officer to believe that evidence relevant to Thornton's crime of
arrest (narcotics possession) might be found in the vehicle."4
Finally, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, dissented.105  The
dissent hewed to the view previously expressed by Justice Stevens that
the Belton rule should be narrowly construed to apply to searching the
passenger compartment of an automobile where the suspects are arrested
while in the automobile.'ta Justice Stevens previously expressed his
disagreement to extend Belton to searches of closed containers in the
automobile. 07 He found the majority's rule in this case yet a further
expansion of Belton, unmoored from its narrow origins and sure to
trigger a "massive broadening" of rules permitting warrantless searches
of automobiles.1"
Thornton warrants two observations. First, the Court went out of its
way to construe the question presented narrowly in order to avoid a host
of legal issues that, as Justice Scalia accurately observed, were fairly
subsumed within that question.0  Second, though the judgment
nominally represented a victory for the Government, close readers will
100. Id. at 2133-34, 2137-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
101. Id. at 2137-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
102. Id. at 2135 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. Id. at 2137 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
104. Id. at 2137-38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
105. Id. at 2138 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 2138-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id, at 2140 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. The Court rephrased the question presented, although their definition more
closely resembled the petitioner's. The petitioner asked whether Belton authorizes a
warrantless search of a car when the arrestee was not in the car when the police initiated
contact. Brief for Petitioner at 1, Thornton (No. 03-5165). The Court instead considered
whether Belton applies when the officer makes first contact with the arrestee after the
arrestee has stepped out of the vehicle. Thornton, 124 S. Ct. at 2129.
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realize that the opinions send a shot across the Government's bow about
its use (and possible abuse) of the Belton rule. While four justices
(Rehnquist, Kennedy, Thomas, and Breyer) appear willing to maintain
the Belton rule,"" two justices (Scalia and Ginsburg) have declared their
willingness to overrule it,"' a third (O'Connor) has expressed doubts
about it," and two others (Stevens and Souter) have been more
circumspect on the issue but have clearly shown concern about untoward
expansions of it."3  That lineup demonstrates that five votes are
potentially there to overrule or at least trim Belton in the proper case.
Illinois v. Lidster
Illinois v. Lidster"4 represents the Supreme Court's latest foray into the
constitutionality of police roadblocks and, more generally, the
constitutionality of warrantless, suspicionless searches."5  Lidster
involved a roadblock set up to investigate the vehicular homicide of a
bicyclist on an Illinois highway." 6  One week after the accident, at
approximately the same time of day when it occurred, police set up the
highway checkpoint specifically to obtain additional information about
the accident."7 As cars approached the roadblock, officers would ask the
occupants if they had seen anything happen the preceding weekend and
handed them a flyer seeking information about the accident." 8 Each
encounter took only ten to fifteen seconds."9 As Lidster approached the
roadblock, he swerved and almost hit one of the officers. ° An officer
sensed alcohol on Lidster's breath, directed Lidster to a side street, and
later arrested him after he failed a field sobriety test.' 2' At his trial for
charges of driving under the influence of alcohol, Lidster challenged the
constitutionality of his arrest, claiming that the roadblock violated his
Fourth Amendment rights. 22 The trial court rejected his challenge, but
the Illinois Court of Appeals and Illinois Supreme Court disagreed and
held that the roadblock violated the Fourth Amendment.2 3 In support of
110. Id. at 2128-29.
111. Id. at 2135, 2137-38.
112. Id. at 2133.
113. Id. at 2138, 2140.
114. 124 S. Ct. 885 (2004).
115. Id. at 888-89.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
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its conclusion, the Illinois Supreme Court relied heavily on the U.S.
Supreme Court's 2000 decision, Indianapolis v. Edmond,14 which
invalidated a police roadblock designed to control crime."'
In an opinion by Justice Breyer, the Supreme Court reversed and held
that the Fourth Amendment did not prohibit carefully designed
roadblocks created to obtain evidence of a specific crime. 2 Speaking for
a unanimous Court, Justice Breyer distinguished Edmond on the ground
that the primary purpose of the checkpoint here, unlike in Edmond, was
not law enforcement but, instead, to obtain information about a crime
committed by others.127 Having distinguished Edmond, the Court then
relied on several factors to explain why the investigative roadblock was
not unconstitutional -it involved automobiles, it did not direct suspicion
at the individuals stopped, the stops were brief, they were akin to
voluntary encounters which the Supreme Court regularly has approved,
citizens can (and often want to) assist criminal investigations, and
community pressure will inhibit undue proliferation of such
checkpoints.128  Six justices (Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Thomas, and Breyer) went on to hold that, applying these factors, the
roadblock in this case was reasonable.
129
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, concurred in
part and dissented in part.30 These three fully shared the majority's view
on Edmond and on the factors governing the reasonableness of the
roadblock here."' Yet rather than apply that test to the facts, they
preferred to remand the case to the Illinois appellate courts. 132 In the
dissenters' view, there might be situations where the intrusiveness of the
roadblock was great or its efficaciousness questionable.'33 The dissent
also felt there were lingering questions in the record about whether the
timing of the roadblock was truly calibrated to garner information about
the accident (implying that the accident might simply be a ruse to
conduct the more general crime control stop barred by Edmond).3 4
Lidster provides an important bookend to Edmond in the Fourth
Amendment doctrine governing police roadblocks. Law enforcement
124. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
125. Id. at 44.
126. Lidster, 124 S. Ct. at 890-91.
127. Id. at 888-89.
128. Id. at 889-90.
129. Id. at 887, 890-91.
130. Id. at 891 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
131. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. Id. at 891-92 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
134. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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can justify an investigatory roadblock, when it is tailored to the
investigation of a specific crime and involves a minimal intrusion. Yet, in
two respects, Lidster seems to beg more questions than it resolves. First,
as the dissent implies, Lidster seems to open the door for police,
particularly in urban or high-crime areas, to use the investigative
roadblock as a ruse for more general crime control)35 Provided that the
location and timing of the roadblock can be plausibly tied to the
investigation of an unsolved crime, law enforcement may be able to
accomplish by another means the crime control ends that Edmond
proscribes. Second, and more generally, Lidster is noteworthy as yet
another example where the Court has been willing to bless warrantless,
suspicionless searches and seizures by law enforcement under the
administrative search and special needs doctrines.3 6  Even if the
roadblock serves a non-law enforcement purpose, it ultimately is being
conducted by law enforcement personnel, who obviously have a crime
control function in addition to their investigative one. As the facts of
Lidster demonstrate, it is unrealistic to expect law enforcement personnel
to shed that crime control function when they are performing the
investigative one. Thus, it is with a bit of "a wink and a nod" when the
Court (and law enforcement) claim that the roadblock simply serves non-
law-enforcement purposes. If that really were true, it would be
conducted by personnel who lack a law enforcement and crime control
function or the fruits of any roadblock should be inadmissible. To
sanction investigative roadblocks and similar seizures by law
enforcement personnel, the Court (and law enforcement) must continue
to navigate the uncomfortable waters between prohibited and permitted
roadblocks.
United States v. Banks
Poor Lashawn Lowell Banks probably wishes that he had taken that
shower a little earlier than two in the afternoon. While Banks was
showering, federal and local law enforcement officers were outside his
apartment, executing a warrant to search for cocaine.1 3' They called out
"police search warrant" and knocked hard on the front door, but Banks
did not hear them. 3 8 After approximately fifteen to twenty seconds,
police officers broke the door open, entered Banks's apartment and
135. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
136. Id. at 889-91; see also Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543
(1976).
137. United States v. Banks, 124 S. Ct. 521, 523 (2003).
138. Id.
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subsequently found drugs and weapons. 39 During his trial on federal
firearms and drug charges, Banks sought to suppress the evidence on the
ground that the officers' manner of executing the search violated the
Fourth Amendment and 18 U.S.C. § 3109.140 The district court rejected
Banks's motion, but a divided Ninth Circuit reversed. 41  The majority
articulated a non-exhaustive list of factors governing how long police
must wait after knocking and announcing their presence.4  The majority
also developed a four-part framework under which the reasonableness of
the entry depended on whether exigent circumstances existed and
whether the entry involved the destruction of property) 43
In an opinion by Justice Souter, a unanimous Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit.' 44 The Court began by reviewing the general rules governing the
execution of search warrants, its tradition of case-by-case development of
the law in this area, the ordinary need to knock and announce presence,
and the exigent circumstances justifying exceptions to the knock and
announce rule. Building on this review, the Court then concluded that,
while the case was "close," the fifteen to twenty second wait was
reasonable in this case, particularly in light of the risk that Banks might
be destroying cocaine.146 Finally, the Court charted a middle road with
139. Id.
140. Id. The statute provides:
The officer may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or
any part of a house, or anything therein, to execute a search warrant, if, after
notice of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance or when necessary
to liberate himself or a person aiding him in the execution of a warrant.
18 U.S.C. § 3109 (2000).
141. Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 523-24.
142. United States v. Banks, 282 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 124 S. Ct. 521
(2003). Factors include:
(a) size of the residence; (b) location of the residence; (c) location of the officers
in relation to the main living or sleeping areas of the residence; (d) time of day;
(e) nature of the suspected offense; (f) evidence demonstrating the suspect's
guilt; (g) suspect's prior convictions and, if any, the type of offense for which he
was convicted; and (h) any other observations triggering the senses of the officers
that reasonably would lead on to believe that immediate entry was necessary.
Id.
143. Id. The four categories are used to aid in the determination of reasonableness.
The court categorizes entries as either forced or non-forced, and then determines
reasonableness in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the execution of
the warrant. Id.
144. Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 522-23.
145. Id. at 524-25. In Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), the Supreme Court held
that the knock-and-announce rule forms part of the reasonableness inquiry under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 929.
146. Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 526. The Court, however, signaled no retreat from its holding
in Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385 (1997), that the Fourth Amendment does not create
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respect to the destruction of property-it rejected the Government's
argument that such a fact is irrelevant to the reasonableness inquiry but
also rejected the Ninth Circuit's four-part framework.47
Banks is surely both a victory and a loss for the Government. On the
one hand, the Government had an easy time persuading the Court to
dismantle the Ninth Circuit's cumbersome framework and multi-factored
test for evaluating the reasonableness of an entry. On the other hand,
the case dealt the Government a setback in two respects. First, the
decision undoubtedly will invite litigation over whether the police waited
a sufficient period of time to justify their destruction of property in the
course of entering a residence. One can expect the decision to support
some attempts to suppress evidence lawfully seized pursuant to a warrant
simply because the police did not choose the least "intrusive" means of
executing the search. Second, and perhaps more importantly, the Court
accepted, without any dissent or much reflection, that the time police
wait before entering a residence, after knocking and announcing, forms
part of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry. To be sure,
the Supreme Court did not go so far as to impose a requirement that a
resident actively or constructively "refuse" entry before law enforcement
may forcibly enter a residence in executing a warrant.1 49  But the Court
clearly left open the possibility that, under other circumstances, an
insufficient wait might render the execution of a search "unreasonable"
and thereby, potentially, require suppression of evidence otherwise
lawfully obtained.1 50 In other words, had police acted the same way in
the course of executing a warrant to recover a stolen piano, or had they
waited less than fifteen seconds in this case, their conduct might have
violated the Fourth Amendment. As with its views on the destruction of
property, the Court's decision, while attempting to balance the parties'
respective interests, creates a fertile field for future litigation.
Groh v. Ramirez
Groh v. Ramirez5' is a complex case involving the intersection of
Fourth Amendment law, the good faith exception of United States v.
a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce rule in the case of searches for narcotics.
Id. at 387-88.
147. Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 528-29. The Court collapsed its analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 3109
with its analysis of the Fourth Amendment issues. Id.; United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S.
65, 73 (1998).
148. Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 524-26.
149. Id. at 527-29. For an article forcefully defending this position, see Tracey Maclin,
Let Sleeping Dogs Lie: Why the Supreme Court Should Leave Fourth Amendment History
Unabridged, 82 B.U. L. REV. 895 (2002).
150. Banks, 124 S. Ct. at 526, 528.
151. 124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004).
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Leon,152 and principles of qualified immunity. 153 In Groh, federal officials
applied for a warrant to search Ramirez's ranch for firearms, explosives,
and records.'5 4 While the warrant application specified these items, the
warrant itself did not.'55 Instead, it simply described Ramirez's house in
the section describing the "person or property" to be seized. 56 When
federal and local officials executed the warrant, they brought the warrant
but only orally described the items sought (the details of the conversation
are disputed). 7 Officers found none of the items specified in the
accompanying affidavit.'58 Based on the lack of particularity in the
warrant itself, Ramirez then filed a civil rights action under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents159 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
officers and alleged that their conduct violated, inter alia, the Fourth
Amendment."6  The district court granted summary judgment to the
defendants, but the Ninth Circuit reversed on the Fourth Amendment
claim .1  The Court of Appeals held that the officer was not entitled to
qualified immunity on that claim. 62 In its view, a reasonable officer
would know that the warrant was facially invalid because it failed to
specify the items to be seized with sufficient particularity.'63
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, a closely divided Supreme Court
affirmed and held that the officers violated the Fourth Amendment and
were not entitled to qualified immunity. 164 On the Fourth Amendment
violation, the majority held that the warrant was "plainly invalid" due to
the insufficiently particular description of the items to be seized. The
Court intimated that a search warrant could cross-reference other
documents but found that rule unhelpful to the officers' case; it also held
that the alleged oral description of the items to be seized was not a
constitutionally adequate substitute for specificity in the warrant or a
cross-referenced document. 166 As a consequence, the warrant was "so
152. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
153. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1287.
154. Id. at 1287-88.
155. Id. at 1288.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
160. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1288-89.
161. Id. at 1289.
162. Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1028 (9th Cir. 2002), affd
sub nom. Groh v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1284 (2004).
163. Id.
164. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1287, 1293.
165. Id. at 1289.
166. Id. at 1289-90.
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obviously deficient" that the search amounted to a warrantless one."'
The Court rejected petitioner's argument that the officers heeded the
purposes of the particularity requirement because they limited their
search to those items specified in the application. 68 On the qualified
immunity point, the Court held that, because the Fourth Amendment
specifies the particularity requirement, and the Court has held that a
warrantless search of a home violates the Fourth Amendment,
6 9
petitioners violated clearly established law and no reasonable officer
would have relied on the facially invalid warrant.
1 7
Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented.'7'
Justice Kennedy agreed with the majority that the officers had violated
the Fourth Amendment. 172  However, he parted company on the
qualified immunity question. 73 In Justice Kennedy's view, the majority's
rejection of the officers' qualified immunity defense had not allowed
sufficient latitude for reasonable mistakes by law enforcement who must
make difficult decisions in the heat of an investigation. 114 Here, the
officers had committed a simple clerical error-they had failed to
reproduce the description of the property, accurately described in the
affidavit, in the warrant itself.
7
Justice Thomas, joined in full by Justice Scalia and in part by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, also dissented."' Justice Thomas began by
highlighting the Court's unsatisfactory attempts to harmonize the Fourth
Amendment's "unreasonable search" clause and its Warrant Clause and
noted that the Court had lurched between reading the Fourth
Amendment to require warrants and reading it to require reasonable
searches simpliciter.' 7 After articulating that principle, Justice Thomas
chided the majority for collapsing the inquiry about the warrant's validity
into the inquiry about the search's reasonableness.'78 To support his
167. Id. at 1290.
168. Id. at 1291-92.
169. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,576 (1980).
170. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1293; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (holding that whether petitioner is entitled to qualified
immunity depends on whether the right transgressed was clearly established in that it
would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful given the
circumstances).
171. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
173. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 1295-97 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1295 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 1298 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
177. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1298-99 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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conclusion that the search was reasonable, Justice Thomas reviewed the
careful steps taken by the petitioner-briefing the search team and
providing them a copy of the warrant and affidavit, reviewing the
warrant's terms, conducting their search within the scope of what the
magistrate had authorized, leaving a copy of the warrant and responding
to the later request for a copy of the application.17 9 Finally, Justice
Thomas believed that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity-
both because no decision clearly established that their conduct was
unconstitutional and because petitioner reasonably could believe that the
search warrant was objectively reasonable. 8°
Groh might seem like a narrow decision. Rare will be the search
warrant containing such an administrative error and rarer still the lawsuit
following a fruitless search pursuant to such a warrant. However, Groh
has potentially broad implications for search warrant practice, the good
faith exception, and the exclusionary rule. Two points bear emphasis.
First, the majority makes the bold assertion that the warrant was so
deficient that the search must be treated as "warrantless...... This holding
opens the door for future defendants to claim that certain police
conduct-whether searches or arrests-must be treated as warrantless
despite the fact that the officers have in fact obtained a warrant and
confined the scope of their conduct to that sought in the warrant
application. Second, the majority narrows the scope of Leon's good faith
exception.18 2 At one point, the majority, citing a footnote from Leon,
asserts that it would not have been reasonable "for petitioner to rely on a
warrant that was so patently defective, even if the Magistrate was aware
of the deficiency."' 83 The majority's citation, however, is quite curious.
The cited footnote discusses the illegality of the search and expressly
refers to the warrant application as part of the good faith inquiry.
While Leon did hold that it might be unreasonable for officers to rely on
a warrant that, on its face, was not sufficiently particular,85 the footnote
cited by the majority suggests that Leon did not contemplate a case such
as Groh. 6  Instead, Leon more likely contemplated a case where,
throughout the application process, the officers had sought permission to
conduct a general search of some place. By holding that the officers'
conduct here fell under one of the Leon exceptions, the majority narrows
179. Id. at 1303 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1301-03 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 1290.
182. See id. at 1297-98 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1292 n.4.
184. Id.
185. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
186. Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1292 n.4.
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the scope of the good faith exception to focus on the facial validity of the
warrant rather than on the objective reasonableness of the police in light
of all the circumstances, including the application.
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court's presented constitutional
challenges to Nevada's "stop and identify statute.' ',8  Under that statute,
a law enforcement officer who has grounds to effect a Terry stop may
require the stopped individual to identify himself.'9 In Hiibel's case, a
Nevada Deputy Sheriff indisputably had "reasonable suspicion" to stop
Hiibel.' 9  Despite the sheriff's repeated requests, however, Hiibel
refused to identify himself.'9' Hiibel was prosecuted for violating the
statute and challenged its constitutionality. 9' Following his conviction,
the Nevada appellate courts rejected the constitutional challenge.9
When it reached the Supreme Court, the case presented the question
whether Nevada's law violated either the Fourth or the Fifth
Amendment.1
94
Upholding Hiibel's conviction in an opinion by Justice Kennedy, a
closely divided Supreme Court held that Nevada's statute violated
neither Amendment.' 95  On the Fourth Amendment question, the
majority noted that "stop and identify" statutes had a rich tradition in the
Nation's history of vagrancy laws. 96 After canvassing its prior case law,
the Court quickly concluded that the Fourth Amendment did not bar a
police officer, pursuant to a valid Terry stop, from demanding that a
suspect identify himself."" The Court reasoned that requiring a suspect
to answer the request and punishing him for failing to do so, represented
only a mild intrusion on the suspect's Fourth Amendment interests and
was closely related to the strong governmental interests justifying the
stop.'9 In reaching this conclusion, the Court disavowed Justice White's
187. 124 S. Ct. 2451 (2004).
188. NEV. REV. STAT. 171.123 (2003).
189. Id. Nevada's "stop and identify law" provides that the "officer may detain the
person pursuant to this section only to ascertain his identity and the suspicious
circumstances surrounding his presence abroad. Any person so detained shall identify
himself, but may not be compelled to answer any other inquiry of any peace officer." Id.
190. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2457.
191. Id. at 2455.
192. Id. at 2455-56.
193. Id. at 2456.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2457, 2460.
196. Id. at 2457.
197. Id. at 2458.
198. Id. at 2459.
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opinion in Terry and dicta in another case which had suggested that the
Fourth Amendment did not require the suspect to answer a police
officer's request during a Terry stop.'99 On the Fifth Amendment
question, the Court concluded that disclosing one's identity ordinarily
did not violate the Fifth Amendment because it was not incriminating.9
In the Court's view, a mere name rarely furnished a link in the chain of
evidence needed to prosecute; this was certainly true in Hiibel's case-
Hiibel could not show how his identity could be used to incriminate
him.2' However, the Court left open the possibility that, in some rare
case, a name could furnish a link in the chain and, therefore, might
require a different rule. This case, however, did not require the Court
to reach that question. °3
Justice Stevens dissented on the Fifth Amendment issue.00 In his view,
the majority overlooked the fact that the statute was tailored to apply
only to suspects in Terry stops, and therefore it followed virtually as a
matter of logic that their names might provide a link in an incrimination
chain . In Justice Stevens's view, identification fell within the core Fifth
Amendment protection, for not only was it incriminating, but it also was
compelled (in light of the stop) and testimonial (in light of its
responsiveness to police questioning). 2°  Finally, Justice Stevens
criticized the majority for overlooking the vast array of investigative
tools (such as databases) available to officers once they know a suspect's
identity.0 7
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, dissented on
the Fourth Amendment issue.2° ' They urged the Court to adopt the
understanding expressed by Justice White in his Terry concurrence-that
the Fourth Amendment allows a police officer to request that a suspect
209identify himself, but does not require the suspect to respond.
According to the dissent, this view, even if never formally adopted by the
Court in a holding, had assumed a fixed place in the Court's
jurisprudence and thus should be accepted as an authoritative statement
199. Id. at 2459-60 see also Berkemer v. McCarthy, 468 U.S. 420, 439 (1984); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (White, J., concurring).
200. Hiibel, 124 S. Ct. at 2460-61.
201. Id. at 2461.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 2461-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 2462-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 2465 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
209. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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of law. In the dissent's view, good reasons supported this legal rule
because it established a bright line on the permissible scope of the police-
citizen encounter.1  Opening the door to require identification
permitted too many imponderables and sent the Court down the dreaded
slippery slope where it would have to decide whether further requests
(such as a license number or place of residence) was permissible.2 2
This case represented a significant victory for law enforcement.
Reversal might seriously have hampered officers' ability to effect any
investigation during the course of a Terry stop. Moreover, some have
suggested that this decision opens the door for possible future laws
mandating national identity cards.1 3 But this suggestion quickly stumbles
over the majority's reasoning that the statute in Hiibel required
reasonable suspicion before law enforcement could request suspects to
identify themselves. However, the close margin suggests that efforts to
expand the scope of stop-and-identify statutes must proceed with caution
in order not to run afoul of the Constitution. Requiring information
beyond identification runs the risk of losing a swing vote. The decision
cries out for a future case to bookend the decision in a situation where
the identification itself might be incriminating, such as when the suspect
is being stopped on suspicion of impersonating an officer or being a
fugitive. One wonders why the majority did not join issue more
forcefully with the dissent over how identification fits into police
databases and other information that may be learned oncc the suspect's
identity is known. One suspects that the majority did not have a great
answer and, therefore, its reliance on history (plus the threshold
requirement of reasonable suspicion) allowed it to sidestep those
concerns.
Fifth Amendment
Yarborough v. Alvarado
Given its procedural posture, Yarborough v. Alvarado'1 should have
been a very easy case. It arose after the Ninth Circuit granted a writ of
habeas corpus following a state court conviction despite the deferential
standards of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA).1 5 The facts were these: Alavarado was seventeen and a half
210. See id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
211. Id. at 2465-66 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting); see Anne M. Coughlin, Simple Question, Big
Implications, WASH. POST, March 28, 2004, at B5.
213. See Coughlin, supra note 212.
214. 124 S. Ct. 2140 (2004).
215. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act provides that
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years old.216 A Los Angeles police officer contacted Alvarado's mother
and asked her if she wouldn't mind bringing him to the station so they
could ask him some questions in connection with a homicide
investigation. 21' The mother agreed and, accompanied by her husband,
took Alvarado to the station.2 '  The officer asked Alvarado to
accompany him to another room and, over the course of the next two
hours, interrogated him about the homicide.2 9 Central to the case, the
officer never read Alvarado his Miranda rights.22' At first, Alvarado
denied any knowledge of or involvement in the homicide.221 Pressed by
the officer, Alvarado eventually changed his story and implicated himself
as a coconspirator to the shooter.222 Twice during the interview, the
officer asked Alvarado if he needed a break.23 Following its completion,
Alvarado returned home with his parents.2
A few months later, Alvarado was charged in California state court
with murder and attempted robbery.225 Alvarado sought to suppress his
confession on the ground that the officer interrogated him in violation of
Miranda.22' The trial court denied the motion and, following his
conviction, the California Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that
227Alvarado was not in custody. On federal post conviction review,
Alvarado reraised his Miranda claim. 228 The federal district court denied
it, but a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed.22' Applying
AEDPA, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the California appellate
court's conclusion that Alvarado was not in custody was an unreasonable
(d) [a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with
respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court
proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
216. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. at 2144-45.
217. Id. at 2145.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id at 2145-46.
223. Id. at 2146.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 2146-47.
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application of federal law clearly established by the Supreme Court.230
Critical to the Ninth Circuit's analysis was the fact that the California
appellate court had failed to consider Alvarado's age in its determination
about whether Alvarado was in custody during the police interview.23
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, a closely divided Supreme Court
reversed and held that the California appellate court's conclusion
regarding custody was not objectively unreasonable.232 After reviewing
the deferential standard set out by AEDPA and its prior case law
governing the "in custody" determination for Miranda 3 the Court
weighed several factors to consider whether Alvarado was in custody.
Several factors supported a conclusion that Alvarado was not in custody.
Officers did not take Alvarado to the station, they did not threaten him,
his parents waited in the lobby, the interrogating officer encouraged
Alvarado to tell the truth, Alvarado twice was offered a break, and
Alvarado went home at the end of the interview.
Other factors supported the contrary conclusion.236 The interview
lasted two hours, the officer did not tell Alvarado he was free to leave,
Alvarado's parents brought him to the interview, and Alvarado's parents
allegedly were barred from attending the interview.237 In light of these
conflicting factors, the California appellate court's custody determination
was not unreasonable. 23' The majority went further, however, and also
concluded that the California appellate court's failure to consider
Alvarado's age was not unreasonable." In the majority's view, the
custody determination focuses on objective factors known to the police,
unlike other tests which might focus on the suspect's condition (like the
voluntariness test).2 40  A suspect's age or personal experience, in the
Court's view, did not qualify as the type of objective factor that police
could know (or could be expected to know) and would run contrary to
230. Id. at 2147.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 2149.
233. Framing the determination of custody for Miranda purposes in Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995), the Court asks whether a reasonable person in the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation "would have felt he or she was not at liberty
to terminate the interrogation and leave." Id. at 112.
234. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. at 2149-50.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2150.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2151.
240. Id. at 2151-52.
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one of Miranda's purposes -namely, providing clear rules guiding police
interrogations and their Miranda obligations.241
Justice O'Connor filed a brief concurring opinion.242 She fully joined
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion and held that, given how close
Alvarado was to the age of majority, his age was irrelevant to the custody
determination. 4 ' But she left the door open for a different result in cases
of younger defendants. 24 In such cases, a younger defendant might be
more likely to feel not free to leave and, therefore, her age might be1 45
relevant to the custody determination.
In a blistering dissent, Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg) castigated the majority both for its implausible
custody analysis and its "objective reasonableness" test for custody
determinations.246  The dissent reminded the majority that
"reasonableness" tests (civil negligence, criminal mens rea, etc.) involve
247
a blended subjective/objective inquiry. Certainly a person below the
age of majority, who lacks total liberty, feels less free to leave a situation
than an adult.2 48 Many of the factors cited by the majority to support the
conclusion that Alvarado was not in custody broke down on closer
examination. For example, the fact that he went home at the end of the
interview had no probative value as to whether he felt free to leave the
249interview in the first place. Finally, even accepting the majority's test,
Justice Breyer asserted how it easily led to the conclusion that Alvarado
was in fact in custody.2 °
Alvarado represents a very important development in Miranda
doctrine. Two points bear emphasis. First, prior to Alvarado, the Court
had struggled to generate more concrete guidance about the meaning ofSt. 251
"custody" for purposes of Miranda. Apart from obvious cases like
arrests (custody) and routine traffic stops (no custody), the Court had
generally offered loose standards, such as whether a reasonable person
would feel free to terminate the interview and leave, without glossing
what "reasonable" meant and how one determined whether, in fact, a
241. Id. at 2151 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
242. Id. at 2152 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
243. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
244. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
245. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
246. Id. at 2152-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 2155 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
248. Id. at 2154 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
249. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
250. Id. at 2155-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
251. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99 (1995); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S.
318 (1994); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S.
1121 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
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reasonable person would feel free to leave.252 Alvarado clarifies that
reasonable generally means "objectively reasonable" and that one
considers freedom to leave by looking at the various factors that the
majority itself utilized in applying its test to the facts of the case.253
Second, Justice O'Connor's opinion leaves the door open for defense
counsel to argue that subjective considerations should sometimes factor
into the custody inquiry.9 The most obvious example suggested by
Justice O'Connor's opinion would be a ten-year-old suspect, perhaps
because the suspect's immaturity is so obvious to the police that certain
inferences about whether the suspect feels free to leave naturally flow
from that fact. 25' But Justice O'Connor's concurrence is not so confined.
What about a suspect who does not speak English particularly well or
who clearly comes from a culture that is more deferential to authority?
Such facts may be equally obvious to the police as a suspect's extreme
immaturity, and Justice O'Connor's separate opinion, by providing, once
again, the crucial fifth vote, leaves many of these questions hanging. Had
she simply joined the majority, the law regarding custody would have
256been much clearer. But her separate writing here, as in other areas,
ensures constant litigation in the future over the precise state of the law.
Missouri v. Seibert
Miranda v. Arizona157 requires police officers to provide certain
familiar warnings prior to any custodial interrogation. Missouri v.
Seibert 59 presented the question about the proper remedy when police
officers deliberately withhold Miranda warnings at the outset of the
interrogation, only give them when they have extracted a confession
from the suspect, and then, during this second stage, refer back to
statements made during the pre-Miranda interrogation.6 The Missouri
Supreme Court held that, under these circumstances, this deliberate end-
run around Miranda required exclusion of the confession.261  It
distinguished this case from mere "technical" and unintentional
252. See cases cited supra note 251.
253. Alvarado, 124 S. Ct. 2149-50.
254. Id. at 2152.
255. See id.
256. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276-80 (2003) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 292-97 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Peguero v. United States, 526 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1999)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
257. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
258. Id.
259. 124 S. Ct. 2601 (2004).
260. Id. at 2605.
261. Id. at 2606.
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violations of Miranda which, under Oregon v. Elstad,262 do not require
exclusion of post-Miranda statements provided that both the statements
263
and the Miranda waiver are voluntary.
A badly divided Supreme Court affirmed. Writing for the Court's
plurality, Justice Souter (joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer) first noted that this practice of interrogating "outside Miranda"
had become increasingly common since Elstad.64 Next, the plurality
explained that this practice had the effect of depriving the Miranda
warnings of much value if the warnings were given only after the suspect
had confessed. The plurality crafted an "objective" test under which
the admissibility of the confession turned on whether the objective
circumstances revealed that the timing or manner of administering the
warnings deprived them of their functional value. 266 Applying that test,
the Court concluded that in this case, a variety of circumstances
warranted the confession's exclusion. These circumstances included the
same officer conducting both stages of the interrogation, allowing no
break in the interrogation before the warnings were given, the second
stage of the interrogation referring back to statements made by the
suspect in the first stage, and the interrogation taking place at a police
267 ostationhouse . Each of these facts, moreover, distinguished this case
from Elstad.266
211Justice Breyer filed a brief concurrence 9. In it, he argued that the
Court should simply employ the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis that
it had developed for some other violations of constitutional rights but,
heretofore, had declined to adopt in the Miranda context.21
Justice Kennedy concurred only in the judgment.27' While he agreed
that the confession had to be excluded in this case, he adopted a different
test from the plurality's. Unlike the plurality, Justice Kennedy placed
273greater weight on the deliberateness of the misconduct. In Justice
Kennedy's view, the confession should be excluded when it is the product
of a deliberate withholding of Miranda rights, when the post-Miranda
262. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
263. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2606-07.
264. Id. at 2608-09 (plurality opinion).
265. Id. at 2609-10 (plurality opinion).
266. Id. at 2610-11 (plurality opinion).
267. Id. at 2612-13 (plurality opinion).
268. Id. at 2612 (plurality opinion).
269. Id. at 2613-14 (Breyer, J., concurring).
270. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring); see Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S, 298 (1985); Wong Sun
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
271. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. at 2614-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
272. Id. at 2614 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
273. Id. at 2615 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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interrogation referred to statements made in the pre-Miranda phase, and
when officers have not taken corrective action, such as notifying suspects
that their pre-Miranda statements are inadmissible as proof of guilt.
274
Justice O'Connor (joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and
Thomas) dissented 75 She accused the majority of "devour[ing]" Elstad
276through its new exclusionary rule. In her view, Elstad rejected the
fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, and the majority was, in effect,
adopting a variation on it through excluding the confession here.277 She
would have analyzed the confession's admissibility under Elstad's
voluntariness framework. She also noted that some facts cut in favor of
279
a finding of involuntariness in this case.
Seibert demonstrates that Miranda issues will continue to divide the
Court despite the so-called "d~tente" announced several terms ago in
Dickerson v. United States."' While some believed that Dickerson finally
settled Miranda's constitutional status, others foresaw that Dickerson1 81
merely set the stage for more battles over Miranda's meaning. Much
like the Court's splintered decision two terms ago in Chavez v.
Martinez the divisions in Seibert demonstrate that this latter group was
more prescient.2 3 More so than Dickerson, Seibert contained a dramatic
reassertion of Miranda's constitutional pedigree, at least from the
plurality. One can expect future cases probing the divisions among the
274. Id. at 2615-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
275. Id. at 2616-20 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
276. Id. at 2616 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 2619 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
278. Id.
279. Id. at 2619-20. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
280. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
281. Compare Conor Bateman, Dickerson v. United States: Miranda is Deemed a
Constitutional Rule, but Does It Really Matter?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 177, 177-207 (2002), with
Bryan Doyle, Securing Liberty with Chains: Locking Up the Fifth Amendment Within the
Confines of Miranda, 21 MISS. C. L. REV. 55, 55-81 (2001), and Timothy Brennan,
Silencing Miranda: Exploring Potential Reform to the Law of Confessions in the Wake of
Dickerson v. United States, 27 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 253, 253-78
(2001).
282. 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
283. Justice Thomas, writing for the plurality which included Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice O'Connor, held that a suspect's interrogation is not a violation of the
constitutionally protected right against self-incrimination absent the commencement of
criminal proceedings. Id. at 766 (plurality opinion). Justices Souter and Breyer concurred
in judgment, but concluded that a suspect's claim that questioning alone was a violation of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments subject to redress could be recognized if a core
guarantee or the judicial capacity to protect it would be placed at risk absent
complimentary protection. Id. at 777-78 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment).
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justices over Miranda such as whether statements taken in deliberate
violation of Miranda may be used for impeachment purposes.
United States v. Patane
United States v. Patane28 concerned a lingering question in Miranda
doctrine-the admissibility of physical evidence derived from a Miranda
violation.'8 In Patane, law enforcement officers arrested Patane for
287
violating a restraining order. While Patane was in custody outside his
home and without reading Patane a complete set of Miranda rights, the
officers asked him about a pistol allegedly in his possession."8 Patane
informed the officers about the pistol's location, and he was later charged
with violating federal felon-in-possession laws.2"9 The district court
granted Patane's motion to suppress the gun (due to lack of probable
cause to arrest), and the Tenth Circuit affirmed its order on a different
theory-that, as a result of Dickerson v. United States,2'9 the Constitution
required suppression of physical evidence (here, the gun) derived from a
Miranda violation.9
A badly divided Supreme Court reversed. 292 Justice Thomas, writing
for a three-justice plurality, which included Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, supported a per se rule that the failure to give Miranda
warnings does not require the suppression of physical evidence derived
therefrom.2 93 The plurality anchored this theory in the notion that the
Fifth Amendment does not proscribe unwarned statements, only
involuntary ones, and that Miranda merely was designed as a
prophylactic rule to support that constitutional right.294 Consequently,
the bare failure to read Miranda rights did not constitute a completed
constitutional violation and, therefore, did not require application of the
traditional fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree rule.29' Protection of the core right
of self-incrimination did not require such an expansive interpretation of
the exclusionary rule: the exclusion of the unwarned statement already
provided an adequate deterrent to law enforcement, and notions of
284. E.g., People v. Neal, 72 P.3d 280, 294 (Cal. 2003).
285. 124 S. Ct. 2620 (2004).
286. Id. at 2624.
287. Id. at 2625.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
291. Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2625-26.
292. Id. at 2630-32.
293. Id. at 2629 (plurality opinion).
294. Id. at 2626-27 (plurality opinion).
295. Id. at 2628-29 (plurality opinion).
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trustworthiness underpinning the Fifth Amendment were not at play in
296the case of physical evidence. Finally, the plurality rejected the Tenth
Circuit's reliance on Dickerson. While Dickerson characterized Miranda
as a constitutional rule, it did not override the requirement of a "close
fit" between the core constitutional right and the exclusionary remedy.297
Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice O'Connor) concurred in the
judgment.! Unlike the plurality, they found it unnecessary to decide
whether, categorically, a failure to give Miranda warnings itself
constitutes a violation of Miranda's constitutional rule.299 Instead, Justice
Kennedy extracted the principle from the Court's prior cases that the
underlying purposes of Miranda must be balanced against the other
objectives of the criminal justice system.3°° In this case, the reliability and
probative value of the physical evidence justified its admission; a rule
that admitted such evidence while excluding the unwarned statement
adequately balanced the interests of law enforcement and the suspect.
30 1
Justice Souter (joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg) dissented. 30
They accused the majority of sidestepping the issue in the case; the case
was not about the scope of the Fifth Amendment.303 Rather, the case
concerned whether exclusion of derivative physical evidence was
necessary in order to deter questioning outside Miranda . 3 4 Permitting
the admission of the evidence undercuts Miranda's protective function
and, thereby, harms the Fifth Amendment itself. They predicted that
the rule announced today would encourage officers to flout Miranda, just
like Elstad did two decades ago, leading to the tactics at issue in Seibert.
3 °6
Justice Breyer also dissented.37  He saw this case as functionally
equivalent to Seibert and, for that reason, would apply the fruit-of-the-
. 300
poisonous-tree doctrine to this case.-
What Seibert giveth, Patane taketh away (or the other way around,
depending on your perspective). The two cases were handed down the
same day, which is unsurprising because, at a certain level of generality,
296. Id. at 2630 (plurality opinion).
297. Id. at 2629-30 (plurality opinion).
298. Id. at 2630 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
299. Id. at 2631 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
300. Id. at 2630-31 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
301. Id. at 2631 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
302. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
303. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
304. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
305. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
306. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 2632 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
308. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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both cases involved the common issue of the admissibility of evidence
derived from a Miranda violation. For Justice Breyer, that was the
correct level of generality at which to assess the cases.3w  Yet the
reasoning in the two plurality opinions could not be more different-with
the Seibert plurality focusing on preserving the core purpose of
Miranda31° and the Patane plurality taking a cramped view of the core
purpose of the Amendment. " ' The outcomes and opinions suggest that
Justice Kennedy has positioned himself as the "swing vote" on many
post-Dickerson Miranda issues, which suggests that, in future cases,
practitioners would be well advised to pitch toward his views in order to
obtain a favorable outcome.
Sixth Amendment
Schriro v. Summerlin
Two years ago, in Ring v. Arizona," the Supreme Court invalidated
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme under which a judge could impose a
sentence of death absent a prior jury finding that at least one aggravating
circumstance could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.313 This Term,
Schriro v. Summerlin314 presented the question whether that holding
applied retroactively under Teague v. Lane.3 - The Ninth Circuit held
that it did on two alternative grounds: (1) that Ring was substantive and
therefore fell outside Teague's framework, and (2) that Ring announced
a watershed rule of criminal procedure and therefore fell under one of
316Teague's exceptions.
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, a closely divided Supreme Court
reversed and held that Ring did not apply retroactively. The Court first
laid out the common ground-that Ring announced a new rule and that
one of Teague's two exceptions (removing conduct beyond the state's
power to punish) did not apply."' It then held that Ring was procedural
309. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
310. Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S. Ct. 2601, 2613 (2004) (plurality opinion).
311. Patane, 124 S. Ct. at 2626 (plurality opinion).
312. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
313. Id. at 609.
314. 124 S. Ct. 2519 (2004).
315. Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2521; Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Summerlin filed
his federal habeas petition prior to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996's effective date, so its harsher restrictions did not apply. See Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at
2522-23.
316. Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2523.
317. Id. at 2526.
318. Id. at 2523-24.
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rather that substantive. 319  Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's view, the
majority explained that Ring did not alter the range of conduct that
Arizona subjected to the death penalty; rather, it merely required that
this conduct be proven in accordance with Ring's procedural dictates.
Finally, the Court concluded that Ring did not comprise a watershed rule
of criminal procedure.321 In the Court's view, judicial fact-finding was not
seriously inaccurate-this followed both from general accuracy in
sentencing and from the Court's decision in DeStefano v. Woods.322
DeStefano declined to apply retroactively Duncan v. Louisiana323 (which
incorporated the Sixth Amendment jury guarantee against the states) on
the ground that a trial held without a jury was not necessarily
inaccurate.324
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg,
dissented on the ground that Ring was a watershed rule of criminal
procedure (they did not seem to quarrel with the holding on the
substantive/procedural point).325 In the dissent's view, the applicability of
Teague's watershed exception turned on two findings: (1) that the
decision implicated fundamental fairness (something with which the
majority did not quarrel), and (2) that it enhanced accurate
punishment.36  Ring, according to the dissent, fulfilled this second
function because death sentences ultimately rest on a community
judgment about the proper level of retribution, which is something that a
327jury is better able to render than a judge. The dissent rejected the
majority's twin rationales for holding otherwise relying on three points:
(1) the unique community-based judgments inherent in capital
sentencing; (2) the interests in accuracy, uniformity, and fundamental
fairness underpinning Teague; and (3) the weak support of DeStefano for
the majority's rule.328 In the dissent's view, DeStefano offered the
majority little comfort because it predated Teague and involved far
different social consequences. 329 Applying Duncan retroactively would
have thrown the prison doors open to thousands of prisoners; by
319. Id. at 2523.
320. Id. at 2523-24.
321. Id. at 2524-25.
322. Id. at 2525; DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
323. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
324. DeStefano, 392 U.S. at 633.
325. Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2526-27 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 2527 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
327. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
32& Id. at 2528-30 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
329. Id. at 2530 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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contrast, applying Ring retroactively would have upset, at most,
approximately one hundred death sentences.
330
Schriro is noteworthy in two respects. First, the majority opinion
refines Teague's basic framework. Traditional hornbook law suggested
that the general bar against retroactive application of new procedural
rules was subject to the two above-described exceptions. T Schriro folds
one of these exceptions (placing conduct beyond the power of the state
to punish) into the corollary that Teague does not apply to new
substantive (as opposed to procedural) rules.332 Since Schriro did not
even implicate this exception, this development is arguably dicta, but
habeas practitioners should follow how lower courts treat it in their
future retroactivity analyses. Second, Schriro marks yet another battle in
the ongoing fight over the scope of the Apprendi rule.333 Here, the
typical Apprendi lineup (Stevens, Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg)
gave way to the typical lineup in close habeas/federalism cases
(Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas), suggesting the
Court's commitment to federalism principles underlying its habeas
jurisprudence trumps the anti-federalism tendencies of the Apprendi
rule.
Blakely v. Washington
Blakely v. Washington14 involved a constitutional challenge to
Washington's sentencing scheme.335 Under the scheme, the facts of the
crime and the defendant's criminal history determine a recommended
sentencing range within the statutory maximum.336 In Blakely's case, he
pled guilty to various violent crimes, and the recommended sentence
under the guidelines was forty-nine to fifty-three months.337 Just prior to
sentencing, however, the trial judge tagged thirty-seven more months to
the sentence because of the presence of certain "aggravating factors" of
cruelty and violence.33  The resulting sentence exceeded that
recommended under the guidelines _but still was below the statutory
maximum.39 Blakely argued that this determination violated his Sixth
330. Id. at 2530-31 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
331. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 28.6(a)
(2d ed. 1992).
332. Schriro, 124 S. Ct. at 2522-23.
333. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
334. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
335. Id. at 2534.
336. Id. at 2535.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 2537.
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Amendment rights. The Washington Court of Appeals rejected
Blakely's constitutional argument, a decision that the Washington
340Supreme Court declined to review.
In an opinion by Justice Scalia, a closely divided Supreme Court
reversed.34 ' The majority began by summarizing its holding in
Apprendi-that any fact other than recidivism which increases the
statutory maximum offense must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable
342doubt. It then explained that this holding reflected two principles of
historical criminal jurisprudence: (1) that the truth of any accusation be
confirmed by a jury; and (2) that an accusation, to result in punishment,
requires proof of facts.343  While acknowledging that the statutory
maximum for Blakely's crime was ten years, the majority held that the
relevant maximum for Apprendi purposes was the range prescribed by
the guidelines-namely, the range dictated by the jury's findings or the
defendant's admissions.3 4 The facts contained in Blakely's guilty plea,
the majority explained, did not authorize the judge to grant an
exceptional upward departure. That departure depended, instead, on
facts outside the plea and, therefore, violated the Apprendi principle.346
This view of the "statutory maximum," the majority explained, was
necessary to give "intelligible content to the right of the jury trial,"
something that the dissenters failed to do, for their position led to one of
two alternatives: (1) legislative labeling, or (2) subjective limits on
whether a sentence was too extreme-neither of which was defensible.
3 4
1
The dissenters' concerns about reallocation of punishment power and the
unfairness of the rule or its impact on determining sentencing were either
inaccurate or overstated.14" At bottom, the decision rested simply on
preserving the jury's right to determine the facts necessary to
punishment.
34
Justice O'Connor (joined by Justice Breyer and, in part, by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy) dissented.350 In the dissent's
view, the majority decision consolidated sentencing power in the
340. Id. at 2536.
341. Id. at 2533-34, 2543.
342. Id. at 2536-37.
343. Id. at 2536.
344. Id. at 2537.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 2537-38.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 2541-42.
349. Id. at 2543.
350. ld. (O' Connor, J., dissenting).
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judiciary, at the expense of the legislature.351 That result, in Justice
O'Connor's view, hampered uniformity in sentencing and thereby
undercut the underlying purpose of sentencing reform for the past two
decades.352 Accusing the majority of "doctrinaire formalism," the dissent
claimed that the majority's decision called into doubt the
constitutionality of numerous sentencing schemes, including the federal
sentencing guidelines, which like Washington's scheme, guided the
sentencer's discretion depending on the presence or absence of certain
facts.353
Justice Kennedy filed a separate dissent which Justice Breyer joined.354
On top of the criticisms leveled by the principal dissent, Justice Kennedy
explained that the majority's decision upset the careful interchange
among constitutional actors (specifically courts and legislatures) over the
crafting of good policy.35 The offense here was especially grave because
it offended not simply horizontal intergovernmental concerns but vertical
ones as well, and thereby deprived states of the opportunity to serve as
laboratories for reform.356
Justice Breyer filed a dissent which Justice O'Connor joined.357 While
agreeing with the majority that the distinction between sentencing factor
and statutory element ultimately was a matter of legislative labeling, he
refused to conclude that the Sixth Amendment proscribed how
legislatures treated the two categories. In his view, the majority's
decision threatened to undermine the fairness of criminal justice systems,
rested on a faulty history, and upset the law around which legislatures
have built their punishment systems. 9
Blakely is an important decision. Until Blakley, the Court had a
relatively clear line at which it could limit Apprendi's reach -the jury had
to find any facts that would increase the maximum punishment for a
crime allowed under a statute.3 Any fact-finding that might guide a
sentencer's discretion within that range did not offend the Apprendi
principle. Such a limit would have enabled Apprendi to coexist
comfortably with guidelines sentencing. Blakely, however, blew away
that dMtente and called into doubt a far greater variety of punishment
351. Id. (0' Connor, J., dissenting).
352. Id. (O' Connor, J., dissenting).
353. Id. at 2548-49 (0' Connor, J., dissenting).
354. Id. at 2550 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
355. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
356. Id. at 2551 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
357. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
358. Id. at 2552 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
359. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
360. See id. at 2536.
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regimes. While the majority expressly disavowed that it was calling into
question the constitutionality of the federal guidelines , even the
Government acknowledged in its amicus briefs that the federal scheme
bore some similarities to Washington's scheme and, therefore, might be
called into doubt by reversal in this case.3 6' As a result of Blakely, the
Court now is considering the guidelines' constitutionality and likely will
require a jury finding or waiver for any upward departures.363 When that
time comes, it is worth recalling that Justice Scalia was the sole dissenter
in Mistretta v. United States,'6 the 1989 decision that upheld the
guidelines against separation-of-powers attack."' Three of the four
justices forming the Apprendi majority (Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg)
joined the Court after Mistretta was decided. 36 Thus, Justice Scalia may
yet prevail in his fight against the guidelines, albeit on a Sixth
Amendment (rather than separation of powers) battleground.
Federal Criminal Law
Sabri v. United States
Sabri v. United States... presented the constitutional question whether
the federal bribery statute constituted a valid exercise of Congress's
Article I power. 368 Sabri was indicted after he offered three bribes to a
local governmental official as a kickback for various favors, including
steering him grant money supported in part by federal funds.369 Sabri
sought to dismiss his indictment on the ground that the federal bribery
statute was facially unconstitutional because it failed to require proof of a
federal nexus to the bribe among the crime's offense elements.7 The
district court granted Sabri's motion, but a divided panel of the Eighth
Circuit reversed and held that the statute was a valid exercise of
Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause as an incident
to the Spending Power.'
361. Id. at 2540.
362. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 25-26,
Blakely (No. 02-1632).
363. See United States v. Willis, 322 F. Supp.2d 76, 81-82 (D. Mass. 2004).
364. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
365. Id. at 412-13.
366. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); see Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 362.
367. 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004).
368. Id. at 1944 (citing to 18 U.S.C.A. § 666, which proscribes "bribery of state, local,
and tribal officials of entities that receive at least $10,000 in federal funds").
369. Id. at 1944-45.
370. Id. at 1945.
371. Id.
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The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, though it divided on the
reasoning.7 In the opinion for the Court, Justice Souter dispensed with
Sabri's (and the Eighth Circuit's) arguments in short order.373  The
majority held that nothing in the Constitution required a jurisdictional
element as a prerequisite to a federal criminal statute)74  Rather, the
Court found it abundantly clear that Congress had the power under the
Spending Clause to appropriate federal monies and, as incident to that
power, the authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact
laws ensuring that those monies were not squandered. 37  The Court
showed little patience with Sabri's argument that the Constitution
376
required proof that federal money actually was involved in the bribe.
In its view, the fungibility of money showed that it made little difference
whether federal funds were involved (or other funds, which thereby freed
up federal funds for other uses).3 77  Regardless of the funds, the
Necessary and Proper Clause surely encompassed a federal interest in
weeding out greedy local politicians who might squander federal
resources if given the opportunity.3 78 In the final portion of the opening
section of its analysis, the Court quickly rejected Sabri's reliance on the
Court's Commerce Clause and federalism jurisprudence, finding neither
379particularly relevant in his case.
Had the majority ended its opinion here, it might have been
unremarkable. But the Court went further. It proceeded to chide Sabri
for launching a facial challenge, rather than an as-applied one, which
would have been disposed of far more easily since his case in fact
involved a federal nexus. 3' ° The Court reiterated its old adage that facial
challenges are disfavored and generally must clear a high hurdle."' But
then it arguably broke new territory in two ways. First, it explicitly
linked up the Court's facial challenge jurisprudence with its overbreadth
jurisprudence, typically associated with the First Amendment. 382 Second,
it suggested that facial challenges (like overbreadth ones) ordinarily
should be reserved only for certain categories of rights such as free
372. Id. at 1944.
373. Id. at 1945-47.
374. Id. at 1945-46.
375. Id. at 1946-47.
376. Id. at 1945.
377. Id. at 1946.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 1947-48; see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
380. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1948.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 1948-49; see Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 10-
14.
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speech, abortion, the right to travel, and the scope of Congress's Section
5 power under the Fourteenth Amendment, where weighty reasons
overcome the Court's reticence to entertain facial attacks on statutes.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, filed a brief opinion
concurring in part. 84 Justice Kennedy fully concurred in the majority's
constitutional analysis .38 But he declined to join its exposition on facial
challenges and sought to dispel any doubt over whether the Court was
right to entertain facial challenges in United States v. Lopez3  and United
States v. Morrison.387
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment. 388 In his view, the case
could be resolved more simply under the Commerce Clause. 89 In light of
the Court's Commerce Clause jurisprudence (with which Justice Thomas
admittedly has disagreed), the federal bribery statute was a perfectly
valid exercise of Congress's Commerce Clause power.398 Unlike his eight
brethren, Justice Thomas expressed skepticism over whether the
Necessary and Proper Clause supplied a sufficient power in this case-in
his view, the federal bribery statute, read literally, swept up an array of
conduct where the federal interest was remote at best and nonexistent at
worst.391 Thus, Justice Thomas was hard pressed to find how the statute
was a proper exercise of power under the Necessary and Proper
Clause.3
Sabri could have been a fairly narrow opinion, simply rejecting the
view that the Constitution required a federal nexus and holding that, in
any event, Sabri could not benefit from the rule he sought. But the
Court used the case as a vehicle to break open a broader debate in two
areas. First, as the divisions between the Souter and Kennedy camps
illustrate, there is an underlying tension in the Court's jurisprudence over
when facial challenges will be appropriate. The majority opinion in Sabri
potentially cabins such challenges substantially to a few categories of
rights (or others where the litigant's interests are sufficiently weighty).
Second, as the divisions between the majority and Justice Thomas's
opinion illustrate, the case offers a potentially expansive reading of the
383. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. at 1948-49.
384. Id. at 1949 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
385. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
386. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
387. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. 1949 (Kennedy, J., concurring); 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
388. Sabri, 124 S. Ct. 1949 (Thomas, J., concurring).
389. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
390. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J.,
concurring), and Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring)).
391. Id. at 1949-51 (Thomas, J., concurring).
392. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Necessary and Proper Clause. This may provide a vehicle for those
opponents of the Court's restrictive Commerce Clause jurisprudence, in
Lopez and Morrison, to rely on a different textual hook to justify the
exercise of federal power.
First Amendment
City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.
City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C.3 93 required the Court to
examine Littleton's "adult business" licensing ordinance to determine
whether it met a First Amendment requirement to assure prompt judicial
review of licensing denials. 4 The city's ordinance requires all "adult
businesses" to apply for an adult business license with the city.395 Z.J.
opened his adult bookstore in an area not zoned for an adult business
and instead of applying for a license, initiated this suit challenging the
ordinance as facially unconstitutional.3 96  The federal district court
rejected Z.J.'s claims, but the Tenth Circuit held that the ordinance did
not assure the prompt final judicial decision required.397
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed but divided on the
reasoning.398 In the opinion for the Court, Justice Breyer (joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Thomas, and Ginsburg)
held that the city was required to assure a prompt judicial decision to
challenges of denied licenses.3 99 The majority, however, agreed with the
city's claim that the state's ordinary judicial review procedures met the
First Amendment requirements.4° So long as Colorado courts remain
sensitive to the importance of First Amendment cases and the need to
sometimes expedite these cases, the state's ordinary procedures suffice.4 °'
The Court concluded that challenges to the promptness of a decision
should be reserved for a case-by-case determination not a facial
challenge.4
Several justices filed opinions concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment."3 Justice Stevens disagreed with the majority's interpretation
393. 124 S. Ct. 2219 (2004).
394. Id. at 2221.
395. Id. at 2222.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 2221.
399. Id. at 2224.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id. at 2226.
403. Id. at 2221.
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of FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas4°4 and Freedman v. Maryland.40 5 He argued,
there is a difference between "prompt judicial review" and "prompt
judicial decision. '" The latter, according to Justice Stevens, means little
more than the assurance of the possibility of a prompt decision, which is
insufficient to guard against the dangers of unjustified suppression of
speech.4°  Justice Souter agreed with the majority's interpretation that
the language of FW/PBS and Freedman required a prompt judicial
decision; however, he disagreed that the state's ordinary judicial review
process was adequate to meet the First Amendment requirements.
408
Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, but argued the activity of the
adult bookstore, pandering sex, is not protected by the First
Amendment.4 9
There is no clear ruling from the Court in this case that makes it easy
to predict the disposition of future cases. We know that a majority of the
justices agree the First Amendment requires a "prompt" judicial
decision, but we do not know the definition of "prompt." Five justices
feel that the ordinary procedures of a state's judicial review process are
"prompt," while other justices express concern over the possibility of
delays in unjustified suppression of speech cases.41° In addition, the
majority agreed that the promptness of a decision is best left to a case-by-
case determination rather than a facial challenge. 41   Finally, it is clear
Justice Scalia has a much narrower interpretation of First Amendment
protections than the rest of the Court.
Locke v. Davey
In Locke v. Davey,1 2 the Court addressed the constitutionality of
Washington's Promise Scholarship Program. Under this program,
students may not receive a scholarship if they choose to pursue a degree
in theology.4 3  Washington's State Constitution states: "Religious
Freedom. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or
applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of
404. 493 U.S. 215 (1990).
405. Z.J. Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2226-27 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
406. Z.J. Gifts, 124 S. Ct. at 2227.
407. Id.
408. Id. at 2227-28 (Souter, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
409. Id. at 2228 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
410. Compare id. at 2226, with id. at 2227-28 (Souter, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
411. Id. at 2226.
412. 124 S. Ct. 1307 (2004).
413. Id. at 1309; WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 250-80-020(12)(f)-(g) (2001).
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
any religious establishment., 41 4  Davey was awarded a Promise
Scholarship and decided to attend Northwest College, a private,
Christian college affiliated with the Assemblies of God denomination, an
accredited institution and eligible under the Promise Scholarship
Program.4 5 When Davey chose to pursue a double major in pastoral
ministries and business management/administration, he learned he was
no longer eligible for the scholarship. 41' He then commenced litigation
and argued that the denial of his scholarship based on his course of
studies was a violation of the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free
Speech Clauses of the First Amendment.4 7 The district court rejected
Davey's claims. 48 A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed and concluded that the State had singled out religion for
unfavorable treatment, thus violating the Court's ruling in Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah .4 " The question before the Supreme
Court in this case became whether the State of Washington could
continue to deny funding without violating the Free Exercise Clause.
The Court rejected Davey's claim that Lukumi applied because "[the
Program] does not require students to choose between their religious
beliefs and receiving a government benefit .... [The] Promise Scholars
may still use their scholarship to pursue a secular degree at a different
institution from where they are studying devotional theology., 42' The
Court also found that the Program goes a long way in protecting religious
beliefs in that students are allowed to use their scholarships at extremely
religious colleges, so long as they are accredited.22 The Court then used
a historical analysis to show that the state's interest in a stringent
Exercise and Establishment Clause is not novel and that, in fact, it is
entirely consistent with the Founders' "formal prohibitions against using
tax funds to support the ministry. 4 23 Since early state constitutions saw
no problem in explicitly excluding only the ministry from receiving state
dollars, the Court argued this reinforces its conclusion that religious
instruction is in a different class. 24 In upholding the Program's degree
requirement, the Court found the state's interest in not funding
414. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
415. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1310.
416. Id. at 1310-11.
417. Id. at 1311.
418. Id.
419. Id.; Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
420. Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1312.
421. Id. at 1312-13 & n.4 (footnote omitted).
422. Id. at 1310.
423. Id. at 1313-14.
424. Id. at 1314.
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devotional degrees substantial and the burden it placed on recipients
425
relatively minor.
Justice Scalia and Thomas dissented in this case.426  Justice Scalia
argued that Lukumi clearly applied. He believed the scholarship was a
public benefit and, therefore, the Government cannot withhold that
benefit from some individuals solely on the basis of religion.428 Likening
the benefits of the scholarship program to general, public benefits,
Justice Scalia addressed the majority's historical argument by stating,
"No one would seriously contend, for example, that the Framer's would
have barred ministers from using public roads on their way to church.
4 29
Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's dissent, but also added in a short
dissent of his own, that the study of theology is not always for a
devotional purpose.43 °  A theology degree can be from a secular
perspective and for a secular purpose as well as a religious one.4 3'
Interestingly, this case had Justice Scalia and Thomas arguing for
broader rights under the First Amendment and other justices arguing in
favor of allowing a particular form of discrimination that fit within the
"joints" of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. 32 Justice Scalia
even wrote in his dissent, "In an era when the Court is so quick to come
to the aid of other disfavored groups, its indifference in this case, which
involves a form of discrimination to which the Constitution actually
speaks, is exceptional., 433  So what does this case say about the First
Amendment, especially since the trend, as Justice Scalia noted, has been
to increase protections? It appears that a majority of the justices are
willing to apply a state's religion clause, even if the state's clause is more
stringent than the Federal Constitution. Beyond that it is difficult to
make any predictions.
The Court did not specify a standard of review in this case. The Court
mentioned a compelling state interest and minimum burden on the
scholarship recipients. 34 However, unlike in Lukumi, and other First
Amendment cases, the Court did not specifically identify and apply a
test. In addition, the Court relied largely on historical analysis and did
425. Id. at 1315.
426. Id. at 1315-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1320-21 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
427. Id. at 1315-16 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
428. Id. at 1316 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
429. Id. at 1316-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
430. Id. at 1320 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
431. Id. at 1321 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
432. Id. at 1311.
433. Id. at 1320 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635
(1998)).
434. Id. at 1315.
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not address Justice Thomas's view that there are times when a
theological degree is for a secular course of study and not necessarily for
devotional purposes.435 In the end, the best prediction is that a majority
of the justices are willing to review cases that fall within the "joints" of
the two religion clauses and that going forward the Court most likely will
have to determine a standard of review for this category of cases.
Ashcroft v. ACLU
Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft 11)436 addressed the Child Online
Protection Act (COPA) enacted by Congress in 1998.43' This was the
statute's second trip to the Court.438 In its first journey, the Court held
that the statute's "community standards" provision was not overbroad. 39
In this latest journey, the Court had to consider the propriety of an
injunction based on the lower courts' finding that the Government had
failed to meet its burden of proving that alternative speech regulations
were less effective. 40
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, agreed with the decision of
the lower courts.441 He explained that the Constitution demands that
content-based restrictions on speech be presumed invalid and that the
Government bears the responsibility of proving their constitutionality.442
Part of this burden requires the Government to rebut the plaintiff's
argument that there are feasible, less restrictive alternatives to the act."3
In this case, the majority believed filters would be more effective than
the statute because filters (1) are less restrictive and do not have a
"chilling effect on speech"; (2) prevent minors from seeing all
pornography, not just that posted in the United States; and (3) can be
applied to all Internet communication, including e-mail. 4 The majority
explained further, "The Government's burden is not merely to show that
a proposed less restrictive alternative has some flaws; its burden is to
show that it is less effective." 445  Finally, the Court expressed the
importance of remanding the case for trial because new technologies
435. Id. at 1320 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
436. 124 S. Ct. 2783 (2004).
437. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-736 (1988) (current version at 47 U.S.C. § 231
(2000)).
438. See Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564 (2002).
439. Id. at 566, 585.
440. Ashcroft 11, 124 S. Ct. at 2788.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Id.
444. Id. at 2792.
445. Id. at 2793.
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have been developed and new congressional acts have been passed since
the initiation of the suit five years ago.44'
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, filed a concurring
opinion.4 7  They reiterated their position from Ashcroft I that the
language in the statute with respect to "community standards" is• . 448
unconstitutional. In addition, Justice Stevens wrote, "Criminal
prosecutions are, in my view, an inappropriate means to regulate the
universe of materials classified as 'obscene,' since 'the line between
communications which offend and those which do not is too blurred to
identify criminal conduct.
'
'
4 49
Two dissenting opinions were filed.450 In the principal dissent, Justice
Breyer (joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia), agreed that in order
to meet constitutional requirements the Government must have a
compelling interest, narrowly tailored means, and the means must be the
least restrictive available.4 1 However, the dissenting justices believed the
Act met these requirements, especially since it was drafted after the
Court's ruling in Reno v. ACLU.4 12 In a separate dissent, Justice Scalia
expressed the same views from his concurrence in Z.J. Gifts: businesses
that profit from the pandering of sex are not protected by the First
Amendment. 453 Therefore, the speech in this case should not be subject
to a strict scrutiny review .4  However, since the other eight justices
disagreed, Justice Scalia sided with the dissent and held the Government
met its burden and the Act was constitutional.
Ashcroft has significant lessons for future speech cases and is a good
story for Court watchers. For the First Amendment lesson, eight justices
applied the most heightened level of review to this restriction on
speech-strict scrutiny-and a majority required the Government to
prove that all of the plaintiff's alternatives were less effective than the
Government's statute.456 This case exemplifies the Court's concern with
any restrictions on speech, even speech deemed offensive to some
individuals and harmful to children. It also signals some potentially new
446. Id. at 2794-95.
447. Id. at 2795-97 (Stevens, J., concurring).
448. Id. at 2795-96 (Stevens, J., concurring).
449. Id. at 2796 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291,
316 (1977)).
450. Id. at 2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 2797-806 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
451. Id. at 2797-98 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
452. Id. at 2805 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
453. Ashcroft 1I, 124 S. Ct. at 2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see City of Littleton v. Z.J.
Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 124 S. Ct. 2219, 2228 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
454. Ashcroft 11, 124 S. Ct. at 2797 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
455. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
456. Id. at 2794; id. at 2796 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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branches among the Court's jurisprudence, such as Justice Scalia's
refusal to apply strict scrutiny and Justices Stevens and Ginsburg's
skepticism over criminal penalties. 7 For Court watchers, the decision
has all the hallmarks of a "lost majority." Justice Breyer did not pen a
majority opinion in the April sitting, and his dissent reads strongly like
an opinion originally drafted as a majority. Though such "flips" of the
Court happen at most two or three times per term, the decision should
remind students of the Court that, even after the justices have voted at
their Friday conference, those votes are not set in stone and can be
turned through a particularly persuasive opinion from one of the
brethren (such as Justice Kennedy's in this case).
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow458 involved issues of
standing and the First Amendment's religion clauses. 59 Under California
law, every public elementary school must start the day with an
appropriate patriotic exercise. 46° The Pledge of Allegiance (set forth as
461
amended in a 1954 congressional act), satisfies this requirement,
though students with religious objections may refrain from reciting it.462
However, Newdow, an ordained atheist, filed suit on behalf of his
daughter, challenged the 1954 act that amended the Pledge and added
the words "under God," and sought an injunction against use of the
Pledge to satisfy the school's patriotic exercise requirement.4 The
district court concluded that the Pledge did not violate the Establishment
Clause, but the Ninth Circuit reversed 4  In a series of opinions, the
Ninth Circuit unanimously held that Newdow had standing "as a parent
to challenge a practice that interferes with his right to direct the religious
education of his daughter ' 465 and, in a split decision, held that the 1954
congressional Act and the mandatory, daily recitation of the Pledge in
school violated the Establishment Clause.46 6
457. Id. at 2796-97 (Stevens, J., concurring).
458. 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
459. Id. at 2305.
460. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 52720 (Deering 2000).
461. Act of June 14, 1954, ch. 297, 68 Stat. 249 (codified as amended at 4 U.S.C. § 4
(2000)).
462. Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2306.
463. Id. at 2306-07.
464. Id. at 2307.
465. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F.3d 466, 485 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom. Elk
Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004).
466. Newdow, 328 F.3d at 490.
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Before the case reached the Supreme Court, it took two unusual
procedural turns. First, Sandra Banning, the mother, filed a motion to
dismiss the case, claiming that she had exclusive legal custody of her
daughter and that, consequently, Newdow had no right to sue on her
behalf.467 The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument.4, Second, Justice
Scalia made public remarks criticizing the Ninth Circuit's decision.4 69 As
a result, he took the unusual step sua sponte of recusing himself from the
case,4 70 an action that stood in stark contrast to his refusal to recuse in the
Cheney v. United States District Court471 case, despite a request from one
of the litigants.
When it reached the Court, the case presented two issues: (1) whether
Newdow had standing to sue on behalf of his daughter, and (2) whether
the school district's policy violated the First Amendment.473  Justice
Stevens, writing for the majority, concluded that Newdow did not have
standing, so it did not reach the First Amendment issue.474  Showing
extreme deference to state law, Stevens argued, because California law
does not give Newdow the right to sue as next friend, he lacks prudential
standing to challenge the policy of the school district. 475 The Court
added, "A next friend surely could exercise such right, but the Superior
Court's order has deprived Newdow of that status., 47 6 Justice Stevens's
opinion did not address Newdow's First Amendment claim.477
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, and Justice Thomas each
filed opinions concurring in the judgment of the case. These three
justices voted to reverse the case based on its merits, rather than the
standing issue raised by the majority419 According to Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the importance of the constitutional question at issue
supersedes the standing issue .8  Chief Justice Rehnquist then engaged in
467. Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2307.
468. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 500, 505 (9th Cir. 2002).
469. See Charles Lane, Scalia Will Sit Out Review of Pledge of Allegiance Case, WASH.
POST, Oct. 19, 2003, at A3.
470. Id.
471. 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004).
472. See Charles Lane, Scalia Won't Sit Out Case on Cheney: Justice's Memo Details
Hunting Trip with VP, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2004, at Al.
473. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2308 (2004).
474. Id. at 2312.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 2305-12.
478. Id. at 2304.
479. Id. at 2312 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2321 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2328, 2333 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
480. Id. at 2312 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
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a lengthy historical discussion of references to God in our country's
patriotic exercises, stated that the Pledge was just such a patriotic
exercise, and concluded that the words "under God" do not convert it to
an explicit or formal religious exercise. 1 Justice O'Connor applied the
endorsement test and concluded that under the test, a reasonable person
with knowledge of our Nation's history would not perceive the words of
the Pledge to be government endorsement of a particular religion.
8 2
Finally, Justice Thomas argued the Establishment Clause is a federal
provision, "which . . . resists incorporation," and regardless of that
consideration, the Pledge is not unconstitutional because it does not
violate any free-exercise rights.
483
At the beginning of the Term, legal experts and First Amendment
scholars anticipated Newdow would be one of the Court's landmark
decisions.4 ' Since a majority of the Court did not even address the First
Amendment issue and dismissed the case on a standing technicality, what
is the importance of this case? The answer to this question may depend
on how one reads the opinions. Some people argue that this case is
significant because Justice O'Connor, the swing vote in many
controversial cases, affirmatively (and somewhat exceptionally) stated
her belief in the constitutionality of the Pledge despite not needing to do
so. 485 Others might argue that the five justices who resolved the case on
standing grounds would find the Pledge unconstitutional if the right case
came along for them to address the issue on the merits. In light of Justice
Scalia's public critique of the Ninth Circuit's decision,4 6 it appears that
Justice Kennedy may be the swing vote in the next case presenting this
issue.
Though the case did not chart new First Amendment territory, it did
make important case law regarding a parent's right to sue on behalf of his
child. Despite the Court's recent jurisprudence suggesting that the Due
Process Clause embraced a parent's right to control the upbringing of his
child,48 the five justices in this case took a far dimmer view of parental
rights.48 Admittedly, the parental relationship in this case was a strained
one-with a state court order trimming Newdow's right to sue on his
481. Id. at 2317-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
482. Id. at 2321-26 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
483. Id. at 2328, 2330 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
484. See, e.g., Marcia Coyle, High Expectations, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 2003, at 1.
485. See, e.g., Supreme Deliverance, DAILY NEWS L.A., June 14, 2004, at N16, LEXIS,
News Library, LAD File.
486. See Lane, supra note 469.
487. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
488. See Elk Grove, 124 S. Ct. at 2311-12.
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daughter's behalf.48 9 Nonetheless, the majority's holding, that certain
parents do not have a right to sue on behalf of their children, dents both
the Court's parental rights jurisprudence and its third party standing
jurisprudence. 49" By linking prudential standing considerations explicitly
with state law, the Court invites future challenges on prudential standing
grounds based on the eccentricities of the state from which the case
arises. Thus, while Court watchers must wait another day to hear how
the Court will decide the constitutionality of the Pledge, the standing
determinations in this case are sure to have substantial repercussions in
future cases.
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission49' addressed the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA),492 more popularly known as the
McCain-Feingold Act or the Shays-Meehan Act.493 The purpose of the
Act was to address three developments in federal election campaign
finance since the Court's ruling in Buckley v. Valeo:494 (1) the increased
importance and influence of "soft money," (2) the proliferation of "issue
ads" aired during the 1996 federal elections, and (3) the findings of a
Senate investigation into the general campaign practices of federal
officials during the 1996 election cycle.9
The BCRA has five parts, called Title I through Title V.4" Justices
Stevens and O'Connor wrote for the majority (including Justices Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer) upholding the major provisions of Titles I and II,
which control soft-money, expenditure restrictions for national party
committees, and disclosure requirements for broadcast companies
regarding electioneering communications .49 Rejecting strict scrutiny, the
majority applied a less demanding "close scrutiny" that it derived from
Buckley.498 It justified this more lenient standard on the ground that
contribution limits "'entai[l] only a marginal restriction upon the
489. Id. at 2307.
490. Cf. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990).
491. 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
492. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2
U.S.C.A.)
493. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 124 S. Ct. 619, 643 (2003); see Mark
Fineman, Top 'Soft-Money' Donor Does It 'Under the Radar,' L.A. TIMES, June 26, 2002,
at Al, available at 2002 WL 2485906.
494. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
495. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 648.
496. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155,116 Stat. 81.
497. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 643, 706.
498. Id. at 656-57, 659.
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contributor's ability to engage in free communication"' and display the
499
appropriate deference to Congress in light of its expertise in this area.
Next, the majority held that limitations on a national party, its
committees, or agents, to solicit or spend money do not violate the First
Amendment. 500 Here again, the Court found that the Government's
interest in preventing corruption is "sufficient to justify not only
contribution limits themselves, but laws preventing the circumvention of
such limits."' ' Finally, the Court concluded the Government had met its
burden of proof with substantial evidence showing how large soft money
contributions contribute to the appearance and actual corruption of
federal officials. °2
The Court then rejected McConnell's argument that Title II's
regulation of "electioneering communication[s]" contradicts Buckley.
5 0 1
Buckley requires political committees to file financial reports with the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) regarding communications that
expressly advocate the election or defeat of a specific candidate .
BCRA applies the rule in Buckley to "electioneering communication,"
which includes any broadcast that identifies a specific candidate and is
aired within sixty days of a general election and within thirty days of a
primary.05 The Court explained that Buckley in no way set out a
constitutional distinction between express and issue advocacy.5°6 Instead,
Buckley was a statutory interpretation, not a principle of constitutional
law.507 However, the Court noted that this ruling against the facial
challenge of electioneering communication requirements does not
foreclose the possibility of future challenges to this requirement as
applied .
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion for the Court on the
constitutionality of Titles III and IV.50 In one section of his opinion
(joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer), Chief Justice Rehnquist struck down section 318
which forbade minors from contributing to political parties or
499. Id. at 655-57 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-21).
500. Id. at 659-61.
501. Id. at 661 (citing Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Campaign Comm.,
533 U.S. 431, 456 (2001)).
502. Id. at 666.
503. Id. at 687.
504. Id. at 686.
505. Id. at 686-87.
506. Id. at 687.
507. Id. at 688.
508. Id. at 692.
509. Id. at 707.
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candidates."0 Applying strict scrutiny, the Court concluded that the
Government had not met its burden of proof showing that this provision
was necessary for combating corruption and that there were no other less
restrictive alternatives available."' In another section, Chief Justice
Rehnquist (joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas) held that McConnell's challenges to BCRA's millionaire
provisions were nonjusticiable.512 The millionaire provisions weakened
campaign finance restrictions for candidates whose opponents used large
sums of their own funds to finance their campaigns. 3 In the majority's
view, however, McConnell and other plaintiffs lacked Article III standing
because they could not demonstrate an "actual or imminent" "injury in
fact" that was "fairly traceable" to BCRA.5 4
Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, and
Ginsburg) delivered the opinion of the Court upholding Title V, section
504, which requires broadcasters to keep public records of political
requests for broadcasting time made by or on behalf of federal
candidates.5 t5 The district court held this was a violation of the First
Amendment; however, the Court reversed on the grounds that these
"requirements [for records] are virtually identical to those contained in a
regulation that the Federal Communications Commission promulgated
as early as 1938. "516 Also rejecting McConnell's argument that the
regulations place an undue burden on broadcast companies, party
committees, and individuals that pay for the ads, the majority stated that
the Government's interest in enforcing the provisions and goals of
BCRA outweigh the small administrative burden placed on the
broadcast companies.5 7
Justice Scalia argues in his opinion that "[tlhis is a sad day for the
freedom of speech. 51 8 He expresses his confusion with a Court that
endorses the First Amendment privileges of online pornography,
pornographic cable television, and tobacco advertising, but will not
protect what he believes to be the heart of the First Amendment-the
right to criticize government.5t9 He adds, there are three arguments
510. Id. at 711.
511. Id.
512. Id. at 710.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 707, 710.
515. Id. at 712.
516. ld. at 712, 715.
517. Id. at 713-14.
518. Id. at 720 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment in part).
519. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment in part).
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supporters of the Act use that are fallacious: (1) money is not speech, (2)
pooling money is not speech, and (3) speech by corporations can be
abridged.520
Justice Thomas also added a long opinion to this decision.52' Like
Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas believes Buckley was decided
incorrectly.522 He argues, with this decision, the Court continues to err by
applying the low level of scrutiny adopted in Buckley.23 In addition, he
expresses concern that the Court has created a slippery slope with this
decision. 24 He asks what's next for the Court to apply this ruling to, and
answers that it is entirely possible for the freedom of the press to be
next.12 He concludes this is possible because "[t]he press now operates
at the whim of Congress. 526
Justice Kennedy writes in his opinion that "significant portions of
Titles I and II of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act.. . constrain" the
freedom of speech. 27 He argues that the Court's decision in this case
surpasses Buckley because "Buckley did not authorize Congress to
decide what shapes and forms the national political dialogue is to
take. '5 28 Like Justices Scalia and Thomas, Justice Kennedy dissents from
most of the majority's ruling in this case because he believes it stifles
speech, violates the First Amendment, and creates a society that is less
free.529
McConnell marks a significant victory for proponents of campaign
finance reform in the United States. Beginning with Federal Election
Commission v. Akins,530 a number of members of the Court have signaled
520. Id. at 721, 724-25 (Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring
in the judgment in part).
521. Id. at 729 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
522. Id. at 737 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
523. Id. at 730 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
524. Id at 732 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
525. Id. at 740 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
526. Id. at 742 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part).
527. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
528. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
529. Id. at 742-43, 772 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
530. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
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their sympathy for campaign finance reform laws."' However, as
demonstrated by the proliferation of section 527 organizations (also
known as "Soft PACS") after McConnell,532 BCRA is not the last chapter
in this struggle. Apart from the fanfare over Titles I and II, however, the
story with perhaps the most lasting doctrinal impact may be Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion striking down BCRA's restrictions on minors'
campaign contributions .53  For some time, the Court has struggled with
defining the scope of minors' constitutional rights and the appropriate
level of constitutional scrutiny in reviewing restrictions on those rights.
Somewhat unexpectedly, the Court in McConnell took a very harsh line
on such restrictions, subjecting them to heightened scrutiny and
invalidating them.534 Subsequent cases, whether on matters of abortion
or the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances, are sure to make
use of this doctrinal development.
Voting Rights
Vieth v. Jubelirer
Vieth v. Jubelirer535 had the potential to end with a bang but instead
ended with a whimper. This case involved a challenge under Article I
and the Equal Protection Clause to an alleged political gerrymander in
Pennsylvania.5 36  According to the plaintiffs' claim, Pennsylvania's
Republican-dominated government (which at the time controlled both
houses of the legislature and the governor's office) carved up the state's
congressional district in a blatantly pro-Republican fashion, partly in
retaliation for prior pro-Democrat plans.37 After a three-judge district
court ruled in the plaintiffs' favor, the general assembly revised the plan,
which the district court accepted on review. 58 As the case went to the
Supreme Court, it presented the question not simply whether the revised
plan comported with the Constitution, but whether a voting rights
challenge based on a political gerrymander theory presented a non-
531. See Fed. Election Comm'n v. Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S.
431 (2001); Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
532. See Thomas B. Edsall, Pro-GOP Groups Outpaced in Funds: Pro-Democratic
'527s' Far Ahead, WASH. POST, July 16, 2004, at A9; ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, SECTION
527 ORGANIZATIONS ("SOFT PACS"), at http://www.allianceforjustice.org/nonprofit/
public-policy/527_organizations.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2004).
533. McConnell, 124 S. Ct. at 711.
534. Id.
535. 124 S. C. 1769 (2004).
536. Id. at 1773.
537. Id.
538. Id. at 1774.
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justiciable political question.539 Eighteen years earlier, in Davis v.
Bandemer,540 the Supreme Court had held that a political gerrymander
claim was justiciable, but could not agree on the proper standard to
assess the claim.541
A divided Court affirmed the district court's decision but could not
agree on the reasoning.5 42 A plurality, led by Justice Scalia, took the
position that political gerrymander claims were nonjusticiable and
argued that Davis should be overruled. The plurality began by
canvassing the history of political gerrymanders, noting that they were a
common feature of colonial government.? 4 It then noted that although
the text of the Constitution did not impose a legal limit on how
congressional districts are drawn, it did supply a textually explicit remedy
for poorly drawn districts-namely that Congress could "make or alter"
those districts.545 The plurality then explained that political gerrymander
claims entailed a "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards" -one of the grounds for political questions identified in Baker
v. Carr.546
In the plurality's view, the Court's complete failure over the past
eighteen years to craft a set of standards for evaluating political
gerrymander claims evidenced the utter lack of discoverable and
manageable standards, leaving lower courts (and state governments)
adrift.547  Finally, the plurality rejected both the appellants' proposed
standard (a type of "purpose" test drawn from the racial gerrymander
context) and the various standards proposed by the dissenters.548 The
fact that the dissenters proposed no fewer than three different standards
merely confirmed the lack of judicially discoverable standards in this
context5
49
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.50 Unlike the plurality, he
would not overrule Davis at the present time because he believed that it
remains possible to discover some judicially manageable standard for
539. Id. at 1776-78.
540. 478 U.S. 109 (1986).
541. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1777.
542. Id. at 1792-93.
543. Id. at 1778, 1792 (plurality opinion).
544. Id. at 1774-76 (plurality opinion).
545. Id. at 1775 (plurality opinion) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4).
546. Id. at 1776, 1778 (plurality opinion) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962).
547. Id. at 1778-80 (plurality opinion).
548. Id. at 1780-81, 1786-89 (plurality opinion).
549. Id. at 1784 (plurality opinion).
550. Id. at 1792 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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political gerrymander claims.551 In his view, the damage to democracy
wrought by political gerrymanders requires that the Court seek to
develop some legal standard for policing them." Justice Kennedy
suggested that First Amendment principles might provide a helpful
analogy in this context but declined to commit to them conclusively.553
Instead, he seemed to conclude that, absent a clear standard in this case,
the judgment of the district court should be affirmed 5
In three separate opinions, four justices dissented and offered various
standards for evaluating political gerrymander claims. Justice Stevens,
relying on the racial gerrymander cases, proposed that the proper
standard be whether partisanship was the legislature's "predominant"
motive."" Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, borrowed from the
Court's racial harassment jurisprudence and proposed a burden-shifting
analysis akin to the McDonnell Douglas v. Green55 ' framework.5 8 Justice
Breyer argued that the proper standard should be whether the
gerrymander resulted in unjustified entrenchment of the dominant
party.5 59
Unfortunately, this case raises more questions than it answers. Eight
votes are clear-four for nonjusticiability, four against. One vote, Justice
Kennedy's, is the most difficult to explain. He clearly wants to leave two
doors open-one for nonjusticiability and one for the development of a
manageable standard.5 60 The problem is how to explain his vote on the
judgment in this case.
As Justice Scalia properly demonstrates, Justice Kennedy's decision to
affirm the judgment below can be explained on only one of two
rationales-either no standard is available, in which case the
nonjusticiability doctrine should apply, or a standard is available, in
551. Id. at 1792-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
552. See id. at 1794-95 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
553. Id. at 1797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
554. Id. at 1798-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
555. Id. at 1799 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1815-22 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at
1822 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
556. Id. at 1810 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
557. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
558. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1817 (Souter, J., dissenting). Under that framework, the
plaintiff must advance a prima facie case of discrimination. Green, 411 U.S. at 802. At
that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for its action. Id. If it does so, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that
the defendant discriminated against him. Id. at 804; see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,
124 S. Ct. 513 (2003); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993); Tex. Dept. of
Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
559. Vieth, 124 S. Ct. at 1825 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
560. See id. at 1798-99 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
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which case affirmance only can occur by reasoning that the plaintiffs
have failed to satisfy that standard."' Since Justice Kennedy explicitly
acknowledges that the Court has no agreed-upon standard, his opinion is
probably most reasonably read as a cautious fifth vote in favor of
nonjusticiability in this case. The risk in not joining the majority in toto
is that future litigants may attempt to stitch together a standard from the
opinion of Justice Kennedy and the four dissenters, forcing courts to
grapple with the same uncertainty that confronted them after Davis. It
would have provided far greater guidance to litigants for the Court either
to shut the door entirely on such claims or to hash out a standard on
which they all could agree.
International
Republic of Austria v. Altmann
Republic of Austria v. Altmann512 involved the retroactive application
of the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA). 63 Enacted in 1976,66
the FSIA sets forth a general rule immunizing foreign states and their
instrumentalities from suits, but it contains a series of exceptions,
including, of relevance here, "rights in property taken in violation of
international law., 565 Prior to its enactment, there were two basic phases
in the sovereign immunity law. 66 Until 1952, sovereigns generally were
absolutely immune from suit.167 Beginning in 1952, until the adoption of
the FSIA, the United States employed a "restrictive theory" of sovereign
immunity under which foreign sovereigns could lose their immunity if
their conduct fell under certain exceptions detailed in a 1952 letter by the
then Acting Legal Advisor at the State Department.568  Following
decades of jurisprudential confusion and inconsistent application of the
"restrictive theory," the FSIA sought to codify the principles under
which sovereigns would be immune. 69  This legal progression isimportant because Altmann's case involved conduct occurring in the late
561. Id. at 1790 (plurality opinion).
562. 124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004).
563. Id. at 2243; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (2000).
564. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611).
565. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2003); see Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2243.
566. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, to
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), DEP'T. ST. BULL., June 23,
1952, at 984-85 (1952).
567. See id.
568. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2249; see Tate, supra note 566.
569. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2249; see also Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461
U.S. 480, 487-88 (1983).
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1930s and early 1940s, when the principle of absolute immunity still
reigned supreme in the United States.
Altmann's case involved the unlawful seizure (by either the Nazi Party
or the Austrian Government) of six paintings done by the famous
Austrian artist Gustav Klimt.5 0 Following a decades-long struggle with
the Austrian government for the return of the paintings, Altmann finally
sued it (and its national museum) in federal court.7 The Austrian
defendants moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that at the
time of the events in question, they enjoyed absolute immunity and that
nothing in the FSIA retroactively abrogated that immunity. The
district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, albeit on
different grounds. 73
In a broad and very important opinion by Justice Stevens, the Supreme
Court affirmed and held that the FSIA applied retroactively to conduct
like Austria's that occurred both prior to its enactment and prior to the
United States' adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
The Court began by reviewing its leading retroactivity decision in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products,575 and concluded that it did not control
171,the instant case. Under that framework, the FSIA, under Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,77 was not purely jurisdictional (and
therefore automatically retroactive), and Congress had failed to include
an "express command" requiring retroactive application of the statute.
578
Normally, the Court would then ask whether the statute had an
impermissible retroactive effect (if so, it should not be applied
retroactively). 579 Here, however, the opinion took a curious turn. The
Court held that the Landgraf framework did "not definitively resolve"
the case because the FSIA was sui generis-it did not attempt to define
substantive liability principles but, instead, to give sovereigns present
570. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2243.
571. Id. at 2244-46 & n.4.
572. Id. at 2246.
573. The district court concluded that the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act was a
jurisdictional statute which applied retroactively. Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F.
Supp. 2d 1187, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2001), affid, 317 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2002), affid, 124 S. Ct.
2240 (2004). The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit argued that Austria could not
have reasonably expected to be immune from suit at the time of its alleged misconduct.
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 124 S. Ct. 2240
(2004).
574. Altman, 124 S. Ct. at 2254.
575. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
576. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2249-50.
577. 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
578. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2251-52.
579. See id. at 2252.
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protection from suits based on past conduct.5" For this reason, in the
Court's view, the FSIA defied description under the types of statutes
described in Landgraf.5 8' Leaving behind Landgraf, the Court then
proceeded to use traditional tools of statutory interpretation (text,
structure, and policy) to conclude that Congress intended the FSIA to
apply to all pending cases regardless of when the conduct at issue
occurred.582 Finally, the Court concluded with a somewhat dubitable
caution that its holding was extremely narrow-it was not opining on
whether Austria's conduct fell under the expropriation exception or
whether other doctrines might protect Austria; nor was it prejudging any
"statement of interest" by the United States (an unlikely event according
to the record) suggesting that the Court should decline to exercise
jurisdiction, which might be entitled to deference by the Court.""
Several justices concurred. Justice Scalia argued that the FSIA was a
jurisdictional, not a substantive, statute that simply expanded the
available forums for suit.5 8 Under the plain logic of Landgraf, the statute
had no impermissible retroactive effect and, therefore, applied to
pending cases such as Altmann's, regardless of the timing of the
underlying conduct." 5 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Souter, found
that close reading of the text, the Court's past practice, and practical
considerations supported retroactive application of the FSIA and
mitigated against any damage to sovereigns' "reliance" interests on the
pre-1952 rule of absolute immunity."' Unlike the majority, Justice
Breyer also explicitly relied on foreign precedent from France and
England that stood for the proposition that a sovereign's status at the
time of suit (rather than at the time of the underlying conduct) controlled
the immunity inquiry.87
Justice Kennedy (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas) dissented . In Justice Kennedy's view, the majority opinion
suffered from two flaws.5 89 First, the majority potentially upset the
580. Id.
581. Id. at 2251-52.
582. Id. at 2252-54.
583. Id. at 2254-56. The State Department, as authorized by the Attorney General,
may issue a statement advocating the international interests of the United States
implicated by the litigation. 28 U.S.C. §§ 516-517 (2000).
584. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2256 (Scalia, J., concurring).
585. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
586. Id. at 2258-63 (Breyer, J., concurring).
587. Id. at 2259 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary
Magistrate (Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3)), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, and Ex-King Farouk of
Egypt v. Christian Dior, CA Paris, 84 Clunet 717, (1957), reprinted in 24 I.L.R. 228).
588. Id. at 2263 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
589. Id. at 2263,2273 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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settled expectations of foreign sovereigns for conduct that, as in the
present case, occurred decades ago.5 For this reason, Justice Kennedy
would have followed the principle enunciated in Landgraf (and a long
line of cases preceding it) that the Court should not apply statutes that
have an impermissible retroactive effect s9' The dissent chided the
majority for contorting Landgraf-if the statute lacks clear congressional
language mandating retroactive application and has an impermissible
retroactive effect, that should be the end of the case. 92 In order for the
majority to move beyond this framework and consider the statutory text
(despite how it fares under Landgraf), it must twist that decision beyond
recognition. Doing so calls into doubt the validity of the Supreme
-, 591
Court's decision in Hughes Aircraft v. United States ex rel. Schumer,
where the Court declined to give retroactive effect to a statute that
created a new cause of action and, thus, like the FSIA, arguably
expanded the Court's jurisdiction.9 4  Second, Justice Kennedy closed
with a caution that the majority's opinion potentially treads dangerously
on separation of powers principles. 95 In the dissent's view, the FSIA
represented a carefully crafted compromise between the executive and
legislative branches over the scope of a foreign sovereign's immunity in
U.S. courts, typically a very sensitive political matter.596 By suggesting
that a statement of interest by the executive branch might be entitled to
deference, the majority arguably elevated the Executive power over the
legislative power exemplified by Congress's carefully crafted scheme.
Moreover, to allow the Court to pass on the deference due to the
executive statement would be a raw exercise of judicial power in matters
of foreign affairs.
This case, as Justice Kennedy explained, was a hard one, involving a
murky retroactivity test and foreign affairs powers. At bottom, the case
was tricky, not because of the issues but because the Court was the victim
of its own jurisprudence. The clearest solution was Justice Scalia's-that
the FSIA was a jurisdiction-creating statute normally entitled to
retroactive effect.5 97 However, as the majority acknowledged, that view
was hard to reconcile as a principled matter with Verlinden, which
suggested that the FSIA was also substantive 9  Once that premise-
590. Id. at 2263 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
591. Id. at 2264 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
592. Id. at 2266 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
593. 520 U.S. 939 (1997).
594. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2270-72 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
595. Id. at 2273 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
596. See id. at 2274-75 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
597. Id. at 2256 (Scalia, J., concurring).
598. Id. at 2251.
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
FSIA qua substantive law-is accepted, then, as the dissent points out,
the case is hard to distinguish from Hughes, which denied retroactive
application to a statute creating a cause of action 99 Thus, fidelity to
stare decisis would seem to have required the conclusion reached by
Justice Kennedy-that the FSIA should not apply retroactively. The
majority dodged this conclusion only by rewriting the Landgraf test and
making it non-dispositive for this sui generis statute.6°° That holding is
bound to generate future litigation over whether other statutes share the
salient qualities with the "sui generis" FSIA.
This murky doctrinal broth would have been digestible in a garden-
variety statutory case. However, peppered as the case was with flavors of
foreign policy, the stakes are far higher; for the case removes a major
hurdle to suits against foreign nations for a wide variety of past conduct
(such as the Japanese comfort women litigation). 6O1 To be sure, the
decision does not remove all hurdles, and doctrines such as Act of State
and forum nonconveniens ultimately may provide additional barriers to
the liability of state defendants, as Justice Breyer rightly observes.6 But
there are at least two crucial differences between those doctrines and
sovereign immunity. One is ease of proof, a point that Justice Breyer
elides. Act of State and forum nonconveniens tend to be highly fact-
sensitive determinations, often amenable to conclusion only after some
amount of discovery (or, at least, fact pleading). 603 By contrast, immunity
(at least of the pre-1952 brand) was an easy argument-we're a
sovereign, so we win. Thus, the most important upshot of the decision
may be increased litigation (and therefore settlement pressure) against
foreign sovereigns, even if the cases never reach trial. The second is the
diplomatic effects of the decision. As the majority and Justice Breyer
recognize, the State Department may sometimes come to the foreign
nation's rescue by filing a statement of interest. 6°4 That solution is not
599. ld. at 2267 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
600. See id. at 2251-52.
601. See generally Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
602. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2262.
603. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 249-50 (1981) (holding that each
case invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens turns on its own particular facts);
Koster v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947) (holding that there must be
a clear showing of facts that make the chosen forum inappropriate).
604. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. at 2255-56, 2262. Foreign nations often placed diplomatic
pressures on the State Department in seeking immunity. According to the Court in
Verlinden, "on occasion, political considerations led to suggestions of immunity in cases
where immunity would not have been available under the restrictive theory." Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983); see Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in
Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings Before the House Subcomm. on Admin. Law and
Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 34-35 (1976)
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unproblematic. Apart from the separation of powers concerns identified
by Justice Kennedy, the decision also forces the State Department to
make sensitive diplomatic decisions about intervening in litigation-
decisions that it previously could avoid more easily, at least with respect
to pre-1 9 5 2 conduct, where the theory of absolute immunity made the
case easy. 6°5 Although the majority assures its readers that its holding is a
narrow one, practitioners can be sure that its implications, both legal and
political, are not.6°6
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.
Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.60 7 provided the Supreme
Court its first opportunity to interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1782. 0 ' That statute
permits a federal district court to order the production of a person or
documents found within its jurisdiction "for use in a proceeding in a
foreign or international tribunal., ' 9  In this case, Advanced Micro
Devices (AMD) brought an antitrust complaint against Intel, its rival in
the microprocessor industry, before the European Commission's
Antitrust Directorate (EC).6'° For use in the EC's investigation, AMD
sought an order in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
California for Intel to produce certain documents.611  The district court
declined to order their production, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the documents were potentially
discoverable for use in the EC proceeding even if they would not be
discoverable had the documents been located within the European
Union.6 2
The Supreme Court affirmed and announced five key holdings. First,
the Court held that the class of "interested persons" who may invoke
§ 1782 is not limited to sovereigns but includes private litigants. 6" To
support this holding, the Court relied on the plain text of § 1782 and
scholarly commentary glossing its meaning; it rejected Intel's reliance on
the statute's caption which suggested that the scope of "interested
[hereinafter Jurisdiction Hearing] (testimony of Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor,
Department of State).
605. Jurisdiction Hearing, supra note 604.
606. See id.
607. 124 S. Ct. 2466 (2004).
608. Id.
609. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2000).
610. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2474.
611. Id. at 2475.
612. Id. at 2475-76.
613. Id. at 2478.
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parties" might be limited to litigants.6  Second, the Court held that the
EC in this case qualifies as a "foreign or international tribunal," a
holding supported both by the EC's role as the exclusive fact-finding
body in the antitrust investigation and the drafting history of § 1782,
suggesting its purpose was to include quasi-judicial agencies. 6 " Third, the
Court rejected Intel's argument that the proceeding before a foreign
tribunal be "imminent" or "pending" for § 1782 to be available.611 Since
1964, § 1782 no longer requires that a proceeding be "pending" or
"judicial," and no subsequent legislative action by Congress suggests
617intent to depart from that understanding. Fourth, the Court held thatS 618
§ 1782 does not impose a foreign discoverability requirement. Neither
the text nor the legislative history of § 1782 supported such a reading of
the statute, and Intel's policy concerns (respect for foreign governments
and parity between litigants) did not support a categorical prohibition on
discovery.619 Finally, while § 1782 permitted discovery in this instance,
the statute did not require it, and the Court announced several criteria
that should guide the district court's exercise of its discretion on remand:
(1) whether the party seeking discovery is a party to the foreign
proceeding; (2) the nature of the tribunal, the character of the
proceedings, and the receptivity of the foreign court or agency to
assistance; (3) whether the discovery request seeks to circumvent an
applicable discovery limit of the foreign country; and (4) the
intrusiveness or burdensomeness of the request.2
621Two justices filed separate opinions. Justice Scalia concurred in the
judgment to disavow any reliance on legislative history to support his
reading of the statutory text.622 Justice Breyer dissented alone .23 In his
view, the majority's interpretation paved the way for private litigants to
exploit § 1782 to obtain information about a competitor or to upset a
foreign proceeding.6 24 The discovery permitted by § 1782 imposed a
costly burden on the target and potentially could be exploited as a means
614. Id.; see Hans Smit, International Litigation Under the United States Code, 65
COLUM. L. REV. 1015, 1027 (1965).
615. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2479; see Smit, supra note 614, at 1026-27, 1026 n.71, 1027 n.73.
616. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2479-80; see Smit, supra note 614, at 1026 & n.72.
617. Intel, 124 S. Ct. at 2479-80.
618. Id. at 2480.
619. Id. at 2481.
620. Id. at 2483.
621. Id. at 2484 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2485 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
622. Id. at 2484-85 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
623. Id. at 2485 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
624. Id, (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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for the target to settle the underlying foreign dispute.6 5 Instead, Justice
Breyer proposed two limiting principles on his interpretation of the
statute: (1) where doubts exist over whether the foreign entity qualifies
as a tribunal, a court should defer to the entity's own view of its mission
(here the EC disavowed any desire for AMD's discovery); and (2) a
court should deny discovery where it would be unavailable under both
foreign law and domestic law (here EC law did not permit AMD to
obtain discovery and AMD, as a third party, would not be entitled to it
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).626
This case resolves some important interpretive puzzles about an oft-
overlooked, obscure statute in international civil litigation. As increased
globalization fuels more transboundary private disputes, tools such as
§ 1782 will become increasingly important. The greatest impact of Intel's
holding probably will not be felt in EC antitrust investigations. Instead,
the decision may have the greatest impact in international arbitration
proceedings involving U.S. companies.627 The decision clears many of the
hurdles necessary for a party to a foreign arbitration to obtain documents
or testimony from its adversary that are located in the United States.
This possibility raises the specter that Intel feared, namely, non-
reciprocal discovery rights that may enable the foreign party to obtain
more information about the U.S. adversary than could be obtained from
it. The Court's opinion contains enough qualifying language that it might
still reach a different result in an international arbitration case (or at
least apply the discretion-guiding factors differently). But practitioners
of international arbitration should watch for the growing use of this
statute in future proceedings.
Rumsfeld v. Padilla
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, one of the two "enemy combatant" cases,
629
involved facts with which most readers already will be quite familiar.
625. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
626. Id. at 2486 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
627. Prior to Intel, U.S. judicial assistance to a foreign court was not always
forthcoming. See, e.g., In re Sarrio, No. 9-372, 1995 WL 598988 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 1995)
(holding that § 1782 cannot be invoked to require production of evidence originally
located in Spain even though the evidence is currently in the United States). But see In re
Brierley, 145 B.R. 151 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) (permitting, in the interests of comity,
discovery of evidence in the United States for purposes of an English insolvency
proceeding). For an overview on the rise of U.S. courts' producing evidence for a foreign
proceeding, see GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (3d ed.
2001).
628. 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004).
629. Dan Eggan & Susan Schmidt, U.S. Says It Has Thwarted Dirty-Bomb Terrorist
Plot, WASH. POST, June 16, 2002, at A3.
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Padilla, a U.S. citizen, was seized at a Chicago airport and taken to New
York on a "material witness" warrant issued by a grand jury.6
Suspected of being part of an al Qaeda plot to detonate a "dirty bomb"
in the United States, Padilla later was transferred to a military detention
facility in South Carolina.6 His lawyer filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus in New York challenging the constitutionality of his
632detention. The district court held that the President had the authority
to detain Padilla (subject to, inter alia, a right to challenge the President's
determination and a right to counsel). 633 The Second Circuit reversed
and ordered his release.634
In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, a closely divided Supreme
Court reversed and held that the New York court lacked jurisdiction
over Padilla's petition.635 In the majority's view, two rules controlled this
case. The first was the "immediate custodian" rule, under which a
habeas petition generally must sue the leader of the facility where he is
636being held, not his ultimate superior located elsewhere. In this case,
that rule required Padilla to sue the commandant of the South Carolina
brig, not Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.637 The second was that federal
courts' habeas power was limited to granting relief "within their
respective jurisdictions." '638 That rule limited a federal court's habeas
power to the territory of the district where it was located and,
consequently, required a habeas petition to seek relief in the district of
his confinement.639  Padilla failed to do this by suing in New York
(instead of South Carolina), and none of the cases creating exceptions to
that general rule applied here.6'40
Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice O'Connor) filed a concurring
opinion.64' While agreeing with the majority, Justice Kennedy expanded
on what he believed was meant by the "jurisdictional" limitation of the
"immediate custodian" rule .42 In his view, this rule did not function as a
"subject matter jurisdiction limitation," but was more akin to a personal
630. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2715.
631. Id. at 2715-16.
632. Id. at 2716.
633. Id. at 2716 & n.5.
634. Id. at 2717.
635. Id. at 2729.
636. See id. at 2718.
637. Id. at 2721-22.
638. Id. at 2724 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000)).
639. Id. at 2722 (citing Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611 (1961)).
640. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2725-27.
641. Id. at 2727 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
642. Id. at 2727-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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jurisdiction or venue limitation. 43 As such, it was waivable and was
subject to equitable exceptions that the Court might craft (such as when
the habeas petitioner is moved to another jurisdiction after the petition
has been filed).i Here, the Government did not waive the defense,
none of the well established exceptions applied, and Padilla had not
made a sufficient showing to justify an expansion of those equitable
exceptions.64'
Justice Stevens (joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer)
dissented.6  The dissent accused the majority of dodging the merits of a
case of profound national importance.647  While agreeing with the
majority about the general applicability of the "immediate custodian"
rule and the jurisdictional limitation on federal courts' habeas power, the
dissent believed that this case appropriately fell within the equitable
exceptions justifying the exercise of jurisdiction. 48 The dissent suggested
the majority returned to an interpretation of habeas corpus "that would
suffocate the writ in stifling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with
the manacles of arcane and scholastic procedural requirements."6 9
Having determined that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper, the
dissent concluded by opining that Padilla surely was entitled to a hearing
on his status, for nothing less than the essence of a free society was at
stake .65
Padilla arose in an admittedly awkward procedural posture. To reach
the merits of the case would have forced the Court to make new habeas
law that could not be easily confined to the unique setting presented by
this case and thus risked havoc for the ordinary course of habeas corpus.
To that extent, the majority's decision is faithful to the doctrine. Yet the
dissent is not without cause for complaint. For the upshot of the
majority's rule is twofold. First, it encourages defense counsel to file
preemptive habeas petitions in order to "lock in" the jurisdiction of the
court in the district where a defendant is detained, even if the defendant
is subsequently moved. And perhaps more insidiously, it encourages the
Government to engage in forum shopping by moving detainees to
jurisdictions with inhospitable habeas jurisprudence (note that South
Carolina is in the traditionally conservative Fourth Circuit). The
643. Id. at 2727 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
644. Id. at 2728-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
645. Id. at 2729 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
646. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
647. Id. at 2729-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
648. Id. at 2731 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
649. Id. at 2733 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S.
345, 350 (1973)).
650. Id. at 2735 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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presence of the Hamdi v. Rumsfeld65' case on the docket at the same time
as Padilla enabled the Court to reach the merits of "an enemy
combatant" case (albeit one involving a U.S. citizen seized on the
battlefield) without having to clear the procedural hurdles necessary to
reach the merits in Padilla's case. One wonders whether the Court would
have charted the same path without the availability of Hamdi to address
the constitutional issues.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Hamdi was the other major enemy combatant case on the Court's
docket.652 Like Padilla, Hamdi was a U.S. citizen.6 3 Unlike Padilla,
Hamdi was seized on the battlefield in Afghanistan, not in the United
States.654 The Government classified him as an enemy combatant and
651moved him to a military brig in South Carolina. Challenging that
classification, Hamdi's father (who claimed that his son was performing
relief work in Afghanistan) filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 656
The district court found that the Government had submitted insufficient
evidence to justify Hamdi's detention, but the Fourth Circuit reversed,
placing great weight on the fact that Hamdi was captured in an active
combat zone and, consequently, was not entitled to a full-fledged factual
hearing on the necessity of his detention.657
A badly divided Supreme Court reversed and held that (1) the
President, acting pursuant to a congressional authorization, had the
authority to detain Hamdi; and (2) Hamdi was entitled to challenge the
658factual basis for his detention before a neutral decision maker. Justice
O'Connor (joined by the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy, and Justice
6591Breyer) penned the plurality opinion. On the first point, the plurality
believed that the congressional authorization to use military force
660
encompassed individuals who fought as part of the Taliban against the
United States in Afghanistan, and Ex parte Quirin6 1 made clear that such
authorizations could include the detention of U.S. citizens before a
651. 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004).
652. Id.
653. Id. at 2635.
654. Id. at 2635-36.
655. Id. at 2636.
656. Id.
657. Id. at 2638.
658. Id. at 2640-41, 2648.
659. Id. at 2634 (plurality opinion).
660. Authorization for Use of Military Force, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (Supp. 2001).
661. 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (holding that American citizens associated with the military of
an enemy government are enemy belligerents and detainable).
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military tribunal. 62 On the second point, the plurality borrowed the
balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge663 to determine the scope of
Hamdi's right to challenge his classification . 6 4 Finding weighty interests
on both sides of the balance, the plurality held that Hamdi was entitled
to receive "notice of the factual basis for his classification" and a "fair
opportunity" to rebut that classification "before a neutral decision
maker." 665 While the plurality did not provide a detailed sketch of the
procedures governing such a proceeding, it did offer some limited
guidance: (1) the system might work on burden-shifting principles (with
the Government bearing the initial burden to produce facts supporting
its classification and, at such point, shifting the burden to Hamdi); (2)
while the decision maker had to be neutral, it could under the
appropriate circumstances be a military official; and (3) Hamdi had a
right to counsel in connection with these proceedings. 6 6
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, filed an opinion concurring
in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment.667 Parting
ways with the plurality, these justices believed that Hamdi's detention
was unlawful because Congress had not authorized it (and Article II did
not allow the President to act absent congressional authorization).
69
Having lost that point (with Justice Thomas, infra, providing the fifth
vote for the plurality on it), these justices agreed that Hamdi was, at
least, entitled to the procedural protections sketched out in Justice
669O'Connor's plurality opinion.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, filed a dissenting opinion. 670
In their view, the Government should lose this case for a simple reason:
when someone takes up arms against the United States (as Hamdi is
alleged to have done), the Government may prosecute that individual for
671treason. If wartime necessity or other exigencies make prosecutionimpracticable, the Constitution provides a very simple mechanism-
662. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2640-41 (plurality opinion).
663. 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (announcing a balancing test for weighing an individual's
right to due process against the Government's asserted interest).
664. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2646-48 (plurality opinion).
665. Id. at 2648 (plurality opinion).
666. Id. at 2649, 2651-52 (plurality opinion).
667. Id. at 2652 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
668. Id. at 2653-56 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in
the judgment).
669. Id. at 2660 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
670. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
671. Id. at 2663-64 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Congress can suspend the Habeas Corpus Clause." Because Congress
has not suspended the Clause and because the Government has not
prosecuted Hamdi for treason, the Government cannot lawfully detain a
U.S. citizen within the Nation's territory (the result might be different for
non-citizens or for citizens detained outside the territory)."'3 To hold
otherwise (as the plurality and Justice Thomas did) flies in the face of
centuries of constitutional jurisprudence and pre-constitutional English
674practice.
Justice Thomas also dissented but on substantially different grounds. 75
In Justice Thomas's view, the Executive had the authority to detain
enemy combatants such as Hamdi.67 Courts were ill-equipped to second-
guess that executive determination and, by doing so, were unduly
interfering in the Executive's ability to make sensitive national security
67determinations. The procedural protections put forth by the plurality
might be sensible policy, but the prerogative to develop them belongs to
Congress, not to the Court.67' The only question properly before the
Court is whether the President has the authority to determine Hamdi's
status as an enemy combatant (not the correctness of that
determination). 679 Having concluded that the President has this authority
(in this case, supported by a congressional authorization), the Court
should have gone no further. 68°  Even assuming that the Mathews
framework applies (a view that Justice Thomas does not share), the
majority misapplies it by discounting how a hearing would impede the
Government's ability to gather intelligence and to prosecute war.681
Somewhat unexpectedly, Hamdi, instead of Padilla, proved to be the
pathbreaking enemy combatant case. Prior to argument, some
speculated that the Court would take a more deferential view of Hamdi
(because it involved a citizen seized on the battlefield) but condemn the
Government's practice in Padilla (because it involved a citizen seized on
U.S. soil). Since Padilla ultimately was resolved on procedural grounds,
Hamdi (ably argued by CUA alum, Frank Dunham) became the main
event. The fanfare did not disappoint, though the reasoning left
672. Id. at 2664-65. The Constitution provides that "[tihe Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 2.
673. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2671-73.
674. Id. at 2661-71.
675. Id. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
676. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
677. Id. at 2680, 2683-85 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
678. Id. at 2674 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
679. Id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
680. Id. at 2680 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
681. Id. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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something to be desired. Unsurprisingly, a majority of the Court rejected
the Government's extreme position (no judicial review), allegedly taken
over the recommendation of the Solicitor General.62 Slightly more
surprisingly, the Court came within one vote (where was Justice Breyer?)
of holding the detention unconstitutional. It avoided this outcome (and
the thorny question of the scope of Executive power) through a sleight of
hand-concluding that the Authorization for Use of Military Force
authorized the President to detain Hamdi.613 This was curious for two
reasons: (1) as Justice Scalia pointed out, the statute nowhere authorizes
detention;8 4 and (2) it authorizes action only against those whom the
President determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided in the
September 11 attacks-a category in which the plurality lumps Padilla by
declaring it "obvious" that this language extended to Taliban soldiers
fighting the United States generally.6"' Not only was its reasoning
dubious, its guidance for future proceedings was especially vague. The
Court intimated that a military tribunal might supply the required
neutral decision maker but did not directly address that question; it also
proclaimed that people like Hamdi were entitled to the assistance of
counsel but did not bother to explain why that was the case, much less
why the Court was addressing this arguably moot issue (Hamdi had
received access to counsel).68 Thus, despite the one opportunity it had
this Term to opine on some of the most important and pressing
constitutional issues presently facing the country, the Court balked.
Some credit should go to Justices Souter and Ginsburg who provided the
necessary votes on the "hearing" issues so that the Court could at least
issue a judgment.187 One wishes, however, that the plurality had been a
bit more carefully crafted and thoroughly developed so that courts and
litigants had more guidance for future matters.
Rasul v. Bush
Rasul v. Bush611 concerned the ability of foreign captives, detained at
the U.S. military base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to challenge the
legality of their detention.6 89 The facts are well known. Following the
commencement of military activities in Afghanistan, the United States
682. The Hamdi Catch-22, WASH. POST, June 28, 2002, at A28.
683. Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2639-40.
684. Id. at 2671 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
685. Id. at 2640 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
686. Id. at 2652 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
687. Id. at 2660 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment).
688. 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
689. Id. at 2690.
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
transported to Guantanamo Bay a number of foreign citizens seized on
the battlefield. 690 There, it held them in an effort both to remove them
from the battlefield and to obtain intelligence related to terrorist
activities directed at the United States.691 Several of these detainees, all
foreign citizens, challenged the legality of their detention through a
variety of statutory mechanisms, including, among others, the habeas
corpus statute, the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),692 and the Administrative
Procedure Act.693 Construing their claim as a request for habeas corpus
694
relief, the district court dismissed their action. Relying on Johnson v.
Eisentrager,695 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
affirmed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction over the claims of foreigners
detained in U.S. military custody and held outside the sovereign territory
of the United States.696
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, the Supreme Court reversed and held
that federal courts had jurisdiction to consider the legality of the foreign
captives' detention. 9' After tracing the roots of the habeas corpus
power, the Court confronted the Government's primary argument that
Eisentrager barred the exercise of habeas jurisdiction.696 In the majority's
view, Eisentrager rested critically on Ahrens v. Clark,699 which held that a
court's habeas power was limited to its territorial jurisdiction .7,
Decisions since Ahrens had effectively overruled that restrictive
interpretation of the Court's jurisdiction and, consequently, the critical
premise on which Eisentrager rested.01  Thus, Eisentrager did not
control. 702 The Court next rejected the Government's argument that
extraterritorial application of the habeas statute required a clear
statement from Congress; in the Court's view, that argument was
inapposite where, as here, the detainees were held in an area that was the
690. Id.
69t. Brief for the Respondents at 4, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos. 03-334,
03-343).
692. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (providing that district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United Nations).
693. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2691; Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237
(1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
694. Id.
695. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
696. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2691-92.
697. Id. at 2698.
698. Id. at 2693.
699. 335 U.S. 188 (1948).
700. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2694.
701. Id. at 2695 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973)).
702. Id.
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functional equivalent of the territorial jurisdiction of the United States
(particularly in light of the Government's concession that a federal court
would have habeas jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen detained there)."3
Finally, the Court held that Eisentrager did not bar the detainees' ATS
claim and that aliens, no less than U.S. citizens, had a right of access to
U.S. courts if they had a cognizable claim.70
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment0 5  Skeptical of the
majority's argument that Braden overruled the statutory premise on
which Eisentrager rested, he nonetheless believed that the result reached
706by the majority flowed from Eisentrager. In his view, Eisentrager
articulated a sliding scale of Executive power over military affairs (to the
exclusion of judicial oversight) depending on certain facts.7 7 Two critical
facts distinguished this case from Eisentrager and necessitated a different
result.7 " First, the detainees in this case were being held in a locale that,
for all practical purposes, constituted U.S. territory (whereas the
detainees in Eisentrager were being held in the territory of a foreign
sovereign). 9  Second, the detainees in this case were "being held
indefinitely, and without benefit of any legal proceeding to determine
their status" (unlike the detainees in Eisentrager who had been tried by
military commissions and sentenced to prison terms).
710
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas,
dissented. T In his view, the majority was turning its back on more than a
half-century of jurisprudence, leading all the way back to Eisentrager1 2
Its reasoning, grounded in the demise of Ahrens, amounted to an over-
reading of the intervening Supreme Court precedent.713 Coming at a time
when U.S. forces were still fighting in the battlefield, the majority's
decision ran the risk of jeopardizing military operations and throwing
open federal courts to habeas claims from around the globe." In the
dissent's view, such a radical step, if it should be taken, should come from
Congress, not the courts.715
703. Id. at 2696.
704. Id. at 2698-99.
705. Id. at 2699 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
706. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
707. Id. at 2699-700 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
708. Id. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
709. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
710. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
711. Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
712. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
713. Id. at 2704-05 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
714. Id. at 2706-07 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
715. Id. at 2711 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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For all the fanfare that it created, Rasul is likely not to have much
impact in the war on terror though it may in the war over the meaning of
the habeas statute. While the decision certainly opens the jurisdictional
door for challenges to the legality of detentions, it of course offers no
view on the merits of the question. Moreover, cabined as it was by the
unique nature of the military facility at Guantanamo Bay, the decision,
contrary to Justice Scalia's worst-case scenarios, does not hold (or
require) that federal courts now answer the door whenever any prisoner
detained on the battlefield comes knocking. Instead, the case is limited
to the perhaps unique situation of a federal enclave that is within the
sovereign control of the United States even if the underlying title to the
land belongs to a foreign sovereign. Perhaps the greater impact of the
decision will be felt in the garden-variety habeas case. By rejecting the
fairly straightforward and strict textualist interpretation of the habeas
statute offered by Justice Scalia, the majority now raises the question
whether federal courts might be able to reach across state (or district)
lines to challenge the detention by a custodian elsewhere. Padilla
suggests that this will not always be the case, but reconciling those two
decisions and articulating a coherent theory for the super-jurisdictional
habeas power for the federal courts will be a task that the lower courts
will face for some time to come.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machaim"' involved the availability of a federal forum
for certain torts committed against aliens.77  Alvarez-Machain was
wanted in the United States for trial on charges of murdering a federal
7181drug agent. With the approval of federal narcotics enforcement
authorities, Mexican officials abducted him and brought him to the
United States. 719 Following his acquittal, Alvarez-Machain sued Sosa, a
Mexican official, under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and federal
officials under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 70 After a rather
circuitous procedural history, 2' the district court eventually granted
716. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
717. Id. at 2746.
718. Id.
719. Id.
720. Id. at 2747; 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (2000) (removing sovereign immunity of the United
States from suits in torts and, with certain specific exceptions, rendering government liable
as a private individual would be under the same circumstances).
721. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd sub nom.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). "The District Court partially granted
defendant's motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals ...reversed in part and
remanded. On remand, the ... District Court . . . entered summary judgment against
former policeman, substituted United States for DEA agents, and dismissed [Alvarez-
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Alvarez-Machain summary judgment on his ATS claim but dismissed his
FTCA claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ATS claim but
reversed as to the FTCA claim.723
In an opinion by Justice Souter, a divided Supreme Court reversed.2
The Court announced two main holdings. First, the Court held that
Alavarez-Machain could not state a claim under the FTCA.125 The
FTCA waives the Federal Government's sovereign immunity for certain
torts but creates an exception to the waiver for torts "arising in a foreign
country., 72 6  In the Court's view, that exception barred any claim
(including Alvarez-Machain's) where the injury occurred on foreign soil,
even if the planning and directing of the tort took place on U.S. soil."' In
reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's
"headquarters doctrine," which had allowed F1TCA claims for alleged
injuries suffered abroad as a result of planning in the United States.728
Second, the Court held that Sosa could not state a claim under the ATS.
In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the extreme positions
offered by both sides in the case-Sosa's (and the Government's)
position that the ATS afforded no cause of action and Alvarez-Machain's
position that the ATS afforded a broadly available cause of action.9
Instead, after canvassing the sparse history of the ATS, the majority
concluded that the ATS did afford a cause of action for certain limited
torts that the drafters of the ATS (part of the 1789 Judiciary Act) likely
envisioned -offenses against ambassadors, violation of safe conduct, and
piracy.730 To qualify for a cause of action under the ATS, a tort must
have a content and acceptance as widespread as these torts did in the
eighteenth century.7" Since Alvarez-Machain's claim did not fall within
this limited class, the ATS was unavailable.32
Justice Scalia, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas,
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment.733 While agreeing with
Machain's] FTCA claims." Id. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded. Id.
722. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747.
723. Id.
724. Id.
725. Id. at 2754.
726. Id. at 2748 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (2000)).
727. Id. at 2749.
728. Id. at 2748-54 (discussing Cominotto v. United States, 802 F.2d 1127 (9th Cir.
1986)).
729. Id. at 2754-55.
730. Id. at 2759.
731. Id. at 2765.
732. Id. at 2769.
733. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
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Justice Souter's analysis of the FTCA claim and with his canvas of the
ATS's history, Justice Scalia parted company over the availability of the
cause of action under the ATS.3  Justice Scalia accused Justice Souter of
inventing judge-made law where none was appropriate. Instead of
carving out a narrow class of cases where the ATS provided a cause of
action, Justice Scalia would have held categorically that the ATS does
not provide a cause of action under any circumstances.736 That decision
must be made by Congress.737
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in part and
concurred in the judgment. 38 While joining completely the majority's
disposition of Alvarez-Machain's ATS claim and the result on the FTCA
claim, Justice Ginsburg's disposition of the FTCA claim rested on
different reasoning.739 Unlike the majority, Justice Ginsburg read the
foreign tort exception to the sovereign immunity waiver to apply to
"'place[s] where the act or omission occurred,"' not places where the
injury occurred.7 0  In her view, this interpretation harmonized the
foreign tort exception with other sections of the FTCA and avoided
federal courts' entanglement in the interpretation of foreign law.741
Finally, Justice Ginsburg rejected the Ninth Circuit's "headquarters
doctrine" because it "render[ed] the FTCA's foreign-country exception
inapplicable" and entailed needlessly confusing choice-of-law
determinations when the acts crossed state boundaries.42
Justice Breyer filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment.743 Agreeing completely with Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer
added that the availability of the ATS claim also should turn on notions
of comity-whether the exercise of jurisdiction respects foreign nations'
sovereign rights and whether a universal consensus exists both on the
existence of a right and the procedures for vindicating it.
744
Sosa is an important case in the development of federal law governing
the availability of a federal forum for international human rights
violations. Though the ATS statute had been enacted over two centuries
734. Id. at 2769-70.
735. Id. at 2772.
736. Id. at 2772-76.
737. Id. at 2776.
738. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
739. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
740. Id. at 2777 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b)(1)).
741. Id. at 2778-79 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
742. Id. at 2780-81 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
743. Id. at 2782 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
744. Id. at 2782-83 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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earlier, this was the Court's first opportunity to offer any interpretation
of the law's meaning or scope. 745  As a result of several pathbreaking
opinions in the Second Circuit, the statute has been an important
vehicle for the pursuit of civil claims for human rights violations. 74 Had
the Court adopted Justice Scalia's position (as the Government urged), it
would have cut off an important avenue of relief for such claims (albeit
on a quite plausible theory). By leaving the door open (albeit only
slightly), the Court ensures that the statute will continue to supply an
important vehicle for such claims in the future but with the added
wrinkle that the parties must squabble over whether the underlying tort
at issue adequately resembles the types of cognizable claims described by
the majority.
Environmental
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen741 was an important
case for the Bush administration.744 Prior to its entry into the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the United States
maintained a moratorium on the operation of Mexican trucks in the
710Untied States . In NAFTA, the United States agreed to lift the
moratorium but, after some foot-dragging, Mexico commenced
arbitration under NAFIA, which led to an award concluding that
America's failure to lift the moratorium violated NAFTA.75' Shortly
thereafter, President Bush announced his intention to lift the
moratorium.752  Subsequently, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Administration (FMCSA) issued safety regulations governing Mexican
745. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 36-49 (3d ed. 1996); Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International
Law Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, in THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN
ANALYTICAL ANTHOLOGY 175-78 (Ralph G. Steinhardt & Anthony D'Amato eds., 1999)
[hereinafter THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT].
746. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980).
747. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Internalization of Domestic Law, in THE ALIEN
TORT CLAIMS ACT, supra note 745, at 3-6.
748. 124 S. Ct. 2204 (2004).
749. See Joseph Miller, United States Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen,
28 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 593, 593 (2004).
750. Public Citizen, 124 S. Ct. at 2210-11.
751. Id. at 2211; see also North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32
I.L.M. 605.
752. Public Citizen, 124 S. Ct. at 2211.
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motor carriers.753  Federal law required FMCSA to assess the
environmental impact of the rules and, when doing so, FMCSA assumed
that the rules would not change the truck volume between the United
States and Mexico.5 4 It reasoned that any change in volume was due to
President Bush's lifting of the moratorium, not the FMCSA's rules."'
Interest groups challenged this decision, and the Ninth Circuit granted
their request for relief. 
756
In a unanimous opinion by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court
reversed and held that the federal law did not require the FMCSA to1 57
consider the effect of the truck volume. The Court first considered
whether the FMCSA's action comported with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)58 and its related
regulations. In brief, those rules required FMCSA to consider
"effects" of its issuance of the rules. 67 In the Court's view, any increase
in Mexican trucking volume was not an "effect" of FMCSA's rules
because FMCSA lacked any ability to countermand the President's
decision to lift the moratorium on Mexican trucks.16' Due to FMCSA's
"limited statutory authority over the relevant actions," any rules issued
by the agency did not "cause" the "effects" subject to the NEPA's
-762
environmental impact requirements. The Court then considered
whether FMCSA's action comported with the Clean Air Act (CAA),763
which prohibited an agency from any activity that would violate a state's
air quality implementation plan. 64  Looking to the regulations
promulgated under the CAA, the Court concluded that, although
FMCSA's action qualified as a "cause" (as that term is used) of any
increased emissions due to the entry of Mexican trucks, the CAA only
applied to "direct" or "indirect emissions," and the emissions from the
Mexican trucks did not qualify under either category.765 At bottom, the
Court tracked its analysis under the NEPA -that the FMCSA lacked any
ability to countermand the President's decision to lift the moratorium.
753. Id.
754. id. at 2209, 2212.
755. Id. at 2212.
756. Id,
757. Id. at 2218-19.
758. 42 U.S.C § 4332 (2000).
759. Id. at 2213-14; 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1518.4 (2003).
760. Public Citizen, 124 S. Ct. at 2213.
761. Id. at 2216.
762. Id. at 2217.
763. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7431 (2000).
764. Public Citizen, 124 S. Ct. at 2217.
765. Id. at 2218.
766. Id.
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This case averted a thorny political battle. Had the Ninth Circuit's
decision been allowed to stand, it would have put the United States at
odds with its international treaty obligations and chilled its relationship
with one of its most important trading partners. Moreover, the issue of
cross-border Mexican trucking operations had been the subject of close
congressional scrutiny, and resolution of the issue depended critically
on FMCSA's issuance of these rules.7 68 Thus, as a political matter, the
Court handed the administration a major victory. The decision also has
some significant legal consequences. It has the potential to reshape the
parameters of NEPA's environmental impact requirement where agency
action is decoupled from an exercise of Presidential authority. In such
cases, the decision lightens the burden on agencies to limit their
environmental impact assessment to a relatively narrow class of "effects"
that flow directly from their rules, rather than from Presidential decisions
related to but not directly flowing from the issuance of those rules. The
decision surely complicates efforts of the public interest-environmental
litigation community to use NEPA's environmental impact requirement
as a tool to slow or thwart agency action.
Separation of Powers
Cheney v. United States District Court
Cheney v. United States District Court69 involved tricky issues of
jurisdictional, statutory and constitutional law. Shortly after his election,
President Bush formed the National Energy Policy Development Group
(NEPDG).170 At a minimum, the NEPDG membership consisted of the
Vice President (the chairman) and various senior staff from government
agencies.7 In addition to these members, representatives of private
industry allegedly attended and voted at the NEPDG's meetings.772 Such
participation, if true, could trigger the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA), which imposes open-meeting and disclosure requirements.773
Various public interest organizations filed suit under the Mandamus
Act T7 and the Administrative Procedure Act, alleging violations of
FACA.775  In relevant part, the district court declined to dismiss the
767. See, e.g., id. at 2210-11.
768. See id. at 2214-15.
769. 124 S. Ct. 2576 (2004).
770. Id. at 2582.
771. Id.
772. Id. at 2583.
773. See 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2000).
774. 28 U.S.C § 1361 (2000).
775. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2583.
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complaint against certain government defendants, and the case
776proceeded to discovery. The plaintiffs propounded broad discovery
requests against the remaining government defendants and the Vice
President, which the district court refused to narrow.777 The government
defendants petitioned for a writ of mandamus, which the D.C. Circuit
refused to issue, principally on the ground that the government
defendants had failed to invoke executive privilege.""
In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed and
held that the government defendants' failure to invoke executive
privilege did not render mandamus inappropriate 779 After dispensing
with a preliminary jurisdictional objection, the Court considered
whether, and under what circumstances, mandamus would be
appropriate in this case.78  It reviewed the three prerequisites for
mandamus to issue-that the party seeking mandamus has "no other
adequate means to obtain the relief," that this party has a "clear and
indisputable" right to the relief, and that issuance of the writ "is
appropriate under the circumstances." '781 The majority then explained
how this case, particularly because the Vice President was among the
named defendants, implicated important separation of powers
considerations that should have informed a court's mandamus analysis.1
82
However, the majority did not ultimately decide whether mandamus was
appropriate in this case.78 3 Instead, it simply held that the D.C. Circuit
placed excessive weight on the fact that the government defendants,
unlike the President in United States v. Nixon ,8 did not invoke executive
privilege. Nixon was not on point primarily because that case involved
a criminal prosecution where the public's need for information was great
and where several checks existed to limit overzealous prosecution.
Moreover, in contrast to the strict constraints placed on the subpoenas in
Nixon, the discovery requests in this case (the first round of presumably
many) were far-reaching and swept up an array of documents and
information that the government defendants would potentially have to
187review. In the Court's view, other choices were available to the lower
776. Id. at 2584.
777. Id.
778. Id. at 2584.
779. Id. at 2592-93.
780. Id. at 2586-87.
781. Id. at 2587.
782. Id. at 2587-88.
783. ld. at 2593.
784. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
785. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2593.
786. Id. at 2589-90.
787. Id. at 2590.
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788
courts before concluding that all (or no) discovery was appropriate.
Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the D.C. Circuit to
consider, anew, the government defendants' mandamus request.
789
Justice Stevens concurred.90 In his view, remand was appropriate
because the plaintiffs were seeking an extraordinary remedy
(mandamus) and had propounded exceedingly broad discovery in
connection with that request. 791' As a consequence, Justice Stevens
reasoned, granting broad discovery would effectively "prejudge" the
plaintiffs' case because, if they received the discovery, they would
effectively be getting all the relief that they were seeking. Remand was
appropriate, perhaps to craft a narrower discovery order limited to a few
interrogatories or depositions necessary to determine the extent of non-
Government participation in the NEPDG. 93
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in part and
794dissented in part. These justices agreed that the D.C. Circuit's
judgment had to be reversed. 795 However, they parted company with the
796
majority on how to dispose of the case. In their view, the case should
have been remanded with instructions that the D.C. Circuit issue
mandamus to the district court.7"' Since the plaintiffs in this case
themselves had proceeded on a writ of mandamus, they were only
entitled to that writ if they had a clear and unmistakable right to relief.
798
In Justice Thomas's view, even the district court acknowledged that
plaintiffs' right to relief was debatable, and it should follow, a priori, that
mandamus should not lie.799
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stevens, disscnted.9 In her view,
the D.C. Circuit was right to refuse mandamus because the Government
had failed to avail itself of available avenues for relief-namely, asking
the district court to narrow discovery or invoke executive privilege."°'
788. Id. at 2592.
789. Id. at 2593.
790. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
791. Id. at 2594 (Stevens, J., concurring).
792. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
793. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
794. Id. at 2594 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
795. Id. at 2595 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
796. id. at 2594-95 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
797. Id. at 2595 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
798. Id (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
799. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
800. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
801. Id. at 2595-96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Many have commented that the Court's decision in Cheney is a victory
for the White House.82  I am not so sure. The decision certainly
acknowledges the separation of powers concerns raised by the suit
(trimming back some of its broad language in Clinton v. Jones"3 that had
been less solicitous of these concerns) and leaves open the door for the
D.C. Circuit to issue mandamus. But the Court (with the exception of
Justices Scalia and Thomas) clearly was unwilling to order the D.C.
Circuit to issue the writ. As a result, the case leaves open the possibility
that the D.C. Circuit will decline to issue the writ on other grounds or
will issue the writ and order narrow discovery. Thus, the Court's
decision keeps alive the suit and the possibility that the Vice President
(barring a claim of executive privilege) still could be compelled to
disclose documents in connection with the NEPDG. Moreover, some
language in the opinion hints at the Court's skepticism over some of the
positions taken by the Government. For example, the Court was
unwilling to hold (and passed on whether) the collateral order doctrine
entitled the Vice President to immediate appellate review of a discovery
order. Additionally, the Court stated that, had the Vice President not
been named, its analysis of the propriety of mandamus might be
different. s This is perhaps the decision's oddest feature, for it suggests
that the plaintiffs simply made a poor tactical error. To the extent they
simply are seeking to prove non-Government participation in the
NEPDG, they could accomplish that result more easily by voluntarily
dismissing the Vice President and propounding discovery against the
remaining government defendants.
Civil Procedure
Hibbs v. Winn
Hibbs v. Winn8 is an Establishment Clause wolf in the clothing of a
civil procedure sheep. The plaintiffs commenced a case in federal court
challenging the constitutionality of Arizona's program authorizing an
income tax credit for payments to school tuition organizations that award
scholarships to students in private schools, including parochial schools.
80 7
802. See, e.g., Charles Lane, High Court Backs Vice President, WASH. POST, June 25,
2004, at Al.
803. 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
804. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2586. A collateral order is appealable because "[it] is not an
ingredient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it." Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
805. Cheney, 124 S. Ct. at 2587.
806. 124 S. Ct. 2276 (2004).
807. Id. at 2282.
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Arizona sought to dismiss the case on, among other grounds, the basis
that the Tax Injunction Act (TIA)0 8 barred the suit.809 The TIA prohibits
federal courts from restraining "'the assessment, levy or collection of any
tax under State law. ' ' 8'0 The district court dismissed the suit, but the
Ninth Circuit reversed.811
In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, a closely divided Supreme Court
affirmed and held that the TIA did not bar the plaintiffs' suit."' After
dispensing with an argument that the petitioner's certiorari petition was
untimely, the majority turned to the merits.8 3 The majority offered an
extended exposition on the importance of a federal forum in racial
desegregation cases when localities sought to revise their tax codes in an
effort to block school desegregation. 814 Apart from the importance of the
federal forum, the Court found that the lawsuit here did not offend the
core purposes of the TIA-which were to bar federal interference in
cases involving the assessment, levy, or collection of state taxes.1 ' In the
majority's view, plaintiffs' suit did not intrude on any of these functions
because it merely challenged the availability of a state tax credit."16 Thus,
to apply the TIA here would depart from the "secure, state-revenue-
protective moorings" of the Court's prior case law.Y The majority
closed by noting that numerous other federal court decisions had
explicitly or implicitly found no TIA bar to lawsuits involving similar
challenges to tax credit schemes."8
Justice Stevens penned a brief concurrence stating his view that
considerations of stare decisis trumped any textual argument in support
of TIA application."'
Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and
Thomas, dissented. 20 The dissent chided the majority for undervaluing
808. 28 U.S.C § 1341 (2000).
809. Hibbs, 124 S. Ct. at 2281. Respondent's argued that the certiorari petition was
jurisdictionally untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) since it was filed longer than ninety
days after the Ninth Circuit first entered judgment. However, the Court held that it was
timely because it was filed within ninety days of the date the Ninth Circuit denied
rehearing en banc. Id. at 2283-84.
810. id. at 2281 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000)).
811. Id. at 2283.
812. Id. at 2292.
813. Id. at 2284.
814. Id. at 2281.
815. Id. at 2288.
816. Id. at 2288-89.
817. Id. at 2289.
818. Id. at 2290-91.
819. Id. at 2292 (Stevens, J., concurring).
820. ld. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the role of a state judicial forum, which remained open to resolve these
suits.82' Moreover, the dissent distinguished TIA cases in which federal
courts had exercised jurisdiction on the ground that, in those cases
(unlike this one), no federal forum was available . 22 In the dissent's view,
the majority gave too crabbed an interpretation to the text of the TIA,
which it argued should be read to encompass any interference with "the
State's tax system administration and tax policy implementation."
23
Hibbs contains two important substantive lessons and a piece of gossip
for Court watchers. The first important substantive lesson is that this
case clears a hurdle for those litigants who seek to challenge state efforts
to promote private education in religious institutions. Following the
• . 824
Supreme Court's decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, five justices
were firmly on board in supporting such programs."" Here, however, the
dissenters in Zelman peeled away Justice O'Connor who chose not to
826
opine on the merits of the suit but whose vote let the litigation proceed.
The second important substantive lesson, relating to the first, is Justice
O'Connor's continuing importance as the swing vote in federalism cases.
To be sure, federalism issues, at the core of the TIA, abounded in this
case, which involved at bottom the faith in the state courts' ability to
fairly adjudicate challenges to state tax policy.817 It is no coincidence that
the four dissenters in this case are four of the same justices who comprise
eighty percent of the "federalism five" in other areasY8 However, here
they could not hold onto Justice O'Connor, which leads me to my piece
of gossip for Court watchers. Many speculate that Justice Ginsburg
flipped the Court in this case. They base their well-founded hypothesis
on the fact that Justice Ginsburg issued three decisions from the January
sitting whereas Justice Kennedy issued none. Almost without exception,
at least one majority opinion from each sitting is assigned to each
chamber, so a lacuna like that normally suggests a flip in the Court. One
can sense too, from how the opinions read, that Justice Kennedy's
opinion might originally have been a majority, and Justice Ginsburg's a
dissent.
821. Id. at 2293 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
822. Id. at 2296-97 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
823. Id. at 2298 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
824. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
825. Id. at 641.
826. See Hibbs, 124 S. Ct. at 2280.
827. Id. at 2281.
828. See, e.g., Mark R. Killenbeck, In(re)Dignity: The New Federalism in Perspective,
57 ARK. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (defining the "Federalism Five" as consisting of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas).
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Sovereign Immunity
Tennessee v. Lane
Tennessee v. Lane 29 involved whether Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA)83 validly abrogated state sovereign immunity.83'
The facts of this case are awful. Lane, a paraplegic, arrived at a
Tennessee courthouse to answer criminal charges.832 The hearing took
place on the second floor of the courthouse, which had neither an
elevator nor any other means of carrying Lane's wheelchair up a flight of
stairs.833 This forced Lane to crawl up two flights of stairs in order to
attend the first hearing.8 4 When he appeared for the second hearing,
Lane refused to climb the stairs or to be carried by officers.835 As a
result, he was jailed for failure to appear at the hearing.13 Lane, along
with another, filed suit against Tennessee arguing that it violated Title II
of the ADA which, in relevant part, bars the exclusion of disabled
individuals from "the benefits of the services, programs or activities of a
public entity. 8 37 Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit rejected
Tennessee's sovereign immunity defense.838
In an opinion by Justice Stevens, a closely divided Supreme Court
affirmed and held that Title II of the ADA, as applied to cases involving
the fundamental right of access to courts, validly abrogated states'
sovereign immunity.8 39  Applying its familiar two-step framework
developed in prior cases, the majority first concluded that Congress
unambiguously expressed its intent to abrogate the states' immunity; a
provision of the ADA contains express language to that effect. 4  The
Court then considered whether Congress acted pursuant to a valid grant
of statutory authority and concluded that it had done so.84' In the Court's
view, Title II, at least in the access-to-courts context, was a valid exercise
of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which the Court previously had recognized constituted a valid basis for
829. 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004).
830. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
831. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982.
832. Id.
833. Id.
834. Id.
835. Id. at 1983.
836. Id.
837. Id. at 1982-83 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000)).
838. Id. at 1983.
839. Id. at 1994.
840. Id. at 1985.
841. Id. at 1985-94.
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abrogating state sovereign immunity.842 To support that proposition, the
Court applied the "congruence and proportionality" test first developed
in City of Boerne v. Flores43 and later adapted to the sovereign immunity
context. 844 Under that test, the Court determined that Title II sought to
protect various "basic constitutional guarantees" that under the Due
Process Clause "are subject to more searching judicial review." 5 It then
determined that Title II sought to redress a history of unequal treatment
of the disabled in a wide variety of public service programs, as evidenced
in the Court's prior case law and various governmental reports. 6
Finally, the Court concluded that Title II was a properly measured
response to this history of maltreatment, at least in the context of access
to courts. 47
Several concurring opinions were filed. Justice Souter, joined by
Justice Ginsburg, penned a brief concurrence highlighting the judiciary's
historical complicity in unfair treatment of disabled individuals.w He
dredged up, among other things, the infamous statement of Justice
Holmes in a case upholding forced sterilization of the mentally disabled:
"Three generations of imbeciles are enough." 49 Justice Ginsburg, joined
by Justices Souter and Breyer, also filed a concurrence defending the
ADA as a "measure expected to advance equal-citizenship stature for
persons with disabilities. 8 5 She then argued that such legislation was
"entirely compatible with . ..federalism" because there was nothing
defensible in allowing states to disregard this principle of equal
citizenship.""
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas,
wrote the principal dissent." He found that Title II was not a valid
exercise of Congress's Section 5 power.8 53 He first criticized the historical
record cited by the majority to justify enactment of the ADA-in the
Chief's view, the record did not show that Congress was responding to
widespread violations of disabled persons' due process rights, and most
842. Id. at 1994; see also Nev. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 726
(2003); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
843. 521 U.S. 507,520 (1997).
844. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986-87.
845. Id. at 1988.
846. Id. at 1989-90.
847. Id. at 1992-93.
848. Id. at 1995 (Souter, J., concurring).
849. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
850. Id, at 1996 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
851. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
852. Id. at 1997 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
853. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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• 854
of the instances were acts of private, rather than public, mistreatment.
This utter lack of record evidence put this case squarely within Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett"'5 which held that Title I
of the ADA did not validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity due to
the lack of a historical pattern of discrimination.856 The dissent also
chided the majority for linking Title II to fundamental constitutional
rights-Title II was not so limited but instead spoke more generally
about any service or program (regardless of its fundamental status)
provided by a state entity."7 Finally, the dissent found that the majority's
"as-applied" analysis (limiting the case to access-to-court claims) was
inconsistent with its past precedents, embraced an unrealistic view of
Title II, and risked sparking substantial confusion over future questions
of congressional abrogation.5 s
Justice Scalia filed a separate dissent.8 9 In it, he expressed misgivings
over the "congruence and proportionality" test. ° In his view, such a test
was far too malleable and carried the risk that courts might impose their
own policy judgments on the legislature.16' An alternative test, rooted in
the meaning of "enforce" as that term is used in Section 5, provided a
surer footing.86' While stare decisis perhaps required a more
"permissive" view of the Section 5 power in the context of racial
discrimination, Justice Scalia declared his unwillingness to apply it in
other contexts.
8 63
Justice Thomas filed a brief dissent, reminding the reader that he
dissented from the Court's sovereign immunity decision in Nevada
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs8 (which the Chief authored)
and therefore making clear that his agreement with the Chief's dissent in
865this case did not rely in any way on Hibbs.
854. Id. at 1999 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
855. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
856. Id. at 374; see Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2002 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also 42
U.S.C. § 12112 (2000). Title I of the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits the
states and other employers from "discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a
disability because of that disability ... in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,
advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other
terms, conditions and privileges of employment." Id. § 12112(a).
857. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2004 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
858. Id. at 2005-06 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
859. Id. at 2007 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
860. Id. at 2007-08 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
861. ld. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
862. Id. at 2009 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
863. Id. at 2012-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
864. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
865. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 2013 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Lane is an important decision. Like last Term's decision in Hibbs, it
marks yet another fraying of the "federalism five" that has taken a hard-
line stance on issues of sovereign immunity over the past decade. Since
that alliance developed in Seminole Tribe v. Florida8"6 (over the fierce
dissents of Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), Justice
O'Connor consistently has proven to be the swing vote in sovereign
immunity cases, as Lane makes clear once again . 67 In two respects, Lane
holds the potential for further fraying the Seminole Tribe majority. First,
the decision paves the way for "as applied" challenges to statutes under
the sovereign immunity doctrine. Consequently, it enables the Seminole
Tribe dissenters to uphold a law within a narrow band of cases without
requiring a massive contraction of the sovereign immunity doctrine.
Second, its reliance on the fundamental rights doctrine, coupled with
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,86s sets the conditions for future cases, which, on the
logic of Lane, might uphold other legislation abrogating sovereign
immunity as a valid exercise of the Section 5 power.
Bankruptcy
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation v. Hood869 presented the
opportunity for further development of the Seminole Tribe line of cases,
but instead, became a case simply about bankruptcy procedure. 87° In
8711Hood, the respondent received a general discharge from bankruptcy.
Because the discharge did not cover her student loans, she reopened her
bankruptcy petition, arguing that paying her loans constituted an "undue
hardship.872 As part of this reopening procedure, she filed a complaint
and served a summons on the guarantor of her loans, the Tennessee
Student Assistance Corporation (TSAC), an undisputed state entity.8 73
Pleading sovereign immunity, TSAC moved to dismiss the complaint.874
The courts below rejected this contention, arguing that Congress had
validly abrogated the state's immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause.875
Although Seminole Tribe appeared to hold that Congress could rely only
866. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
867. Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1982.
868. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
869. 124 S. Ct. 1905 (2004).
870. Id. at 1908.
871. Id.
872. Id. at 1908-09; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2000).
873. Id. at 1908-09.
874. Id. at 1909.
875. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, c. 4.
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on constitutional powers developed subsequent to the Eleventh
Amendment to waive state sovereign immunity, the Sixth Circuit
distinguished that case on the ground that the Bankruptcy Clause is one
of only two powers for which the Constitution grants Congress the power
8176
to make "uniform" laws. In the Sixth Circuit's view, such uniform
powers were not at issue in Seminole Tribe, and there were good reasons
flowing from the need for uniform laws to allow Congress to abrogate
the states' immunity when acting pursuant to those powers.87 7
In an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court affirmed
but on different grounds than those relied on by the Sixth Circuit. 7 ' The
Court declined to reach the question presented by the petition for
certiorari (whether Congress may validly abrogate state sovereign
immunity pursuant to the Bankruptcy Clause) because, on the facts of
this case, the discharge of Hood's debt did not implicate state sovereign
879immunity. In the majority's view, bankruptcy jurisdiction was a form of
in rem jurisdiction (over the res of the debtor's estate).80 This finding
was important because the Court previously had recognized that a court
may exercise in rem jurisdiction over a res without offending sovereign
immunity principles.8 8 ' Here, although the bankruptcy rules required
Hood to file a complaint and to issue a summons against TSAC, that
procedure in the context of an in rem proceeding was the functional
equivalent of a motion, which did not implicate sovereign immunity
concerns.8 Thus, a bankruptcy court could proceed to disposition of the
res without having to exercise the in personam jurisdiction over the state,
normally attendant to service of a complaint and summons.88
Accordingly, discharge of Hood's student loan debt did not implicate
state sovereign immunity and did not require the Court to answer the
question presented.8 m
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, filed a brief concurring
opinion reaffirming their disagreement with Seminole Tribe 85
876. Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 319 F.3d 755, 763 (6th Cir.
2003), affd and remanded by 124 S. Ct. 1904 (2004); see also U.S CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
(granting Congress the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization).
877. Hood, 319 F.3d at 761-64.
878. Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1909.
879. Id. at 1909, 1915.
880. Id. at 1911.
881. Id.
882. Id. at 1913-14.
883. Id- at 1914.
884. Id. at 1914-15.
885. Id. at 1915 (Souter, J., concurring).
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886Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented. In their view,
discharging the debt did constitute a proceeding against the state.887
Justice Thomas found this case indistinguishable from Federal Maritime
Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority,88 where this Court
held that Seminole Tribe prohibits dragging an unconsenting state before
an independent federal agency.89 He also expressed doubt over the
majority's treatment of the complaint as the functional equivalent of a
motion-whatever the case, the proceeding clearly required the state to
litigate in order to vindicate its interests. 9 The dissent also took issue
with the Court's reliance on prior in rem cases-noting that those arose
under the Court's admiralty jurisdiction and thus involved different
considerations from its bankruptcy jurisdiction.Y' Having concluded that
nothing in the bankruptcy code required different treatment of the
state's interests in this case, Justice Thomas concluded that it fell
squarely within the Seminole Tribe principle-Congress clearly sought to
abrogate the states' immunity but, by virtue of relying on an Article I
power, lacked the constitutional authority to do so.89
This is an unexpected outcome. If the Court did not wish to answer
the question presented, it might simply have dismissed the case as
improvidently granted. But once it decided to delve into the merits of
the case, the majority had to tow a very fine line to explain why the case
did not implicate state sovereign immunity concerns (as every court
below believed that it had). Its analogy to in rem jurisdiction is plausible,
but its characterization of the complaint as a "functional equivalent" of a
motion is less so. Even assuming that the two are comparable for these
purposes, both vehicles, as Justice Thomas points out, require the state to
defend its interests-which is precisely the burden of which the Seminole
Tribe doctrine seeks to spare them.8 93 One wonders whether one of the
votes among the federalism five might not have been shaky (O'Connor),
prompting the Chief (a) to keep the opinion and (b) to write it in a way
that just barely dodged the need to decide the question while still
including extensive language that would allow courts to apply Seminole
Tribe in future cases presenting different facts. The only risk with this
result from the federalism perspective is that it expands the grounds
upon which future Courts might hold that a particular proceeding does
886. Id. at 1915 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
887. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
888. 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
889. Id. at 760-61; see Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1916-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
890. Hood, 124 S. Ct. at 1917-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
891. Id. at 1918 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
892. Id. at 1920 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
893. See id. at 1917 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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not "implicate" state sovereign interests even if the state is being forced
to litigate. Justice Thomas's opinion at least has the virtue of squarely
attacking the issue and offering a cleaner resolution of it.
III. CONCLUSION
October Term 2003 was an exceptional one for the Court. It
confronted some of the most challenging and troublesome issues that it
has faced for the last half century. The foregoing survey has provided
the reader with both a "macroeconomic" and a "microeconomic" view
on how the Court handled those issues. Some of the lessons from the
Term -such as the smaller docket, the inflow from the Ninth Circuit, and
the "swing vote" from Justice O'Connor-gel with the popular reports
on the Court. Others such as the glut of criminal cases, the high
unanimity rate, and the curious voting alliances (particularly broken out
among topic areas) have not been as obvious.
Perhaps the most critical lesson from the Court's Term has been the
triumph of "judicial minimalism" and the Court's reluctance to decide
cases broadly or to provide significant guidance for future proceedings or
future cases. In several instances, such as Padilla and Newdow, the Court
dodged a critical issue on a technical point. In others, such as Hamdi or
Cheney, the Court resolved a question but did so narrowly, leaving
litigants and courts to wonder just precisely what the Court wanted it to
do. And in yet others, such as Till and Seibert, the Court could not
muster five votes for a position, leaving lawyers to sort out the messy
opinions.
As the Court begins October Term 2004, Court watchers and
practitioners alike can be sure that the rivalries, debates, and trends
documented last term will surely revive. With a Presidential election and
possible retirements on the horizon, a close understanding of the Court's
operations will only become more important.
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APPENDIX: 1
Number of Cases Decided After Argument
October Term Number of Cases Decided
After Argument
2003 73
2002 73
2001 76
2000 79
1999 74
1998 78
1997 92
1996 81
1995 77
1994 84
1993 84
1992 107
1991 107
1990 102
APPENDIX: 2
Source of Cases
Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 2003
% Rev'd or Vacated
in Whole or in Part
# Rev'd or Vacated
in Whole or in Part # Decided
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
100%
75%
25% 1
Court
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Fifth Circuit
9 4
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
D.C. Circuit
Federal Circuit
An End of Term Exam
100%
75%
50%
75%
76%
100%
100%
100%
100%
U.S. District Courts 95100%
State Courts 96
TOTAL
67%
76%
894. Smith v. Dretke, 124 S. Ct. 1652 (2004) (mem.), not included because case was
dismissed.
895. McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, 540 U.S. 93 (2004), was reversed in
part and affirmed in part, therefore, it is included in this calculation.
896. Arizona v. Grant, 124 S. Ct. 461 (2003), is not included because case was
dismissed.
897. The Court decided nine cases from state courts this Term. Six were reversed or
vacated in whole or in part, two were affirmed, and one (Johnson v. California, 124 S. Ct.
1833 (2004) (per curiam)) was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
898. This total does not include the one original jurisdiction case decided by the Court
this Term (Virginia v. Maryland, 540 U.S. 56 (2004)) or two cases where the Court
dismissed the writ (Grant and Dretke).
79898
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APPENDIX: 3
Source of Cases
Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 2002
Court
% Rev'd or Vacated
in Whole or in Part
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
D.C. Circuit
Federal Circuit
U.S. District Courts
0%
100%
0%
100%
100%
71%
67%
100%
78%
100%
50%
33%
50%
75%
# Rev'd or Vacated
in Whole or in Part # Decided
0 1
2 2
0 0
3 3
3 3
5 7
2 3
1 1
18 23
1 1
2 4
1 3
1 2
3 4
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State Courts
TOTAL
81%
76%
APPENDIX: 3
Source of Cases
Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 2001
Court
First Circuit
Second Circu
Third Circuit
Fourth Circu
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circ
Eighth Circui
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Cir
D.C. Circuit
Federal Circu
% Rev'd or Vacated
in Whole or in Part
0%
it 100%
100%
it 64%
100%
90%
uit 0%
it 80%
78%
75%
cuit 100%
66%
uit 80%
# Rev'd or Vacated
in Whole or in Part # Decided
0 1
4 4
1 1
7 11
2 2
9 10
0 2
4 5
14 18
3 4
4 4
2 3
4 5
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U.S. District Courts 0% 0 1
State Courts 78% 7 9
TOTAL 76% 61 80
APPENDIX: 3
Source of Cases
Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 2000
% Rev'd or Vacated # Rev'd or Vacated
Court in Whole or in Part in Whole or in Part 4 Decided
First Circuit 100% 1 1
Second Circuit 38% 3 8
Third Circuit 60% 3 5
Fourth Circuit 40% 2 5
Fifth Circuit 50% 3 6
Sixth Circuit 71% 5 7
Seventh Circuit 50% 2 4
Eighth Circuit 33% 1 3
Ninth Circuit 77% 13 17
Tenth Circuit 75% 3 4
Eleventh Circuit 100% 3 3
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D.C. Circuit
Federal Circuit
U.S. District Courts
State Courts
Total
100%
100%
100%
86%
68%
APPENDIX: 3
Source of Cases
Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 1999
Court
First Circuit
Second Circu
Third Circuit
Fourth Circu
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circ
Eighth Circu
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
% Rev'd or Vacated
in Whole or in Part
0%
it 100%
0%
it 56%
67%
75%
uit 75%
it 20%
90%
t 50%
# Rev'd or Vacated
in Whole or in Part # Decided
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Eleventh Circuit
D.C. Circuit
Federal Circuit
U.S. District Courts
State Courts
TOTAL 61% 46
APPENDIX: 3
Source of Cases
Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 1998
Court in
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Rev'd or Vacated
Whole or in Part
0%
75%
67%
50%
80%
50%
100%
33%
# Rev'd or Vacated
in Whole or in Part # Decided
0 0
3 4
4 6
2 4
4 5
2 4
4 4
1 3
40%
0%
100%
0%
67%
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Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
D.C. Circuit
Federal Circuit
U.S. District Courts
State Courts
Other 9
Total 72% 58
APPENDIX: 3
Source of Cases
Supreme Court of the United States, October Term 1997
Court
First Circuit
Second Circu
Third Circuit
Fourth Circu
% Rev'd or Vacated
in Whole or in Part
60%
it 33%
25%
it 50%
# Rev'd or Vacated
in Whole or in Part # Decided
3 5
1 3
1 4
1 2
899. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
78%
25%
88%
50%
75%
67%
82%
100%
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Fifth Circuit 50% 6 12
Sixth Circuit 100% 3 3
Seventh Circuit 57% 4 7
Eighth Circuit 62% 8 13
Ninth Circuit 82% 14 17
Tenth Circuit 0% 0 1
Eleventh Circuit 100% 2 2
D.C. Circuit 44% 4 9
Federal Circuit 50% 1 2
U.S. District Courts 50% 1 2
State Courts 70% 7 10
Other9 100% 1 1
Total 61% 57 93
APPENDIX: 401
Breakdown of Docket by Category
CRIMINAL
Fourth Amendment
Illinois v. Lidster (9-0)
Thornton v. United States (7-2)
United States v. Banks (9-0) (unanimous)
900. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
901. "Unanimous" indicates a 9-0 decision in which no separate concurrence was filed.
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Groh v. Ramirez (5-4)
Maryland v. Pringle (9-0) (unanimous)
United States v. Flores-Montano (9-0)
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court (5-4)
Fifth Amendment
Missouri v. Seibert (5-4)
United States v. Patane (5-4)
Yarborough v. Alvarado (5-4)
Sixth Amendment
Crawford v. Washington (9-0)
Fellers v. United States (9-0) (unanimous)
Iowa v. Tovar (9-0) (unanimous)
Blakely v. Washington (5-4)
Death Penalty
Schriro v. Summerlin (5-4)
Nelson v. Campbell (9-0) (unanimous)
Beard v. Banks (5-4)
Tennard v. Dretke (6-3)
Smith v. Dretke (dismissed)
Banks v. Dretke (9-0)9o2
Habeas
Baldwin v. Reese (8-1)
Pliler v. Ford (7-2)
Dretke v. Haley (6-3)
Nonconstitutional Criminal Law and Procedure
Castro v. United States (9-0)
United States v. Dominguez Benitez (9-0)
Sabri v. United States (9-0)
RIGHTS
First Amendment
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (5-4) 903
902. Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred in part and dissented in part.
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Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (8-0) 9o4
Locke v. Davey (7-2)
Ashcroft v. ACLU (5-4)
City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4. L.L.C. (9-0)
Civil Rights Act
Jones v. R.R. Donnelly & Sons (9-0) (unanimous)
Voting Rights
Vieth v. Jubelirer (5-4)
INTERNATIONAL
Rumsfeld v. Padilla (5-4)
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (6-3)
Rasul v. Bush (6-3)
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (9-0)
Intel Corp v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. (7-1) 905
Olympic Airways v. Husain (6-2)906
Republic of Austria v. Altmann (6-3)
F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (8-0) 907
FEDERAL
Environment
South Florida Water Management v. Miccosukee Tribe (9-0)
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA (5-4)
Engine Manufacturers v. South Coast Air Quality Management (8-1)
BedRoc Ltd. v. United States (6-3)
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance (9-0) (unanimous)
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen (9-0) (unanimous)
Civil Procedure
Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P. (5-4)
Scarborough v. Principi (7-2)
903. This case is not included in the voting alliance calculations because the
breakdown of votes for each part of this case is too complex for this chart.
904. Justice Scalia did not participate in this case.
905. Justice O'Connor did not participate in this case.
906. Justice Breyer did not participate in this case.
907. Justice O'Connor did not participate in this case.
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Hibbs v. Winn (5-4)
Sovereign Immunity
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood (In re Hood) (7-2)
Tennessee v. Lane (5-4)
Frew ex rel. Frew v. Hawkins (9-0) (unanimous)
United States Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries (9-0) (unanimous)
Bankruptcy
Till v. SCS Credit Corp. (5-4)
Yates v. Hendon (9-0)
Lamie v. United States Trustee (9-0)
Kontrick v. Ryan (9-0) (unanimous)
ERISA
Central Laborers' Pension Fund v. Heinz (9-0)
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila (9-0)
Tax
United States v. Galletti (9-0) (unanimous)
Antitrust/Telecom
Nixon v. Missouri Municipal League (8-1)
Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis (9-0)
Social Security
Barnhart v. Thomas (9-0) (unanimous)
Labor/Employment
Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez (7-0)9
General Dynamics Land System, Inc. v. Cline (6-3)
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders (8-1)
Securities
SEC v. Edwards (9-0) (unanimous)
Native Americans
United States v. Lara (7-2)
908. Justices Souter and Breyer did not participate in this case.
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Privacy
Doe v. Chao (6-3)
National Archives & Records Administration v. Favish (9-0)
(unanimous)
Separation of Powers
Cheney v. United States District Court (7-2)
Banking
Household Credit Services, Inc. v. Pfennig (9-0) (unanimous)
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Virginia v. Maryland (7-2)
APPENDIX: 5
General Voting Alliances for this Term
Voting Alliances: Percentage Each Justice Voted with Another for the Same Disposition"
Rehn Stev OC Seal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn 62.5 88.6 87.3 90.3 64.8 87.5 69.4 72.9
Stev 62.5 70 57.7 69.4 88.7 61.1 88.9 84.3
OC 88.6 70 --- 81.2 84.3 72.5 75.7 75.7 82.4
Seal 87.3 57.7 81.2 80.3 60 91.5 60.6 62.3
Ken 90.3 69-4 84.3 80.3 69 83.3 69.4 70
Sout 64.8 88.7 72.5 60 69 60.6 91.5 84.3
Thom 87.5 61.1 75.7 91.5 83.3 60.6 63.9 61.4
Gins 69.4 88.9 75.7 60.6 69.4 91.5 63.9 93
Brev 72.9 84.3 82.4 62.3 70 84.3 61.4 93 --------
909. These percentages were calculated by dividing the number of times two justices
agreed in the disposition of a case by the number of cases in which they both voted, then
multiplied by 100.
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APPENDIX: 6
Voting Alliances by Category90
Voting Alliances: Fourth Amendment
Rehn Ste OC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehl 417 617 7/7 7/7 4/7 7/7 5/7 5/7
(57%) (86%) (100%) (100%) (57%) (100%) (710%) (71%)
Stcv 4/7 5/7 4/7 4/7 7/7 4/7 6/7 67
(57%) (71%) (57%) (57%) (130%) (57%) (86%) (86%)
OC 6/7 5J7 6/7 6/7 5/7 6/7 67 6/7
(86%) (71%) (86%) (86%) (71%) (86%) (86%) (86%)
Seal 7/7 4/7 6/7 7/7 4/7 7/7 5/7 5/7
1(100%) (57%) (86%) (100%) (57%) (100%) (71%) (71%)
Ken 7/7 4/7 6/7 7/7 -- 4/7 7/7 5/7 5/7
1 (100%) (57%) (86%) (100%) (57%) (100%) (71%) (71%)
Soul 4/7 7/7 5/7 4/7 4/7 4/7 6J7 6/7
(57%) (10C°/O) (71%) (57%) (57%) (57%) (86%) (86%)
Thorn 7/7 4/7 6/7 7/7 7/7 4/7 5/7 5/7
(100%) (57%) (86%) (100%) (100n) (57%) (71%) (71%)
Gins 5/7 6/7 6/7 5/7 5/7 6/7 5/7 -- 7/7
(71%) (86%) (86%) (71%) (71%) _8%) _ 71%) (100%)
Brey 5/7 6/7 6/7 5/7 5/7 6/7 5/7 7/7
(71%) (86%) (86%) (71%) (71%) (86%) (71%) (100%)
Voting Alliances: Fifth Amendment
Rehn Ste OC Scal Ken Sout Thom Gins Brey
Rehn 0/3 3/3 3/3 2/3 0/3 3/3 0/3 0/3
(0%) (100%) (100%) (67%) (0%) (100%), (0%) (0%)
Stev 0/3 0/3 0/3 1/3 3/3 0/3 3/3 3/3
(0%) (0%) (0%) (33%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%)
OC 3/3 0/3 -- 3/3 2/3 0/3 3/3 0/3 0/3
(100%) (0%) (100%) (67%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (0%)
Seal 3/3 0/3 3/3 2/3 0/3 3/3 0/3 0/3
_ (100%) (0%) (100%) (67%) (0/) (100%) (0%) (0%)
Ken 2/3 1/3 2/3 2/3 -- 1/3 2/3 1/3 1/3
(67%) (33%) (67%) (67%) (33%) (67%) (33%) (33%)
Sout 0/3 3/3 0/3 0/3 1/3 0/3 3/3 3/3
(0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (33%) (0%) (100%) (100%)
Thorn 3/3 0/3 3/3 3/3 2/3 0/3 0/3 0/3
(100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (67%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
910 See supra app. 4, for list of cases in each category and disposition.
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Gins 013 313 0/3 0/3 1/3 3/3 0/3 3/3
(0%) (100%) (0%0) (0%) (33%) (100%) (0%) (100%)
Brey 0.3 313 0/3 0/3 1/3 3/3 0/3 3/3
(0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (33%) (100%) (0%) (10(%)
Voting Alliances: Sixth Amendment
Rehn Stev OC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn - - 3/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 4/4
(75%) (100%) (75%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (100%)
Stev 314 3/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 414 4/4 3/4
(75%) (75%) (100%) (75%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (75%)
OC 4/4 34 3/4 4/4 3/4 3,14 3/4 4/4
(100%) (75%) (75%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (100%)
Scal 3/4 414 3/4 3/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 3/4
_ _ (75%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (100%) (100%) (100/) (75%)
Ken 414 34 4/4 3/4 3/4 314 3/4 4/4
(100%) (75%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (100%)
Sout 34 414 3/4 4/4 3/4 414 4/4 3/4
(75%) (100%) (75%) (100%) (75%) (100%o) (100%) (75%)
Thom 3,4 4/4 3/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 - 4/4 3/4
_ (75%) (100%) (75%) (100%) (75%) (100%) (100%) (75%)
Gins 3,14 4/4 3/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 4/4 3/4
(75%) (100%) (75%) (100%) (75%) (100%) (100%) (75%)
Brey 4/4 34 4/4 3/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4
(100%) (75%) (100%) (75%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%)
Voting Alliances: Death Penalty
Rehn Stev OC Seal Kcn Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn 215 4/5 5/5 4/5 2/5 5/5 2/5 215
(40%) (80%) (100%) (80%) (40%) (10(0%) (40%) (40%)
Stev 2/5 3/5 2/5 3/5 5/5 2/5 5/5 5/5
(40%) (60%) (40%) (60%) (100%) (40%) (100%) (100%)
OC 4/5 315 - - 4/5 5/5 3/5 4/5 3/5 3/5
(80%) (60%) (80%) (100%) (60%) (80%) (60%) (60%)
Scal 5,15 215 4/5 4/5 2/5 5/5 2/5 2/5
_ (100%) (40%) (80%) (80%) (40%) (100%) (40%) (40%)
Ken 4!5 315 5/5 4/5 3/5 4/5 3/5 3/5
(80%) (60%) (100%) (80%) (60%) (80%) (60%) (60%)
Sout 25 5/5 3/5 2/5 3/5 2/5 5/5 5/5
(40%) (100%) (60%) (40%) 60% (40%) (100%) (100%)
Thom 5!'5 215 4/5 515 4/5 2/5 -- 2/5 2/5
(100%) (40%) (80%) (100%) (80%) (40% _40%) (40%)
Gins 2!5 515 3/5 2/5 3/5 5/5 2/5 5/5
- (40%) (100%) (60%) (40%) (60%) (too%) (40%) (100%)
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Brey 2/5 5/5 3/5 2/5 3/5 515 2/5 5i5 -
(40%) 1(100%) 1(60%) 1 40%) l(60% (00% (40%) (100%)
Voting Alliances: Habeas
Rehn Stcv OC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn -- 1/3 3/3 3/3 2/3 213 3/3 33 3/3(33%) (100%) (100%) (66%) (66%) (100%) ('00%) (100%)
Stev 1/3 -- 1/3 1/3 2/3 213 1/3 03 0/3
(33%'1 (33%) (33%) (66%) (66%) (33%) (0%) 0%
CC 3/3 1/3 -- 3/3 2/3 2/3 3/3 23 2/3
(100/o) (33%) (100%) (66%) (66%) (100%) (66%) (66%)
Scal 3/3 1/3 3/3 2/3 2[3 3/3 23 2/3
(100%) (33%) (100%) (66%) _(66%) (100%) (66%) (66%)
Ken 2/3 2/3 213 2/3 -- 33 2/3 1.3 1/3
(66%) (66%) 66%) (66%) (100%) (66%) (33%) (33%)
Sout 2/3 2/3 213 2/3 3/3 - 2/3 13 1/3
(66%) (66%) (66) 66%) (100%) (66%) (33%) (33%)
Thorn 3/3 1/3 3/3 3/3 2/3 2/3 - 2'3 23
(100%) (33%) (100%) (100%) (66%) (66%) (66%) (66%)
Gins 3/3 0/3 2/3 2/3 1/3 V3 2/3 3/3
(1000/) (0%) (66%) (66%) (33%) (33%) (66%) (100%)
Brey 3/3 0/3 213 2/3 1/3 1; 2/3 33 -
(100%) (0%) (66%) (66%) (33%) (33%) (66%) (100%)
Voting Alliances: Nonconstitutional Criminal Law and Procedure
Rehn Stev OC Scat Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn - 3/3 313 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 33 3/3
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (10/O5
Stev 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 33 3/3
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
OC 3/3 3/3 - 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100o%) (100m)
Scal 3/3 3/3 3/3 -- 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 313
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Ken 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 31t 3/3
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Sout 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 -- 3/3 33 3/3
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Thorn 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 -- 3 3/3
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100'%o) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Gins 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100% 100/%o) 100% (100%) (100%)
Brey 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3 3/3
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100% 5 (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
Voting Alliances: First Amendment
Rehn Stev OC Seal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brcy
Rehn - 3/4 4/4 2/3 3/4 3/4 2/4 3/4 4/4
(7S%) (1(10%) (66%) (75%) (75%) (50%) (75%) (100%)
Stev 3/4 - 3/4 1/3 4/4 4/4 3/4 4/4 3/4
(75%) (75%) (33%) (100%) (100%) (75%) (100%) (75%)
OC 4/4 3/4 2/3 3/4 3/4 2/4 3/4 4/4
(100%) (75%) (66%) (75%) (75%) (0o%) (75%) (100%)
Scat 2/3 1/3 2/3 - 1/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 2/3
(66%) (33%) (66%) (33%) (33%) (66%) (33%) (66%)
Ken 3/4 4/4 3/4 1/3 -- 4/4 3/4 4/4 3/4
(75%) (100%) (75%) (33%) (100%) (75%) (100%) (75%)
Sout 3/4 4/4 3/4 1/3 4/4 3/4 4/4 3/4
(75%) (100%) (75%) (33%) (100%) (75%) (100%) (75%)
Thorn 2/4 3/4 2/4 2/3 3/4 3/4 -- 3/4 2/4
(50%) (75%) (50%) (66%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (50%)
Gins 3/4 4/4 3/4 1/3 4/4 4/4 3/4 -- 3/4
75% (100%) (75%) (33%) (100%) (100%) (75%) (75%)
Brey 44 3/4 4/4 2/3 3/4 3/4 2/4 3/4
(100%) (75%) (100%) (66%) (75%) (75%) (50%) (75%)
Voting Alliances: Civil Rights Act
Rehn Stev OC Seal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
r R ehn -- 
-- 
1/1 1/1 
1/1 (/1 
1/1 1/1 
1/1 1/1
_(to%)-- (100%0) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
(tev til /  1/1 1/1 00% 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
OC 111 1/1 -- 1/1 1/1 i10% 1/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) 1 (100%) (100%) (100%)
Seal 1 (1 1/1 11 1100% 1 00 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Ken 11 11 11 11- / / / /
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Sout M1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 -- -- 1/1 1/1 1/1
(I00%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Thom 111 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 -- 1/1 1/1
- (10)0%) (100% (100%) (10) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Gins 131 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 lit- - 1/1
(10D%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%/)
Brey 111 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 ill lit 1/1 --
i(1()0%) (100%) (100%)1 (100%) 1 (00%) (100%)1 (100%) (100%)
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Voting Alliances: Voting Rights
Rchn Stev OC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn -- 0/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/1
(0%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (0%)
Stev 0/1 -- 011 0/1 0/1 [/1 Ol 1/1 1/1
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%)
OC 1/1 0/1 - - 1/l 1/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/1
(100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (1o%) (0%) (0%)
Scal 11 0/1 1/1 1/1 0/1 11 0/1 0/1
(100%) (0% (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (0%)
Ken 1/1 0/1 1/1 1/1 -- l -- 0/1 Oil10/
(100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (0%)
Sout 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 1/1 1/1
(0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (100%)
Thorn 1/1 0/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1
(100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Gins 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 - 1/1
(0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (0°) (100%) (0%) (100%)
Brey 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 0/1 1/1 0)1 1/1-
(0%) (00%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (0%0) (100%)
Voting Alliances: International
Rehn Stev OC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn 4/8 3/6 5/8 7/8 5/8 7/8 5/8 3/7
(50%) (50%) (63%) (88% (63%) (88'%) (63%) (43%)
Stev 4/8 3/6 5/8 5/8 7/8 5/8 7/8 5/7
(50%) (50%) (63%) (63%) (88%) (63%) (88%) (71%)
OC 3/6 3/6 4/6 4/6 4/6 2/6 4)6 4/5
(50%) (50%) (7%) 67%) (67%) (33%) (67%) (80%)
Scal 5/8 5/8 4/6 4/8 4/8 6/8 4/8 3/7
(63%) (63%) (67%) (50%) (50%) (75%) (50%) (43%)
Ken 7/8 5/8 4/6 4/8 6/8 6/8 6i8 4/7
(88%) (63%) (67%) (50%) (75%) (75%) 75% 57%)
Sout 5/8 7/8 4/6 4/8 6/8 -- 4/8 88 6/7
(63%) (88%) (67%) (50%) (75%) (50%) (100%) (86%)
Thom 7/8 5/8 2/6 6/8 6/8 4/8 418 2/7
(88%) (63%) (33%) (75%) (75%) (50%) (50%) (29%)
Gins 5/8 7/8 4/6 4/8 6/8 8/8 4/8 6/7
(63%) (88%) (67%) (50%) (75%) (100% (50%) (86%)
Brey 3/7 5/7 4/5 3/7 4/7 6/7 2/7 617
(43%) (71%) (80%) (43%) (57%) (86%) (29%) (86%)
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
Voting Alliances: Environment
Rehn Stev OC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn -- 4/6 516 6/6 6/6 3/6 6/6 4/6 5/6
(67%) (83%) (100%o) (100%) (50%) (100%) (67%) (83%)
Stev 4/6 5/6 4/6 4/6 5/6 4/6 6/6 5/6
(67%) (83%) (67%) (67%) (83%) (67%) (100%) (83%)
OC 5/6 5/6 5/6 5/6 4/6 5/6 5/6 6/6
(83%) (83%) (83%) (83%) (67%) (83%) (83%) (100%)
Seal 6/6 416 516 -- 6/6 3/6 6/6 4/6 5/6
(100%) (67%) (83%) (100%) (50%) (100%) (67%) (83%)
Ken 6/6 4/6 516 6/6 -- 3/6 6/6 4/6 5/6
(100%) (67%) (83%) (100%) (50%) (100%) (67%) (83%)
Sout 3/6 5/6 4/6 3/6 3/6 -- 3/6 5/6 4/6
(50%) (83%) (67%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (83%) (67%)
Thom 6/6 4/6 5/6 6/6 6/6 3/6 4/6 5/6
(100%) (67%) (83%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (67%) (83%)
Gins 4/6 6/6 516 4/6 4/6 5/6 4/6 5/6
(67%) (100%) (83%) (67%) (67%) (83%) (67%) {83%)
Brey 5/6 5/6 6/6 5/6 5/6 4/6 5/6 5/6 - -
(83%) (83%) (100%) (83%) (83%) (67%) (83%) (83%)
Voting Alliances: Civil Procedure
Rehn Stev OC Seal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn -- 1/3 213 213 313 1/3 2/3 13 1/3
(33%) (67%) (67%) (100%) (33%) (67%) (33%) (33%)
Stev 1/3 2/3 0/3 113 3/3 0/3 3/3 3/3
(33%) (67%) (0%) (33%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%)
OC 2/3 2/3 1/3 213 2/3 1/3 2/3 2/3
(67%) (67%) (33%) (67%) (67%) (33%) (67%) (67%)
Scal 2/3 0(3 13 - 213 0/3 3/3 0/3 0/3
(67%) (0%) (33%) (67%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (0%)
Ken 3/3 1/3 2/3 2/3 1/3 2/3 1/3 1/3
(100%) (33%) (67%) (67%) (33%) (67%) (33%) (33%)
Sout 1/3 3/3 2/3 0/3 1/3 013 3/3 3/3
(33%) (100%) (67%) (0%) (33%) (0%) (100%) (100%)
Thom 2/3 0/3 1/3 3/3 213 0/3 0/3 0/3
(67%) (0%) (33%) (100%) (67%) (0%) (0%) (0%0)
Gins 1/3 3/3 213 0/3 1/3 3/3 013 -- 3/3
(33%) (100%) (67%) (0%) (33%) (100%) (0%) (100%)
Brey 1/3 313 213 013 1/3 3/3 0/3 3/3 -
(33%) (100%) (67%) (0%) (33%) (100%) (0%) (100%)
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Voting Alliances: Sovereign Immunity
Rehn Stev OC Seal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn - - 3/4 3/4 3/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4
(75%) (75%) (75%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (75%)
Stev 3/4 4/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 2/4 4/4 4/4
(75%) (100%) (50%) (75%) (100%) (5D%) (100%) (100%)
OC 314 414 2/4 3/4 4/4 2/4 4/4 4/4
(75%) (100%) (50%) (75%) (100%) (51%) (100O) (100%)
Scal 314 2/4 2/4 3/4 2/4 4/4 2/4 2/4
(75%) (50%) (50%) (75%) (50%) (100%) (50%) (50%)
Ken 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4
(100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (75%)
Sout 3/4 4/4 4/4 2/4 3/4 - 2/4 4/4 4/4
(75%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (75%) (50%) (100%) (100%)
Thom 3/4 2/4 2/4 4/4 3/4 2/4 2/4 2/4
(75%) (50%) (50%) (1000%) (75%) (50%) (50%) (50%)
Gins 3/4 4/4 4/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 2/4 4/4
(75%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (75%) (100%) (50%) (100%)
Brey 3/4 4/4 4/4 2/4 3/4 4/4 2/4 4/4 --
(75%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (75%) (100%) (50%) (100%)
Voting Alliances. Bankruptcy
Rchn StCv OC Seal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn - - 3/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4
(75%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (75%)
Stev 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 4/4
(75%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (100%) (1)()%) (100%) (100%)
OC 4/4 3/4 -- 4/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4
(100%) (75%) (100%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (75%)
Seal 4/4 3/4 4/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4
(100%/) (75%) (100%) _ (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (75%)
Ken 4/4 314 4/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 3/4
(100%) (75%) (100%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (750) (75%)
Sout 3/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 - 4/4 4/4 4/4
(75%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Thorn 3/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 4/4 4/4 4/4
(75%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Gins 3/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 4/4 4/4 414
(75%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Brey 3/4 4/4 3/4 3/4 3/4 4/4 4/4 4/4 -
(75%) (100%) (75%) (75%) (75%) (100%) (100%) (00%)
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
Voting Alliances: ERISA
Rehn Stev OC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Stev 212 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
OC 212 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Sea] 212 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Ken 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
So it 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 -- 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Thom 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 22 -- 2/2 2/2
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Gins 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Brey 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 --
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Voting Alliances: Tax
Rehn Stev OC Scal Ken Sout Thom Gins Brey
Rehn 1/1ill 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Stev 1/1 1/1 10/0% 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) 0 00%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
OC ill ill 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) 100%) ( 100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (1000/)
Sel_ 100% 100% (/10% 100% 100%100% 100% 100%
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (10 0 %) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Ken l 1/1  1/1 1100%) 1/1 /1 1/1
(100%) (1.00%) (100%) (100%) ( (100%) (100%) (100%)
Sour ill ill 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%-/) (100%) (100%) (100%/) (100%/) (100%) (100%) (100°/)
Thom II l 1/1 1 1/1 1/1 I ll 11--- 1/1 1/1
Gins ill ill 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) (too%") (100%) (100%/) (too%) (100%) (100%) (100%")
Bre I1 li 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/---
(100%) (100%) (100%/) (100%/) (100%) (100%) (100%) -(100%)
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Voting Alliances: A ntitrust/Telecom
Rehn Stev OC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn 112 212 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(50%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Stev 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2 1/2
(50%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (50o) (50%) (50%) (50%)
OC 2/2 1/2 -- 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) 50% (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Sea] 2/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (50%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Ken 2/2 12 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (50%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Sout 2/2 1(2 2/2 2/2 2/2 -- 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (50%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Thorn 2/2 1!2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (50%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Gins 2/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2
(100%) (50%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Brey 2/2 1/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 2/2 --
(100%) (50%) (100%) ) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Voting Alliances: Social Security
Rehn StCv OC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/l 1/1 1/1 11
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Stev 110 --)-- 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/0 1/0 1/1 1l
(100%) % 100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
(C 1/1 1/1 -- 0 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1l
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
S (al 1/1 1/1 1/1 00 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 i1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Ken 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 0 1/1 1/1 1/1 10/
(100%) ( 0 ) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Sour 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%/) (100%) _(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Thorn 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%L) (100%) (100%) _(100%)
Gins 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 ill 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) 1(100%) (100%1__(100%) (100%) (100%)
Brey 1/1 1/1 1/1 1 /1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/
(100%) (100%o (100%/) 1(100%) 1(100%) 1(100%) (100%) (100%)V
2004]
Catholic University Law Review
Voting Alliances: Labor/Employment
Rehn Stev OC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn 3/3 33 2/3 213 2j2 1/3 3'3 212
(100%) (100%) (67%) (67%) (100%) (33%) (100%) (100%)
Stev 3/3 3;3 2/3 2,3 2;2 1,3 3'3 2/2
(100%) (100%) (67%) (67%) (100%) (33%) (100%) (100%)
OC 3/3 3/3 2/3 23 2;2 1/3 313 2!2
(100%) (100%) (67%) (67%) (100%) (33%) (100%'o) (100%)
Scal 2/3 2/3 2,3 -- 3,3 12 2/3 2/3 1/2
(67%) (67%) (67%) (100%) (50%) (67%) (67%) (50%)
Ken 2/3 2/3 2,3 3/3 1,2 2/3 2!3 1/2
(67%) (67%) (67%) (100%) (50%) (67%) (67%) (50%)
Sout 2/2 2/2 2i2 1/2 1/2 - - 012 2!2 212
(100%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (50%) (0%) (100%) (100%)
Thom 1/3 1/3 1,3 2/3 2/3 0/2 1/3 0/2
(33%) (33%) (33%) (67%) (67%) (0%) (33%) (0%)
Gins 3/3 3/3 3,3 23 26 2;2 13 2/2((100%) 00%) (100%) (67%) (67%) (100%) (33%) 100%
irey 2/2 2/2 2;2 112 12 2/2 0/2 2/2
(100%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (50%) (100%) (0%) (100%)
Voting Alliances: Securities
Rehn Stev CC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Ren100% 100/, 100% 100% 100% l10o (10% (100%
0 00%1 _(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Stev 1/1 l 11 ( % 1/1 100 (10 ll
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
OC 11 1/1 110 0%l lil 10 (10 I1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Scat 1/1 1/1 1;1 --00% 1/1 100 1/1 P10 1ll
_ 
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Ken 1/1 1/1 1id 11 1t lit ill 1010(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Sout 1/1 1/1 1)l lit 1i1 -- -- ill M/ 1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100% (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Thom 1/1 1/1 lil 1/1 1/1 1b1 1/1 1'11
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Gins 1/1 1/1 lD 1I1 I1 1i1 1A1 III
(100%) (100%) (]- 00°/0 100%) (100%) (100%/) (100%) (100%)
Brey 111 1/1 1/1 1t1 111 lDl 1/1 ill-
(10) L0% 100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
[Vol. 54:151
An End of Term Exam
Voting Alliances: Native Americans
Rehn Stev Cc Scal Ken Sout Thom Gins Brey
Rehn I1 1l Oil (10 0)l (10 (10 (10
(100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
-Stev 1/1 --- il 0/1 ldl Oil 111 UI lit
(100%) (00%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
SC 1/1 1il 0il - ll Oil 1/1 0(1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) 0%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Seal 0/1 0/1 0Oili -- 0l 11 0(1 0/1
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Ken 1/1 111 1A1 0/1 Oil 11/1 ill ill
(100%) (100%) (100%) - (00% (0%) % (100%) (100%)
Sout 0/1 Oil 071 171 Oil O-l -- /1 0 0/1
(0) (0%) (0) (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0)
Thon 1/1 1i1 171 Oi1 l1 Oil ill 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%)
Gins 1/1 l/l 171 Oil 1i1 Oil I flt
(100%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%)
Brey 1/1 1/1 11'1 Oil 171 0O/1 Ill 1/1
(100%) (100%) (Om%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%)
Voting Alliances: Privacy
Rehn Stev OC Seal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn - - 1/2 2.2 2/2 2;2 212 2/2 1/2 1/2
(50%) (-00%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (50%)
Stev 1/2 -- 1;2 112 1i2 112 12 2f2 2/2
(50%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (100%) (100%)
OC 2/2 1/2 212 2,12 2/2 212 1/2 1/2
(100%) (50%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (50%)
Seal 2/2 112 2!2 212 2/2 2!2 1/2 1/2
(100%) (50%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (50%)
Ken 2/2 1/2 2/2 212 2!2 2f2 1/2 1/2
(100%) (50%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (50%)
Sour 2/2 112 2!2 212 212 2/2 1/2 1/2
(100%) (50%) (100%) 1(100%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (50%)
Thom 2/2 1/2 2!2 212 212 2,/2 1/2 1/2
(100%) (50%) (00%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (50%) (50%)
Gins 1/2 212 1!2 112 112 1,12 1f2 2/2
(50%) (100%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (100%)
Brey 1/2 2/2 1!2 1/2 1/2 12 112 2/2 --
(50%) (100%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (50%) (50%)
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Voting Alliances: Separation of Powers
Rehn Stev OC Seal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Rehn 1/1 I' 1/1 1/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%)
Stev 1/1 (11 1/1 1/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%O) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%)
(C 1/1 (100% (10 1/1 1/0 0/1 1/1 0/1 1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%)
Soat 1/1 1/1 ill 1/1 0/1 1/1 0/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%)
Ken 1/1 Ill 1!1 1/1 0/1 1/1 oil 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%)
Sout 0/1 Oil 01 0/1 0/1 0/1 ill 0/1
(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (0%)
Thom 1/1 Ill ill 1/1 1/1 0/1 0/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (100%)
Gins 01I 1 Of I 0/1Oi 0/1 1/1 0/1 0/1(0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (0%)
Brey 1/1 1/1 ill 1/1 1/1 0/1 1/1 ()/1
(100%) (100%) (too%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (0%)
Voting Alliances: Banking
_ Rehn Stev OC Scal Ken Sout Thom Gins Brey
R r hn 1l ll 1l 1/1 1/1 1/1 1l 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Stev Ill ill 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) ((%0) . (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
OC ill 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
- (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Scal l 10% (10% 1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Ken 10 i10 10 1/1 (10% 10 1/0 1/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) 100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Sour ill Ill ill 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) (100%)-_ (too-/)_ (100%) (100%) - (100%) (100%) (100%)
Thom ll ill 1!1 1/1 1/1 1/1 ill 1/1
(100%) (100%) %) (100%) (100%) (1 00%) (100Io%) (100%lo)
Gins ill ill 1/1 1/1 1/1 ill 1/1 1/1
(100%) (100%) (too%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100o%) (100%)
Brey ill 1/1 ill 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1(10o 0%) (100%) (100%) (00%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
[Vol. 54:151
An End of Term Exam
Voting Alliances: Original Jurisdiction
Rehn Stev OC Scal Ken Sout Thorn Gins Brey
Reim 0/1 ill ill Oil 1ll, 1/1 L/1 1/1
(0%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Stev 0/1 0/1 0/1 1/1 /1 0/1 0/1 0/1
(0%) (0%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (0/0) (0%) (0%0
OC 1/1 0/1 10% 0/1 1/1 1/0 1/1 1/1
(100%) (0%) (100) (0%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Seal 1/1 1/1 0/1 1 1/1 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) (0%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Ken 0/1 1/1 0/1 Ol / 0/1 0/1 0/1[/ 11
(0%) (100%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%) (10%) (0%)
Sout 1/1 0/1 10 10 0) 1/1 1/1 1/1
(100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Thom 1/1 0/1 1/1 ill 0/1 ill 1/1 1/1
(1030%) (0%) (too%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Gins 1/1 0/1 1/1 ill Oil ill 1/1 1/1
(100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (0%) (100%) (100%) (100%)
Brey i/1 Oil 1/1 1/1 0/1 1/1 1/1 1/1---
(100%) (0%) (too%) (100%) (0o/) (100%) (100%) (100%)
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